

Study	Context	Framing	Policy domain	Outcome variable	Exp. stimuli	Findings
Aaroe & Petersen (2014) Crowding Out Culture: Scandinavians and Americans Agree on Social Welfare in the Face of Deservingness Cues Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=1006) and U.S. (N=1009) <u>Time:</u> unknown	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients	“Social welfare”	Opposition to social welfare: <i>“To what extent do you disagree or agree that the eligibility requirements for social welfare should be tightened for persons like him?”</i>	Split-sample experiment: 1. <i>“Imagine a man who is currently on social welfare”</i> (Recipient with No Cues condition) 2. <i>“Imagine a man who is currently on social welfare. He has always had a regular job, but has now been the victim of a work-related injury. He is very motivated to get back to work again”</i> (Unlucky Recipient condition) 3. <i>“Imagine a man who is currently on social welfare. He has never had a regular job, but he is fit and healthy. He is not motivated to get a job”</i> (Lazy Recipient condition)	<u>Main effects:</u> * Without recipient cues, there are clear cross-national differences, with Danes being less opposed to social welfare than Americans. * When the recipient is described as lazy, both Americans and Danes are predominantly opposed to social welfare. When he is described as unlucky, they are largely in favour. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /

Ashok & Huber (2020) Do Means of Program Delivery and Distributional Consequences Affect Policy Support? Experimental Evidence About the Sources of Citizens' Policy Opinions Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=3347) <u>Time:</u> unknown	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> design and outcomes of welfare policies	Exp. 1: nutritional assistance & job training Exp. 2: home mortgage interest deduction & unemployment insurance	Exp. 1: level of support for the program, costs associated with the program, and perceptions of prospective beneficiaries Exp. 2: (1) Should benefits provided under the program be increased, decreased, or kept the same? (2) Do you want to change, abolish, or keep the program about the same? (3) Preferred benefit amounts for low- and high-income recipients	Exp. 1: mode of delivery (split-sample: direct vs indirect; p. 1105) Exp. 2: distributional consequences (split-sample: progressive vs regressive; 1100)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: respondents are substantially more supportive of indirect over direct spending for both programs. *Exp. 2: regressive framings of the policies do not cause respondents to support decreasing government spending on these programs. In the case of UI, respondents are substantially more supportive of the policy when it is framed progressively. There was only a modest and insignificant increase in respondents' willingness to change the distribution of benefits. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Asticher & Sager (2024) Gender equality frames do not impact public support for economic relief policy in times of crisis: A survey experiment Review of Policy Research	<u>Place:</u> Switzerland (N=1001) <u>Time:</u> 2021 (during the Covid-19 pandemic!)	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy design, policy outcomes	Economic relief during the Covid-19 pandemic: short-term work compensation for low-income workers and allowance for parents suffering income losses *Note: can we categorize this more generally as unemployment compensation?	(1) Support for the two policies within the context of the crisis, (2) support after the pandemic *Note: both were measured at the same time though	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: receives no gender frame 2. Treatment group: receives information that the policy would have a positive effect on gender equality	<u>Main effects:</u> *The gender equality treatment has no significant effect on policy support. There is also no interaction between the crisis setting and the treatment, which suggests that the frames did not have different effects across time (but: the data are cross-sectional!). *Overall, and especially when respondents are instructed to think about the pandemic, support for the two policies is relatively high, possibly indicating that there are general ceiling effects at play. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is no significant interaction between the treatment and respondents' self-identification as a feminist, nor with gender and household composition/employment status (i.e. being a working parent or not).
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Avdagic & Savage (2021) Negativity Bias: The Impact of Framing of Immigration on Welfare State Support in Germany, Sweden and the UK British Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=4158), Sweden (N=2001), UK (N=3269) <u>Time:</u> 2017	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy context	Welfare state in general	Support for social spending: <i>"Do you support an increase in government spending on social benefits and services even if this may lead to higher taxes?"</i>	Split-sample experiment: Baseline information: explanation welfare state + primer that increased spending requires increased taxes. 1. Negative economic impact of immigration on the welfare state. 2. Positive economic impact of immigration on the welfare state. 3. Only baseline information (control group). *Critical note: the positive frame also mentions that there are concerns over the economic impact of immigration! See Avdagic & Savage (2024) for a critical discussion of the authors)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Negative framing of immigration is associated with reduced support for greater welfare spending in all countries. *Individuals in the positive treatment group are less likely to support increased welfare spending and more likely to oppose it than respondents in the control group (but only significantly so in Sweden). *The positive frame is weaker than the negative frame in all countries (negativity bias). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The effect of negative framing can be exacerbated by other attitudes. Individuals who believe welfare claimants are likely to be undeserving, and those who hold negative predispositions towards immigrants, are more likely to oppose increased welfare spending if they received the negative frame in our experiment. However, in most instances, negative framing increases opposition to welfare spending irrespective of an individual's preexisting attitudes and perceptions of economic insecurity.
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Avdagic & Savage (2024) Does the Framing of Immigration Induce Welfare Chauvinism? The Effects of Negativity Bias and Motivated Reasoning Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=4158) <u>Time:</u> 2017	<u>Framing concept:</u> information + (valence) framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy context	Welfare state in general	Welfare chauvinism: “The government should guarantee that immigrants have the same rights to social benefits as German citizens”.	See Avdagic & Savage (2021)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Both the negative and positive frame have no statistically significant effect. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The negative framing is most potent among supporters of the centre-right parties CDU/CSU, reducing support for greater welfare access for immigrants by around a fifth of a point. *The negative framing shifts support for a <i>less</i> restrictive policy by almost half a point among Die Linke supporters, while the positive framing shifts support almost half a point for a <i>more</i> restrictive policy among AfD supporters (=boomerang effect?) *Using a left-right scale, we see that the negative framing has a stronger (negative) effect on right-wing voters than it has on centre- and left-wing voters (which increases the further to the right). *The negative treatment also has a stronger (negative) effect among those facing worse job prospects or presently not having a job. *Household income and “social grade” do not have significant moderating effects.
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Barabas et al. (2020) Analogical Framing: How Policy Comparisons Alter Political Support for Health Care Reform American Politics Research	<u>Place:</u> US (N=4008 for the first two experiments, and 1020 for the third experiment) <u>Time:</u> 2017 and 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> (analogical) framing <u>Framing content:</u> other; difficult to classify	Healthcare	Support for individual health coverage mandates, the Affordable Care Act, and a national healthcare proposal	The three experiments are far too complex to describe here. See Fig. 1 (p. 600) and Fig. 4 (p. 604) for the experimental designs.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Analogies, especially those that also provided the underlying policy logic increased support for healthcare reform. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Partisanship seemed to significantly moderate the impact of the analogical framing. <i>*For more detailed results, consult the relevant article.</i>
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Barnes et al. (2018) Information, Knowledge, and Attitudes: An Evaluation of the Taxpayer Receipt The Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=2529 in wave 1 and 2072 in wave 2) <u>Time:</u> 2014 (wave 1: before the distribution of the taxpayer receipt; wave 2: after the receipt)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> taxes & spending	Healthcare; income taxes	(1) Knowledge about percentage of tax money spent on overseas aid, national defense or health, (2) Policy preferences regarding respondents' own tax burden and tax progressivity	Split-sample experiment: 1. Treatment group, before tax receipt 2. Treatment group, after receipt: reminded respondents that they were part of a study concerning the tax receipts 3. Control group, before tax receipt 4. Control group, after tax receipt: no specific reminder related to the tax receipt *Note: the experiment is also sort of a natural experiment, because the tax receipts were actually received by all respondents in real life (although not all remembered actually receiving and reading it).	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents were slightly more knowledgeable about spending after receiving the tax receipts. *The tax receipt information had no significant impact on respondents' policy preferences. *This is probably due to the fact that only about 25% recalled receiving the taxpayer receipt. Note: these findings suggest that traditional survey experiments might over-estimate information/framing effects compared to real-life situations. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Barnes et al. (2022) Measuring Attitudes toward Public Spending Using a Multivariate Tax Summary Experiment American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=3533) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> levels of spending and taxation	Health, pensions, housing, education and “welfare”	Choice between policy status quo (=current levels of spending and taxes), a reform proposal, or remain undecided	Choice experiment providing information about the total tax level and spending levels in different policy domains (increase, decrease, stay the same; in monetary terms as well as %). *Note: I’m only interested in the domains of health, pensions, housing, education and welfare.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents endorse spending increases in welfare (7%), education (11%), pensions (13%), health (15%) and housing (19%). *Respondents are less likely to favour spending increases in other areas (like “transport”; 5%) and even demand budget cuts for some areas (like “culture”). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Labour voters want more spending than Conservative voters on most categories of spending, especially welfare, education, health and housing. Remain voters want more spending on welfare and housing than Leave voters. *Younger respondents prefer substantially lower levels of taxation and spending in all social spending categories.
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Baumberg Geiger (2021) Disabled but not deserving? The perceived deservingness of disability welfare benefit claimants. Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Iceland, New Zealand, Spain, South Korea, UK, US (N~1000 in each country) for study 1; Norway (N=1998) and UK (N=1973) for study 2. <u>Time:</u> 2004-2007 for study 1; 2017 for study 2	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of (individual) welfare recipients	Disability benefits	Study 1: should the government be responsible for helping people like this in particular ways, including 'to provide disability benefits'? Study 2: to what extent does the person depicted in the vignette deserves to receive support from the government while being out of work? 0 = definitely not deserving; 10 = definitely deserving	Study 1: the following characteristics were randomly varied: 1. Illness: schizophrenia, depression, asthma 2. Gender 3. Race/ethnicity Study 2: the following characteristics were randomly varied: 1. Illness: back/leg pain ('wheelchair use'), depression, schizophrenia, etc. 2. Medicalization: no sick note, sick note but no diagnosis, diagnosis + sick note 3. Blameworthiness of back pain/schizophrenia: weight vs accident and drugs vs trauma 4. Duration: 12 months ago vs 5 years 5. Work ability 6. Work history 7. Age	<u>Main effects:</u> *Study 1: People with depression and particularly schizophrenia were seen as more deserving of disability benefits than people with asthma (+3.2% and +10.2%). *Study 1: ethnic majorities are 3.6% more likely to be seen as deserving; no effect of gender. *Study 2: a clear hierarchy of deservingness is found, with wheelchair use at the top, followed by schizophrenia (-0.9 points), back pain (-1.1), chronic widespread pain (-1.7) and depression (-2.5). *Study 2: medical legitimization increases perceived deservingness (by 1.3 for a sick note + diagnosis), while blameworthiness strongly reduces it (e.g. -1.8 if back pain is described as caused by overweight rather than a car accident). *Study 2: work history, age and work ability all have relatively small effects. Gender and duration of symptoms had no effect. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Study 1: countries do not systematically differ in slightly prioritizing ingroups, but do systematically differ in their
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					8. Gender *Note: to be honest, I have my doubts about the survey experiments; they seem rather messy.	responses to symptoms. Specifically, only the size of the differences varies (schizophrenia +21% in Spain & 2.2% in Korea); not the ranking as such. *Study 1: right-wing voters differentiated slightly more between ingroups vs outgroups, but were less responsive to cues about symptoms. *Study 2: Norwegians and Britons respond near-identically to deservingness-related characteristics in case of unemployment benefit recipients. In case of disability benefit recipients, by contrast, Britons reacted slightly more strongly. *Study 2: right-wing voters reacted more strongly to deservingness-related characteristics than left-wing voters, but this gap was larger for disability benefits than for unemployment benefits.
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Baumberg Geiger (2023) Suspicious Minds? Media effects on the perception of disability benefit claimants Journal of Social Policy	Place: Norway and UK (N=3836) Time: 2017	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipient characteristics	Disability benefits	Perceived deservingness of hypothetical disability benefit claimant depicted in vignette: “does this person deserve to receive support from the government while out of work”?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Benefit fraud condition: a newspaper story describing someone on disability benefits who is clearly cheating the system (see also Kootstra & Roosma, 2018 for the same experimental treatment) 2. Control group Followed by a factorial vignette experiment randomly varying a number of claimant characteristics (see Baumberg, 2021)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Reading the ‘benefits cheat’ story makes respondents judge disability claimants more harshly in both Norway and the UK. According to the authors, the effect is relatively small though (0.3 on a 0-10 scale). *There is no effect of the benefits cheat story on judgements of non-disabled unemployed claimants. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Baute et al. (2022) Conditional Generosity and Deservingness in Public Support for European Unemployment Risk Sharing Journal of Common Market Studies	Place: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain (N=about 1500 in each country) Time: 2018 Note: the final sample size is reduced to 15.602 respondents because those who failed an attention check or had more than one set of “inconsistent answer patterns” were excluded. According to my estimates, the led to a loss of about 3400 respondents.	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics of welfare schemes	European unemployment insurance/risk sharing (EURS)	Forced choice between two EURS policy packages	Conjoint experiment (same as Burgoon et al., 2022). Only difference is that the focus here is on the policy dimensions of generosity and conditionality, and deservingness perceptions are seen as moderators.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Policy packages with the highest replacement rate (70%) are 15.3% more likely to be chosen compared to the lowest rate (40%). A 60% replacement rate is 11.8% more likely to be chosen. *Packages where the unemployed must accept any suitable job offer will lose their benefit are 10.2% more likely to be chosen. This is 9.6% for policy packages with the strictest conditionality. *There is a significant but small interaction effect between generosity and conditionality, indicating that citizens are more likely to support EURS when strict conditions are attached to it. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Both perceptions of the need and the control of the unemployed moderate the impact of both generosity and conditionality. *Obligations imposed on the unemployed increase the likelihood that a package is chosen more strongly among high-income groups and the higher educated. *Generosity is more decisive for left-wing voters; conditionality for right-wing voters.
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Bay & Pedersen (2006) The Limits of Social Solidarity: Basic Income, Immigration and the Legitimacy of the Universal Welfare State Acta Sociologica	<u>Place:</u> Norway (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2003	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion, framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy design	Universal basic income	Change between initial support for or opposition to basic income and support/opposition after being asked about immigrants' access to the policy. *Initial supporters: would you also approve of this arrangement if it is applied also to residents who are not Norwegian citizens? *Initial opponents: would you still be opposed to this arrangement if it could be applied to Norwegian citizens only?	Within-subject design, with initial support asked at T1 and reconsideration question asked at T2 ("persuasion experiment")	<u>Main effects:</u> *Initially, 66% thought that introducing a basic income would be a very good or fairly good idea, while 30% thought the opposite. 3% indicated don't know. *In total, 32% of the respondents were persuaded to leave their original position; 34% of the initial supporters and 26% of the initial opponents (but: asymmetry between the treatments, as the original question already specified that the proposed scheme would apply to all residents in Norway). *Only 45% are willing to support a basic income scheme that they have been reminded will also include non-citizens. By contrast, only 23% remain firm in their rejection of basic income even in non-citizens could be excluded. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Individuals with a liberal attitude to immigration tend to be resistant to persuasion, while those with restrictive attitudes are more prone to change position. Contrary to expectations, it proved easier to persuade those who report being highly politically interested. It also proved harder to persuade opponents than supporters.
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Bay et al. (2016) Welfare Nationalism and Popular Support for Raising the Child Allowance: Evidence from a Norwegian Survey Experiment Scandinavian Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> Norway (N=1558) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Child benefits	Support for a policy proposal to increase the child benefit.	Persuasion experiment: 1. Initial supporters receive counter-argument reminding them about newly arrived immigrants' access to child benefits. 2. Initial supporters receive counter-argument reminding them that labour immigrants from a EEA country will have access, even for children living in the country of origin. 3. Initial opponents receive counter-argument stating that newly arrived immigrants would not have access because eligibility would be limited to Norwegian citizens. 4. Initial opponents receive counter-argument stating that labour immigrants will not be able to export child benefits because access is limited to children living in Norway.	<u>Main effects:</u> *85% upholds their support when reminded of newly arrived immigrants' access to child benefits. 83% of the opponents remain fixed in their opinion. *56% continues to express support after being exposed to the labour immigration treatment. 27% switch to opposition and 17% is now undecided. Among the initial opponents, 63% sticks to their position, 19% now supports the proposal, and 18% is undecided. *The labour immigrant treatment thus has a larger effect than the newly arrived immigrant treatment, presumably because the former states that child benefits can be exported to another country. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The response to the labour migrant treatment is less ideologically driven than the response to the other treatment. Those with a restrictive view on immigration are significantly more likely to change view than those with liberal views as a result of the newly arrived immigrants treatment. This effect is much smaller for the other treatment.
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Bendz & Oskarson (2022) The welfare reality check: how policy-specific information influences public responsiveness Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties	<u>Place:</u> Sweden (N=2074) <u>Time:</u> 2017	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> unclear	Education (“schools”), healthcare (“hospitals”), elderly care (“retirement homes”) and disabled care (“homes for the disabled”)	Preferences for a further increase or decrease of the possibility to choose private service providers (=support for privatization)	Split sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. Experimental group: information about the share of users in privately provided services for each policy domain (displayed in random order)	<u>Main effects:</u> *When exposed to the policy-specific information, respondents adjust their attitudes in a negative direction, i.e. wanting to decrease the possibilities to choose private service providers. The effects are quite small though. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The general effect of information disappears when interactions terms with political ideology are added. *Information effects are found mainly among the moderately left-oriented. Respondents leaning to the right do not respond to the information. Neither do more extreme left-wing voters, for whom there is probably a floor effect (because they were already very much in favour of decreasing the possibilities to choose private alternatives even before they received any information). *Accordingly, the authors conclude that the information seems to polarize public opinion. Note: the authors did not measure the pre-existing knowledge of respondents, so they cannot test any pretreatment effects.
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Bendz & Oskarson (2023) Convince with facts: Information effects on attitudes to the sickness insurance in Sweden Scandinavian Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> Sweden (N=3467) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design/outcomes	Sickness insurance	(1) Satisfaction with sickness insurance, (2) trust in government agency, (3) attitudes on financing, precision and capacity of sickness insurance	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. Compensation level treatment: information about the capacity of the sickness insurance to adequately provide income compensation 3. Approval rates treatment: info about likelihood that applications for sick leave compensation are approved 4. Abuse control treatment: info about the fact that misuse and fraud is being checked	<u>Main effects:</u> *The information on compensation levels had a negative (but small!) effect on satisfaction but not on trust or more specific attitudes. *The info about approval rates had a (once again small!) positive effect on both satisfaction and trust. This means that those who were told that a large majority get their applications approved display a higher satisfaction with the insurance and have higher trust in the agency administering it. *Information on abuse control had no significant effects. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Those moderately to the right or left are not more susceptible to information than those with a more extreme ideological position. *Those with high self-perceived knowledge about sickness insurance do not differ from those with low self-perceived knowledge in their response to information. *However, the authors acknowledge that it would have been better to measure actual existing knowledge instead (to test, among other things, for pretreatment effects).
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Berinsky (2015) Rumors and Health Care Reform: Experiments in Political Misinformation British Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1701 in wave 1 of study 1 and 699 in wave 2; 1000 in waves 1 and 2 of study 2) <u>Time:</u> 2010 *Note: in the article, comparisons are made between the full sample and the ‘attentive sample’, which consists of those passing the attention check (N=876). Importantly, the observed treatment effects are considerably stronger in the latter sample! I focus here on the attentive sample, because only they were invited to participate in wave 2 of study 1	<u>Framing concept:</u> information, persuasion (“political rumors”) <u>Framing content:</u> unclassified	Healthcare	(1) Rejection of rumors around the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA), stating that “death panels” have been installed (“Do you think the changes to the healthcare system that have been enacted by Congress and the Obama administration require elderly patients to meet with government officials to discuss ‘end of life’ options including euthanasia?”), (2) support for the enacted healthcare changes in general	Study 1: split-sample 1. Control group: no info 2. Rumor only 3. Rumor + non-partisan correction 4. Rumor + Republican correction 5. Rumor + Democratic correction Study 2: split-sample 1 1. Rumor only 2. Correction only: no repetition of the rumor 3. Rumor + correction (no control group!) Study 2: split-sample 2 1. Irrelevant recall condition 2. Relevant recall condition: asking questions about rumor *Note: the information was presented in news stories, and the corrections were based on statements made by real-world politicians. Accordingly, not only the source of the frame differed, but also the content, strength, etc. In other words, the frames were not equivalent.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Study 1: compared to 57% in the control group, 46% rejects the rumor in the rumor only condition. This is much higher in all the correction conditions, although clearly highest when the correction comes from an ‘unlikely’ Republication source (69 v. 60%). *Study 1: According to the authors, these effects extend to support for healthcare in the attentive sample, though the effects are modest in size and there is no significant difference between the correction conditions ($\pm 47\%$) and the rumor only condition (42%). Interestingly, the Democratic correction seems to create a backlash, reducing support for the plan to its lowest level across any condition (37%). The level of support in the control is 51%. *Study 1: There is some evidence of a subsiding effect over time. While respondents in the rumor only condition (and control) held steady in their beliefs, the effectiveness of the corrections faded across the board during the week between the two waves of the survey, to the extent that the differences among experimental treatments were no longer statistically significant.
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						*Study 2: the pairing of the rumor with a correction (63%) was more effective in increasing rumor rejection than the correction alone (55%), compared to the rumor only (48%) in wave 2 of the survey. In wave 2, fielded some weeks later, the rumor + correction treatment lost its competitive advantage though (from 63% to 55%), while the other treatments had roughly similar effects on rumor rejection. These findings apply to general support for healthcare as well. *Study 2: those who were asked recall questions about the rumor were affected less by the corrective information than those who answered irrelevant recall questions. However, the effects are small and statistically insignificant. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Study 1: the Republican correction is the most powerful treatment for both Republican and Democratic voters, making the authors conclude that a simple elite cueing story alone cannot explain the results. In fact, democratic voters seem even more influenced by the Republican correction than by the Democratic correction. However, the authors warn against drawing strong conclusions from this because of the relatively small size of the subgroup samples.
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Bonoli et al. (2025) Who deserves the spot? Attitudes towards priorities in access to subsidized childcare Journal of European Public Policy	<u>Place:</u> Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the US (N=1450, except in DE and US, where it is 2700) <u>Time:</u> 2021 (during Covid-19; see footnote 7)	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Childcare	“In some places, there is shortage of childcare places that are subsidized by the government, and decisions must be made regarding who should have priority in obtaining a place. Let us assume that the following individuals seek childcare. All of them are 35 years old and have 2 children. Please tell us if you think that they should be given a low (0) or a high (100) priority”	Vignette experiment randomly varying: 1. Work status (labelled as “conciliation need”) 2. Financial situation 3. Gender 4. Marital status 5. Length of residency 6. Nationality 7. Occupation 8. Effort (“has applied for childcare and is waiting to hear back” vs “applied and organized a temporary arrangement with the neighbours”) 9. Years of tax contributions paid	<u>Main effects:</u> *Financial need is the most important determinant; being described as a family that is financially comfortable is the feature associated with the largest deservingness penalty. Single parents are also prioritized. *Being out of the labour force is associated with the second strongest penalty. Families that paid taxes for 8 years are seen as more deserving than those who did so for 1 year. Whether there is a temporary arrangement or not does not make a difference. *Foreign nationals from distant countries are considered less deserving, whereas foreigners from nearby countries are sometimes given the same priority as nationals. Longer periods of residence lead to smaller penalties. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Need is an important predictor of deservingness in all six countries. The strongest effects, however, are found in ‘liberal’ UK and US. *Having paid taxes does not matter in ‘universal’ DK and SE. *The other criteria work quite similar in the different countries.
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Bor & Simonovits (2021) Empathy, Deservingness, and Preferences for Welfare Assistance: A Large-Scale Online Perspective-Taking Experiment Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3431) <u>Time:</u> unknown	<u>Framing concept:</u> perspective-taking <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients	Welfare state in general	(1) A feeling thermometer measuring affect towards poor people, (2) stereotypes about poor people's efforts and competence, and (3) support for redistributive policies (scale of healthcare, income tax, UBI, etc.)	Perspective-taking experiment split in two samples: 1. A vignette depicting a single parent of two who has been the victim of a workplace accident and laid off from work. The gender of the target person was matched with the gender of the respondent. "White-sounding" names were chosen. 2. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> * Taking the perspective of a deserving, poor individual had a very small (1% on a 0-100 scale) positive effect on feelings towards and stereotypes about the poor. *The perspective-taking exercise had very little effect on support for redistributive policy. *It is highly unlikely that ceiling effects could have suppressed any potential effects. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The treatment effect does not vary between subgroups defined by subjective income, partisan identity, respondent race and matched respondent-target gender. *Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that the perspective-taking exercise works for some as intended but backfires for others (on non-observed respondent characteristics).
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Bremer & Bürgisser (2023) Public opinion on welfare state recalibration in times of austerity: evidence from survey experiments Political Science Research and Methods	<u>Place:</u> Germany, Italy, UK (N=1200 in each country) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare reforms	Exp. 1: education, training for the unemployed, childcare Exp. 2: education, training for unemployed, childcare, unemployment benefits, child benefits, old-age pensions	Exp. 1: Support for increased spending Exp. 2: choice between two welfare reform packages	Exp. 1: split sample (see p. 41 for details) Exp. 2: conjoint (see p. 42 for details)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the widespread support for the different social investment policies decreases when policy trade-offs are introduced. *Exp. 1: there are, however, important differences between the policies. Support for education is relatively unaffected, compared to support for ALMP and childcare (especially when the trade-off implies lowering spending on pension benefits). *Exp. 2: additional pension spending increases reform support the most, as does additional spending on education. Spending on labor market policies is not a priority. In fact, increased spending on unemployment benefits even reduces reform support. Family policy exerts little influence. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 2: pensioners care more about increasing pension spending than working-age people, parents with young children prioritize family policies more strongly, and labour market outsiders attach greater priority to labour market policy. The strongest constituency effect is found for pensions. Such an effect is absent for education.
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Bridgman et al. (2022) All in This Together? A Preregistered Report on Deservingness of Government Aid During the COVID-19 Pandemic Journal of Experimental Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Canada (N=2522 in exp. 1 and 2501 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare claimants	Covid-19 financial relief and Goods & Services Tax Rebate (=a non-taxable amount paid four times a year to individuals and families with low and modest incomes to help offset the goods and services tax that they pay.	Exp. 1: How much money should this person receive from the government during the pandemic per month? (answers could range between 0 and 4000 dollar). Exp. 2: (1) same as in exp. 1 but without a pre-specified range, (2) perceived similarity of the depicted person, and (3) perceived deservingness of government financial support.	Exp. 1: paired-profile conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics of Canadian citizens: 1. Name (incl. clear ethnicity indications) 2. Citizenship 3. Health status 4. Marital status 5. Children 6. Employment status 7. Income before the pandemic Exp. 2: single-profile conjoint varying the same characteristics as in exp. 1. Before reading the description, respondents were randomly assigned to: 1. Covid-19 cash transfer group 2. Goods and Services Tax Rebate group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the largest effect was found for employment status: people who are employed and unaffected by the pandemic were allocated less than those who lost income or employment as a result of the pandemic. *Exp. 1: Noncitizens were allocated less assistance than citizens but there were no significant differences between those who were or were not born in Canada. There were also no significant differences between Whites and non-Whites. *Exp. 1: People with children, poor health and low income were also allocated significantly more assistance. Gender and marital status had no effect. Exp. 2: similar effects as in exp. 1, except for a stronger effect of income (with low-income citizens seen as much more deserving of GST rebate than Covid-19 aid). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: subgroup analyses show that there are no significant differences in the treatment effects based on respondents' employment status, children, health and income.
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Brooks (2012) Framing Theory, Welfare Attitudes, and the United States Case In: Svallfors (Ed.). Contested welfare states.	<u>Place:</u> U.S (N= 1559) <u>Time:</u> 2009	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients and macro context	Welfare state in general	Exp. 1: perceived consequences of the welfare state (economic, moral, social) Exp. 2: gov. responsibility for job guarantee, health care, living standard for the old, the unemployed, child care, paid leave.	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. "Middle class" frame 2. "Immigrants" frame 3. "Blacks" frame 4. Control group Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Additional reference to the impact of the economic crisis on all Americans 2. Same but for middle-class Americans 3. Same but for working-class Americans 4. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the immigration frame increases the perception that welfare provision has negative consequences for the economy and that it has a welfare magnet effect. *Exp. 1: Reference to middle-class recipients decreases the perception that the welfare state makes people lazy (compared to the control and immigrant frames) and reduces the welfare magnetism perception (compared to immigrant frame). *Exp. 1: the black frame reduces the welfare magnet perception (compared to the migrant frame) and reduces concerns about the cost of welfare provision for businesses (compared to the control and immigration frame). *The non-significant difference between the baseline and the immigration frame with regard to perceived costs is ascribed to the idea that "respondents may already consider issues of immigration when evaluating welfare cost issues" (=pre-treatment effect). However, this does not explain the first finding mentioned above. Exp. 2: no significant treatment effects <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Burgoon et al. (2022) Unemployment risk-sharing in the EU: How policy design influences citizen support for European unemployment policy European Union Politics	Place: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain (N=1500 per country) <u>Time</u>: 2018	<u>Framing concept</u>: framing <u>Framing content</u>: policy design characteristics (+policy outcomes?)	EU unemployment benefits (“European-level Unemployment Risk Sharing; EURS)	Choice between, and rating of, two policy packages	Conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Generosity 2. Level of administration 3. Between-country redistribution 4. Domestic taxation 5. Country-level conditionality 6. Individual-level conditionality Note: 20% of the sample is excluded from the analyses because they did not pass the attention check or gave inconsistent answers	<u>Main effects</u>: *Respondents were more likely to choose or support policy packages with more generosity (+12%), national-level administration (+7%), no new taxation (+6%), and country- (+7%) and individual-level conditionality (+7.5%). *The dimension with the lowest effect is between-country redistribution: there is a only a small, marginally statistically significant preference for some redistribution (either for any contributing countries or from rich to poor countries). This is mostly driven by respondents living in Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Estonia, Italy and Spain. In Denmark and the Netherlands, by contrast, respondents are more supportive of no between-country redistribution. *Notwithstanding some notable exceptions, the general pattern is that there is relatively little cross-national variation. <u>Conditional effects</u>: /
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Buss (2018) Public opinion towards targeted labour market policies: A vignette study on the perceived deservingness of the unemployed Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=3015) <u>Time:</u> 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	(1) The appropriate level of unemployment benefits after 1 year of unemployment (on a scale from 0 to 1000 euro). (2) Support for conditions the recipient has to fulfill in order to receive the full amount: move to another city for work, take any job available, and participate in training sessions. (3) Support for a 3-month benefit cut after the recipient failed to attend a meeting with the employment agency.	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Name (Peter Müller vs Ali Ozturk) 2. Age (20, 40, 60) 3. Reason for unemployment (quitting vs bankruptcy) 4. Motivation to find new job (low vs high) 5. Parenthood (single, single parent, married with one child) [6. Appointment (missed appointment with the employment office either for the first or second time)] *Note: the sixth dimension seems to be administered at a later stage in the survey?	<u>Main effects:</u> *Children have the biggest effect on attitudes towards the level of unemployment benefits: a single parent (€534) and a married parent (€527) should receive significantly more than a single person without children (€410). *Individuals who are not responsible for their job loss and those who show strong effort to regain employment are granted significantly more unemployment benefits than those who quit their job and appear unmotivated (€38 and €46, respectively). *Respondents allocate €29 more benefits to a 60-year old unemployed person than to a 20-year old. The difference with the 40-year old is not significant. *Individuals with a Turkish name receive €30 less benefits than those with a German name. *60-year old unemployed people are less often required to move to another city or participate in training activities. Interestingly, respondents do not place an additional penalty on the young unemployed when it comes to benefit conditions.
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						*By contrast, Turkish unemployed people are more often required to move to another city or to take any job available than native people. *Attitudes towards benefit sanctions are to a lesser extent influenced by characteristics of the unemployed than preferences for benefits and conditions. Only age, the cause for unemployment and the motivation of the recipient exhibit weak effects. For example, Turkish and German unemployed people receive the same punishment when they breach the rules of the employment agency. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The negative effect of the Turkish-sounding name on the preferred level of unemployment benefits is much stronger for individuals on the political right (- €75) compared to those on the political left, who do not make such a distinction.
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Callaghan & Olson (2017) Unearthing the Hidden Welfare State: Race, Political Attitudes, and Unforeseen Consequences Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1819) <u>Time:</u> 2014 *Note: all people of color are excluded from the analysis	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing + information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of policy design and recipients	Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)	Support for EITC	Split-sample experiment: 1. Low-information + no racialization treatment 2. High-info + no racialization treatment 3. Low-info + weak racialization treatment (“75% of EITC recipients is black”) 4. High-info + weak racialization treatment 5. Low-info + strong racialization treatment (also: “program recipients are more likely to be poor, black, unmarried and have children”) 6. High-info + strong racialization treatment *Note: the information is inaccurate, as the % of black EITC recipients is much lower in reality.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Providing respondents with additional (weak or strong) racially charged information about the EITC program and its recipients significantly decreases support. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *In the weak racialization treatment, the decline in support is not driven by racial resentment, as the racially resentful do not decrease their support when they are told that 75% of EITC recipients are black. *In the strong racialization treatment, the information does reduce support for the EITC among the racially resentful. It thus seems that it is the inclusion of welfare stereotypes rather than the percentage of blacks that matters.
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Campbell & Gaddis (2017) “I Don’t Agree with Giving Cash: A Survey Experiment Examining Support for Public Assistance Social Science Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=840) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	“Welfare”, “anti-poverty policy”, “public assistance” Concretely: cash assistance, SNAP/food stamps, housing assistance, childcare subsidies	(1) Some people think that Michael and Jessica should be entitled to receive [treatment] from the government. Do you agree or disagree? (2) Imagine that a proposed law would provide households similar to Michael and Jessica’s household with €200 each month in [treatment]. Do you think this is too little, too much, or about right? (3) What total amount per month in [treatment] do you think Michael and Jessica should receive? (open-ended question)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Cash welfare 2. Food stamps 3. Housing assistance 4. Childcare subsidy *Note: all respondents were first shown two vignettes depicting two households with characteristics that are held constant across all respondents. This was done “to keep respondents focused on the type of assistance offered, not the characteristics of the recipients”.	<u>Main effects:</u> *The difference between cash and in-kind benefits is striking. Support for cash welfare is lower than support for other types of assistance. However, the difference between cash welfare and housing assistance is generally not statistically significant. *Programs that offer benefits in-kind are more popular than cash transfers. However, not all in-kind benefits are equal. SNAP and child-care subsidies enjoy more support than housing assistance. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The gaps between support for cash and the other treatment conditions are much larger for moderates and conservatives than for liberals (because they are highly supportive of them all?; see Figure 2 on p. 1364).
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Cappelen & Midtbo (2016) Intra-EU Labour Migration and Support for the Norwegian Welfare State European Sociological Review	<u>Place:</u> Norway (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion, information and priming <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Social assistance, unemployment compensation, child allowances, disability pensions, cash for care benefits	Spending more or less on social benefits	Exp. 1: split-sample information experiment 1. Control group: no additional information 2. Treatment group: receiving factual information regarding labour migrants and their rights to social benefits. Exp. 2: split-sample counter-argument experiment 1. Control group: $\approx$ treatment group exp. 1 2. Treatment group: confronted with a hypothetical scenario in which welfare chauvinist reform has been implemented (which makes that labour migrants no longer have access to social benefits)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Those who are informed about immigrants' welfare rights want to spend less on welfare than those who remain unexposed to such information (but the effect is only significant for social assistance and child benefits). *Those who are presented with a welfare state in which labour migrants are denied access on equal terms with natives prefer more spending than respondents who are presented with a neutral question (*note: it's not really neutral information because it is the same as the treatment group in experiment 1!!!). This effect is significant for all spending categories except child benefits. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *These effects are generally not moderated by gender, education, income or age.
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Carter (2025) Does Misunderstanding Taxes Inflate People's Support for Medicare Spending? Journal of Behavioral Public Administration	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1346) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics (+ policy outcomes)	Medicare	Should spending on Medicare be decreased, kept the same, or increased?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control with only program description: "Medicare provides health insurance to citizens aged 65 and older and people with disabilities". 2. Entitled treatment: description + "Many Americans feel entitled to Medicare because they pay into the program through payroll taxes that come out of each paycheck". 3. Taxes treatment: description + "However, payroll taxes only fund 34% of the cost of Medicare. Many citizens pay less taxes than the cost of their Medicare". 4. Full treatment: all of the above	<u>Main effects:</u> *In the full sample, support for Medicare significantly dropped in the entitled treatment (53%), the taxes treatment (47%) and the full treatment (41%) compared to the control condition. However, participants in the taxes and full treatments did not differ significantly from one another. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *These effects were highly similar across the political spectrum, with no significant interactions detected. Specifically, even though Democrats were far more supportive of Medicare than Republicans, the treatments had very similar effects. *Only Independents deviated from this, as they were only less supportive in the full treatment.
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Cattaneo et al. (2020) Information provision and preferences for education spending: Evidence from representative survey experiments in three countries European Journal of Political Economy	<u>Place:</u> Switzerland (N=5931), Germany and the U.S (see Lergetporer et al., 2018 for latter two countries) <u>Time:</u> 2015 (CH)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information, framing, priming <u>Framing content:</u> spending levels	Education	Exp. 1: preferred level of public school spending Exp. 2: support for increases/decreases in teacher salaries Exp. 3: preferences for different categories of education spending: class-size reductions, teacher salary increases, new books/technologies	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Control group 2. Treatment 1: informed about the annual spending (20000 CHF). 3. Treatment 2: informed about the total spending for the duration of 9 years (180000 CHF). 3. Treatment 3: informed that the total spending equals 16 yrs of tax revenue of average income earners. Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Control group 2. Treatment 1: information about absolute teacher salaries 3. Treatment 2: information about teacher salary relative to the average salary level. Exp. 3: split-sample 1. Control group 2. Treatment: information that class-size reduction is more expensive	<u>Main effects:</u> *Support for increasing education spending declines from 54% to 40% when respondents are informed about current public education spending. *Similarly, support for increasing teacher salaries declines from 27% (control) to 19% (treatment). *Support for investing additional education spending in class-size reductions reduces from 62% to 55% when respondents are informed about the costs of this. *All these effects are statistically significant, but some are small. *Reporting the spending/salary information in relative terms yielded identical treatment effects. So did the provision of total rather than annual spending. Thus, these seem information rather than framing or priming effects. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is little evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects defined by age, gender, education, income, and other characteristics. *Although the effects are similar in Germany and the U.S., effect sizes are generally smaller in CH.
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Chueri et al. (2024) Re-evaluating the welfare preferences of radical-right voters: evidence from a vignette experiment. West European Politics	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=2877), Switzerland (N=1393), Denmark (N=1342) and Sweden (N=1341) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Preferred replacement rate for depicted unemployment benefit recipient	Factorial vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Reason for unemployment 2. Contribution record 3. Job-seeking efforts 4. Savings 5. Citizenship 6. Occupation 7. Gender 8. Age 9. Length of residency	<u>Main effects:</u> *Reason for unemployment and job-seeking efforts have the strongest effects, with those who display such efforts and are unemployed because of Covid-19 being granted a higher RR. *Citizenship, contribution record and savings have weaker effects. *The effect of contribution record is stronger in Germany and Switzerland though compared to Denmark and Sweden. *Note: there is little discussion of the size and significance of the main effects; and no discussion of the effects of gender, age and length of residency. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Both mainstream (-3.9% in RR) and radical (-6.4%) right-wing voters consider welfare claimants who are immigrants as relatively less deserving. The difference between the two is not significant though. Claimants' citizenship has no effect on left-wing voters. *Other than that, effort, need and control have very similar effects across all the partisan groups.
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Cook et al. (2010) Trusting What You Know: Information, Knowledge, and Confidence in Social Security The Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1814) <u>Time:</u> 1999	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Old-age pensions (“Social Security”)	(1) Confidence in Social Security’s ability to provide benefits at the time of retirement, and (2) knowledge index regarding Social Security’s benefits, taxation and administration	A natural experiment with two groups: 1. Treatment group: respondents interviewed before the SSA began mailing annual statements of Social Security benefits to all eligible Americans. These statements provide “factual, nonpartisan, and personally relevant information” about how the Social Security program works in terms of its benefits, financing and future. 2. Control group: respondents interviewed before the statements were sent out for the first time in 1999.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Having received the statement did not have a direct significant effect on respondents’ knowledge about Social Security. *By contrast, mailing information about Social Security did have a modest positive impact on people’s confidence in the system. *Knowledge as such also had an impact: the more people knew about Social Security, the more confident they were about the program’s future. Unfortunately, no pretreatment effects were tested. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Income and education only indirectly influence people’s confidence, by improving their knowledge of Social Security.
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Crabtree & Wehde (2022) Who deserves what and why during the COVID-19 pandemic: Applying the CARIN principles of deservingness to the American welfare state Social Policy & Administration	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1650) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipients	“Traditional welfare” vs “pandemic-related welfare”	Rating of welfare recipients on the deservingness criteria (with the exception of need)	Split-ballot: 1. Group that rates traditional welfare recipients on the four deservingness criteria 2. Group that rates pandemic-related welfare recipients on the deservingness criteria	<u>Main effects:</u> *Overall, across all principles (control, attitude, reciprocity, identity), the target group for pandemic-related welfare received more positive ratings, and thus they can be interpreted as being ‘more deserving’ than the traditional welfare target group. *It should be noted, however, that the mean differences are quite small (e.g., 3.4 vs 3.2 for attitude).
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DeSante (2013) Working Twice as Hard to Get Half as Far: Race, Work Ethic, and America's Deserving Poor American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2010	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	State (social) assistance	A budgeting task in which the respondent is asked to allocate 1500 dollar to two applicants for state assistance (shown at the same time), each of whom is said to need 900 dollars. Respondents were also given the option of allocating some or all of the funds to "offset the state's budget deficit". Thus, each respondent made allocations to three different targets: applicant 1, applicant 2, and to reduce the deficit. *DV1: amount of money an applicant is awarded *DV2: amount of money allocated to the deficit	Conjoint experiment randomly varying: 1. Combination of black-sounding/white-sounding names: Laurie + Emily; Laurie + Keisha, Latoya + Keisha; no names 2. Work history/ethnic: "excellent"; "poor"; and no information given *Note: respondents were told they were evaluating real people with real names and real needs as they were told researchers had been consulting with the state welfare agency in question (i.e. the "North Carolina Work First" program)	<u>Main effects:</u> *On average, the applicant who had an "excellent" work history was awarded an additional 65 dollars. "Laziness" is punished with a greater magnitude than hard work is rewarded, as applicants lose over 170 dollars when said to have a "poor" work ethic. *White applicants are not rewarded more than blacks on the basis of race alone. However, the interaction effect shows that blacks see no reward for their hard work (e.g., Keisha's reward is less than 10 dollars, compared to the 123 reward of Emily), yet are punished for laziness at a disproportionate rate (e.g., Keisha loses over 100; Emily loses less than 25). *With regard to the level of deficit reduction, the experiment shows that white applicants were worth extra money (+100) compared to a pair of black applicants. This shows that Americans are more willing to spend funds on welfare when both applicants are white. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Especially those who are most racially resentful are willing to spend much more on welfare when the applicants are both white than when applicants are black.
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De Vries, Reeves & Geiger (2021) Social class bias in welfare sanctioning judgements: Experimental evidence from a nationally representative sample Social Policy & Administration	<u>Place:</u> U.K (N=1519) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Support for temporary benefit stop as sanction for missing a compulsory appointment	Factorial survey experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Parental occupation + housing situation (=social class identifier) 2. Ethnicity (black; white) 3. Age (19; 35; 55) 4. Gender (male; female)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents were 13-14 % points more likely to recommend a sanction against a claimant with underclass signifiers (=parents are long-term unemployed + benefit recipients and claimant is living in a council estate) than against an otherwise identical claimant from a 'reputable' working class or professional background. There was no significant difference between the latter two. *Respondents were around 7 % points less likely to agree to a sanction against a 35-year old claimants than against an otherwise identical 19-year old claimant; and were around 13 % points less likely to endorse a sanction against a 55-year old claimant. *There was no effect of gender nor ethnicity. *Based on free-text responses, it is concluded that 'underclass' claimants are more likely to be blamed for violating the conditions of their benefit, while claimants from other class backgrounds are more often given the 'benefit of the doubt'. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Doberstein & Smith (2019) When political values and perceptions of deservingness collide: Evaluating support for homelessness investments in Canada International Journal of Social Welfare	<u>Place:</u> Canada (N=1507) <u>Time:</u> 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare claimants	Homelessness/housing policy	How much support (in dollar amount) a hypothetical homeless person should receive. Respondents had to divide up to 3000 dollar per month between two homeless people.	Vignette/conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Age 2. Gender 3. Ethnicity 4. Years of homelessness 5. Daily activities 6. Shelter status 7. History of victimization 8. Estimated cost of the homeless person to the tax system	<u>Main effects:</u> *History of victimization had an effect, with mental disorder and domestic violence significantly increasing the dollar amount compared to no direct form of victimization. *No effect was found for the cost of homelessness, ethnicity, activities and shelter status. *Gender (female) and years of homelessness had a statistically significant positive impact. (see Appendix for OLS results) <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The effects were roughly similar for conservatives and progressives in the sense that both did not react to the cost framing and both were more supportive of homeless people with mental disorders. *The qualitative analysis of the open-ended question shows, however, that both ideological groups had different reasons for this: while progressives saw it as their moral obligation to help homeless people with mental disorders, conservatives mainly emphasized that the help is needed to boost the reintegration and productivity of the homeless.
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Epp & Jennings (2020) Inequality, media frames, and public support for welfare Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=999) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> media framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy context, recipients	Welfare	Spending too much, too little, or about the right amount of money on welfare	Split-sample experiment: 1. Personal-failure treatment: news article mentioning that there are “concerns that many welfare recipients are able-bodied adults who have simply become overly reliant on government benefits”. 2. Societal-failure treatment: news article mentioning that poverty alleviation is needed for “decreasing hunger and child mortality rates in the next decade”. 3. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exposure to the personal-failure article is associated with declining support for welfare spending (compared to both the control and societal-failure group). *There is no significant difference between the control group and the societal-failure treatment group. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *For low-income respondents, the societal-failure frame is associated with more support for welfare spending than the control article and the personal-failure article. There is no statistically meaningful difference between the personal-failure treatment and the control. *None of the articles elicited statistically distinct responses from those with higher family incomes when controlling for demographics.
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Ellis & Faricy (2020) Race, “Deservingness” and Social Spending Attitudes: The Role of Policy Delivery Mechanism Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> US (N=867 in Study 2 and 795 in Study 3) <u>Time:</u> 2015 and 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> design of welfare policy and characteristics of welfare recipients	Study 2: anti-poverty policy/government assistance Study 3: government assistance, healthcare, wage subsidies	Study 2: spending preferences (increase, kept the same, decrease) Study 3: perceived deservingness of program recipients	Study 2: split-sample experiment with “delivery mechanism” treatment 1. Direct spending 2. Tax expenditure No control group! Study 3: vignette experiment varying the following dimensions: 1. Government aid recipients - able-bodied unemployed - middle-class family - working poor 2. Mode of delivery - direct spending - tax expenditure *Note: Study 1 is not an experiment!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Study 2: mean levels of support do not vary across spending frame type: spending through the tax code was not necessarily more popular than spending conducted directly. *Study 3: nevertheless, those who received aid via tax expenditures were (at least for two of the target groups; the able-bodied unemployed and middle-class family) perceived as more deserving of what they receive than recipients of identical benefits delivered through direct means. *Study 3: the explicit statement that the recipient is working might render less important some of the other considerations –including spending mode- that affect how citizens view the deservingness of recipients (see Table 3 on p. 836). <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Ellis & Faricy (2021) The Other Side of the Coin: Public Opinion toward Social Tax Expenditures (Chapter 4) Russel Sage Foundation	<u>Place:</u> US (N=994) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Retirement saving, paying for necessities, student loan aid, mortgage interest, health insurance, green energy consumption policy	Support for the policy program, described either as a tax expenditure or as direct spending	Split-sample experiment: For each policy, respondents were randomly allocated to: 1. A tax expenditure frame: tax credits 2. A direct spending frame: cash transfers	<u>Main effects:</u> *For five of the six programs (all but “paying for necessities”, for which support was about equal across the frames), we see that support is higher when the program is delivered through the tax code rather than through direct spending. The effects of the delivery mechanism are strongest for the “mortgage interest” and “saving for retirement” questions (=25% drop in support when described as cash payments). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The framing matters more to program support for conservatives than it does for liberals, and framing a program as a tax expenditure does substantially more to increase support for conservatives than for liberals (especially with regard to mortgage interest and retirement savings). *For liberals, support often decreased when programs were described as a tax credit. However, only for health care policy is this effect also statistically significant. *In all six policy areas, those who trust the government (cf. “political trust”) are more supportive of direct spending, while those low in trust prefer tax expenditures.
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Fang & Huber (2020) Perceptions of Deservingness and the Politicization of Social Insurance: Evidence from Disability Insurance in the United States American Politics Research	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1145 in exp. 1, 1231 in exp. 2, & 1287 in exp. 3) <u>Time:</u> 2018-19 *Note: Exp. 1 was included in the pre-election wave of the CCES; exp. 2 in the post-election wave of the CCES; and exp. 3 in a 2019 Lucid survey.	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients, policy design characteristics and policy outcomes	Disability insurance (i.e., the Social Security Disability Insurance; SSDI)	Exp. 1: “Do you agree or disagree with the government’s decision to allow Scott to collect SSDI benefit payments”? Exp. 2: Attitudes towards the size and design of the SSDI program Exp. 3: same as in exp. 1	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Injured on the job 2. Intellectually disabled because of a stroke 3. Mood disorder 4. Chronic heart failure 5. Severe arthritis of the spine Exp. 3: same as exp. 1, except heart failure & arthritis, and with the addition of recipients’ race (white vs black) Exp. 2: split sample 1. Control: only basic description of SSDI 2. Pro-argument: risk pooling 3. Pro-arguments: risk pooling + low program abuse 4. Anti-argument: high and growing costs 5. Anti-arguments: high costs + liberalization of screening criteria	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1 + 3: on average, beneficiaries with easier-to-diagnose impairments (i.e., work injury, heart failure, arthritis, stroke-induced mental disability) are considered more deserving than those with harder-to-diagnose impairments (i.e., mood disorder). *Exp. 3: recipient race has no effect on perceived deservingness. *Exp. 2: whereas arguments emphasizing the risk pooling features of SSDI tend to increase support for the program’s size and the status quo design, arguments emphasizing the costliness of the program and reasons for its growing costs tend to move attitudes in the opposite direction. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the effect on a recipients’ perceived deservingness of harder-to-diagnose impairments is larger for Republicans than for Democrats (but generally in the same direction and statistically significant in both groups). *Exp. 3: the non-effect of recipients’ race is similar among Democrats and Republicans.
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Fernandez et al., (2023) Priming or learning? The influence of pension policy information on individual preferences in Germany, Spain and the United States Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=806), Spain (N=812) and the US (N=825) <u>Time:</u> 2018 *Note: the authors recognize issue salience as a potential macro-level moderator of framing effects	<u>Framing concept:</u> priming + information (“learning”) <u>Framing content:</u> policy design	Old-age pensions	(1) Support for increasing the legal retirement age, and (2) Support for spending on old-age pensions relative to other social policy programs	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. Treatment group: information about the forecasted pension replacement rates for 2040 (declining from 56% of the average workers’ income to 42% in the US, from 43% to 38% in Germany, and 79% to 56% in Spain) *Note: these frames are clearly not equivalent in terms of strength! *Note: only the treatment group was asked to “guesstimate” the replacement rate themselves, before being given the information.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Support for increasing the retirement age is generally low (37% in the pooled sample), but is significantly higher in the treatment group compared to the control group (but not in Spain). *Participants’ preferred level of pension expenditure (as % of total social spending) is similar across the three countries (around 28%), but increases in all countries when information about declining replacement rates is provided. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *A slight majority in Germany were correctly informed about the forecasted replacement rate (probably because it was close to the current rate; anchoring effect), compared to only 1 in five respondents in Spain and the US. *The effects of proper-, under- and overestimation on support for raising the retirement age are positive in the three countries, yet only significant in the US. *Underestimation does not have a significant effect in any of the countries. Overestimation only has an effect in Spain. Proper estimation has a significant positive effect everywhere.
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Findor et al. (2023) Equality, Reciprocity, or Need? Bolstering Welfare Policy Support for Marginalized Groups with Distributive Fairness American Political Science Review	<u>Place:</u> Slovakia (N=1009) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Social housing	Support for the construction of a social housing project in a particular town	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: describing a social housing project intended for Roma citizens 2. “Equality” treatment: information that the same budget would be reserved for social housing for non-Roma. 3. “Reciprocity” treatment: information that only those who Roma who helped in the construction of the housing are entitled to it. 4. “Need” treatment: information that only those Roma who need it most are entitled to social housing. Note: there are other experiments discussed, but none of these refer to social policy per se.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Support for building social housing increased in the reciprocity treatment relative to the control as well as relative to the other two treatment groups. *The control group, equality treatment and need treatment were statistically indistinguishable.
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Finseraas et al. (2017) Do knowledge gains from public information campaigns persist over time? Results from a survey experiment on the Norwegian pension reform Journal of Pension Economics and Finance	<u>Place:</u> Norway (N=3000 in wave 1 and 1398 in wave 2) <u>Time:</u> 2012 (wave 1) and 2013 (wave 2) Note: the drop out between the two waves was quite large and the sample had comparatively more men and highly educated people	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Old-age pensions	Knowledge about the pension system	Split-sample experiment: 1. Treatment group: received an information brochure from a government agency on the recently implemented changes in the pension system. 2. Control group: no information *Note: this brochure was part of a larger information campaign on the reform, which included ads in newspapers, radio and TV. At the end of 2010, two years before the survey, the brochure was even distributed to everyone aged 62 or above. However, no pretreatment effects were assessed.	<u>Main effects:</u> *In wave 1, individuals who were provided with information were significantly more likely to state that the pension reform succeeded in simplifying the pension system (+8%), more likely to correctly identify that the new system would imply a higher pension if people decide to postpone their retirement (+10), and more likely to correctly state that an increasing unemployment in your own cohort will not reduce your pension (+7). *In wave 2, none of these effects are still significant. This indicates that while respondents' knowledge was higher one week after receiving the information, this effect disappeared completely when the same questions were asked four months later. Note: this suggests that most experiments over-estimate the impact of information/framing because they only focus on short-term rather than long-term effects.
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Finseraas et al. (2024) Immigration and welfare state sustainability: whose perception is affected by fiscal cost cues? Journal of European Public Policy	<u>Place:</u> Norway <u>Time:</u> 2014 (wave 1) and 2015 (wave 2)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> reform pressures; policy context	Healthcare, old-age pensions, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, social welfare benefits, elderly care, child care	Perceived affordability of the listed benefits/services (“sustainability index”)	Split-sample experiment (see Goerres et al., 2020) <u>*Moderating variables:</u> Context-level: share of and changes in immigrants from Eastern Europe, share of non-Western immigrants, mean income of the community Individual-level: age, gender, education, income, work status, private v. public sector employment, perceived risk of unemployment, social trust, political trust, left-right ideology, benefit reciprocity, trust in refugees, trust in Eastern Europeans → machine learning methodology!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents that received the non-Western immigration treatment express more concern over the future sustainability of the welfare state. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is statistically significant heterogeneity in the average treatment effect. The mean of the DV is 0.14 in the control group, compared to -.56 in the most affected group (and about .14 in the least affected group). Thus, while some are very sensitive to the treatment, others are not. *Political trust is by far the most important moderating variable. Voters with low political trust become much more worried about the future of the welfare state when receiving the immigration treatment. *Some of the other variables also moderate the effect, but the interpretation is not entirely clear from the article. *Other variables have no moderating effect (including, surprisingly, political ideology).
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Ford (2015) Who Should We Help? An Experimental Test of Discrimination in the British Welfare State Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=2117) <u>Time:</u> ? *Note: only white respondents are included in the analyses	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Housing benefits (exp. 1) and disability benefits (exp. 2)	Exp. 1: “Do you think the current provision of housing benefits to families like the one depicted in the vignette is too high, about right, or too low?” Exp. 2: similar question but then for disability benefit claimants	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Black Caribbean recipient (Joseph Bravo from Jamaica) 2. Asian Muslim recipient (Mohammed Quereshi from Pakistan) 3. White recipient (Darren Smith from Sunderland) *Note: it was added that the person “currently receives £500 a week in state unemployment, housing and family benefits”. Exp. 2: split sample 1. White native 2. Asian Muslim native 3. White immigrant (from Ireland) 4. Muslim Asian immigrant (from Pakistan) *Note: both vignettes include quite some information that was not randomly varied!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the Black Caribbean claimant suffers no aggregate disadvantage at all, suggesting that ethnic difference does not always produce discrimination. The discrimination against the Muslim claimant, by contrast, is substantial: the number of respondents indicating that the benefit is too high is 12% higher. *Exp. 2: all three immigrant and ethnic minority claimants of disability benefits receive significantly lower support than the white native claimant. Furthermore, respondents were significantly less sympathetic towards the Muslim immigrant than towards the Muslim native or Irish immigrant. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the treatment main effects are no longer significant once interactions with respondents’ ethnocentrism are added, indicating that white respondents who scored 0 on the ethnocentrism scale (just over half of the total sample) treated all three claimants equally. *Exp. 1: respondents who are most likely to need housing benefits (low-income and worried about
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						losing their home) discriminated more against the Muslim claimant. *Exp. 1: Those who believe welfare claimants are in general undeserving judge black and Muslim claimants more harshly than white claimants. *Exp. 1: there were no significant interaction effects with respondents' perceptions of the national economy, their household finances, their views about the scope of the welfare state, egalitarianism and party identity. *Exp. 2: the interaction effects are roughly similar to exp. 1.
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Fox et al. (2022) Health Insurance Loss during COVID-19 May Increase Support for Universal Health Coverage Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1211) <u>Time:</u> 2020 (mid-pandemic!) *Note: the experiment excludes all those who did not pass the quality-control measures (incl. speedsters) as well as those who passed the comprehension questions. Thus, the experiment is restricted to the most attentive.	<u>Framing concept:</u> (situational) framing and priming <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Healthcare	(1) Support for a national health plan or ‘Medicare for All’ plan, in which all Americans would get their health insurance from a single government plan, (2) impression of different terms (Medicare for All, Medicare for those who want it, universal health coverage, national health insurance, and Obamacare), (3) choice between three mutually exclusive policy options (incrementally building on Affordable Care Act, reversing this act and moving towards more private health insurance, creating a universal health insurance system that would replace employment-sponsored health insurance)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: only asked the DVs 2. COVID-19 treatment: received a vignette of a news article depicting a white, male former football player who gets laid off from his job as a hotel concierge as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and loses his employment-sponsored health coverage 3. Airbnb treatment: same vignette but here the job loss is due to competition from Airbnb	<u>Main effects:</u> *The COVID-19 vignette increased support for Medicare for All by 6.2 percentage points, while the Airbnb treatment increased support by about 4.8 points. However, it is debatable whether these effects are actually significant ($p=0.06$ and 0.14). The authors argue that it is, but do acknowledge that these effects are, at best, modest in size. *The experimental treatments have no impact on the choice variable, and only increase the percentage reporting “mostly positive” feelings towards Medicare for All. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Political affiliation (Republican, Conservative or Independent) had no significant moderating effect. *Results were unchanged if only ‘strong’ partisans were included.
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Gallego & Marx (2017) Multi-dimensional preferences for labour market reforms Journal of European Public Policy	<u>Place:</u> Spain (N=1508) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Labour market policy (~ unemployment benefits)	Forced choice between two differently designed policy reform plans	Conjoint experiment: 1. Generosity 2. Coverage 3. Training services 4. Costs 5. Funding	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents clearly care about the generosity of benefits. Overall, they prefer any reform extending benefits over the status quo. *Coverage also plays a role, but the effect is smaller. Relative to a universal program that includes all residents in Spain, targeting the policy to members of the household in which no member receives a salary or pension increases support for the reform. This suggests that respondents support means-tested programs aimed at the most needy. There is no evidence of welfare chauvinistic support for excluding immigrants. *Respondents marginally prefer programs that offer training services (but not provided by the trade unions). The effect of the costs of the program is insignificant. By contrast, the main driver of support is funding, as a reform funded by spending cuts in education and health is strongly disliked and reduces support by 20%. Funding the reform from (progressive) income tax, public debt and especially cuts in spending on police and defense is more popular than indirect taxes. <u>Conditional effects:</u>
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						*Respondents' socioeconomic situation (measured as work status, income and education) does not influence the weight they place on specific policy attributes when choosing between proposals. *Ideology, by contrast, does moderate the effect of various attributes; in particular with regard to costs and funding. For example, higher costs reduce support for a policy proposal among right-wing but not left-wing respondents. *It is important to note though that many of the policy design features do not show significant interactions with ideology (e.g., generosity). *The authors also note potential context effects, explaining for example why targeted programs are preferred in high-unemployment Spain.
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Gielens et al. (2019) Deservingness in the eye of the beholder: A vignette study on the moderating role of cultural profiles in supporting activation policies International Journal of Social Welfare	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=1802) <u>Time:</u> 2013	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	To what extent do you think the depicted person (1) is entitled to benefits, (2) is entitled to support to find work, and (3) should be obliged to do voluntary work.	Vignette experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Name (Jan vs Tzanniss) 2. Profession (construction worker vs bank director) 3. Having debts vs having savings 4. Cause of unemployment (economic crisis vs own malfunctioning) 5. Job seeking efforts 6. (Un)willingness to move to another part of the country	<u>Main effects:</u> / *In general, the identity of the recipient mattered little for policy support: Dutch Jan and Greek Tzanniss were seen as equally deserving by almost everyone. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *In their support for social rights, persons with different cultural profiles differed significantly in the importance they attributed to the criteria of identity, need and control. Inversely, regarding support for social obligations, only the effect of recipients' attitude differed significantly between cultural profiles. Thus, support for social obligations seems to be less affected by one's cultural profile.
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Gift & Lastra-Anadon (2023) “Deservingness” and Public Support for Universal Public Goods: A Survey Experiment Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=3000) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Healthcare (NHS)	Would you like to see more or less government spending than there is today on the National Health Services?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Motivated non-contributor + a cold 2. Motivated non-contributor + hip problems 3. Motivated non-contributor + heart failure 4, 5 and 6: unmotivated non-contributor + same medical needs 7, 8 and 9: control group with no information about contributions and motivation + same medical needs	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents support significantly less spending on the NHS when activated to think of non-contributors as users (81.7% vs 86.2% in the control group) *Respondents activated to consider non-contributors as “unmotivated” rather than “motivated” support less spending on the NHS (80.2% vs 83.2%). The effect is only marginally significant though. *There is no significant interaction effect between motivation and medical needs. *Presenting respondents with more severe medical conditions (especially the emergency heart failure) also raised support. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Conservatives are less likely to support NHS spending when presented with “unmotivated” as opposed to “motivated” non-contributors (76.1% vs 83.7%). For liberals, there is hardly any difference (89.7% vs 91.4%) *Age, income and employment status did not have a statistically significant moderating effect.
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Gilens (1996) “Race Coding” and White Opposition to Welfare American Political Science Review	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1137) <u>Time:</u> 1991 *note: all respondents were white	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	“Welfare” (= means-tested transfer programs)	(1) Beliefs about welfare mothers (job seeking efforts + having children to get larger check) (2) Opposition to welfare (spending preferences, perceptions of welfare in general, and perceptions of welfare recipients in particular)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Description of white welfare mother (who is 30 years old, has 1 child of 10 years old and is on welfare for 1 year) 2. Description of black welfare mother (with otherwise similar characteristics)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents view white welfare mothers just as negatively as black welfare mothers. *However, the consequences of holding negative beliefs about black and white welfare mothers are not the same. Holding negative perceptions of white welfare mothers leads to increased opposition to welfare among whites, but the increase is modest. Holding negative views of black welfare mothers, in contrast, leads to a substantial increase in opposition. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Goerres et al. (2020) What Makes People Worry about the Welfare State? A Three-Country Experiment British Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=1860), Norway (N=2836), Sweden (N=3729) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> (reform pressure) framing <u>Framing content:</u> reform pressures; policy context	Healthcare, old-age pensions, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, social welfare benefits, elderly care, child care	Additive sustainability index comprising items across the different policy domains	<u>Split-sample:</u> 1. 'Grey wave' treatment 2. 'Too few people working' treatment 3. 'EU immigration' treatment 4. 'Non-Western immigration' treatment ("non-European" in Germany) 5. 'Financial crisis' treatment 6. 'Favourable economic situation' treatment (=only positive one) 7. 'All reform pressures' treatment 8. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *The largest negative effect came from the non-Western migration frame in Sweden and especially Norway. The EU migration frame also had a negative effect, but only in Norway. *The 'all pressures' treatment also had a negative effect in Norway and Sweden, which was weaker compared to the migration frames. Accordingly, "only hearing about immigration produces stronger effects than hearing about immigration as well as ageing, low employment and a financial crisis. *The low employment frame only had a significant negative effect in Sweden. *The positive frame, the population ageing treatment and the economic crisis frame had no significant effect. *None of the treatments had a significant effect in Germany. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *General/specific welfare state support does not really moderate (read: hinder) pressure framing effects.
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Gollust & Lynch (2011) Who Deserves Health Care? The Effects of Causal Attributions and Group Cues on Public Attitudes about Responsibility for Health Care Costs Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1676 in wave 1, and 1334 in wave 2) <u>Time:</u> 2007	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients (exp. 1 + 2) and context characteristics in exp. 3) *Note: “for exp. 3, respondents identified the cause of <i>group</i> differences in health, while in the first two experiments the vignette provided the cause of an <i>individual’s</i> poor health	Health care	Exp. 1 + 2: (1) respondents’ attribution of blame to the individual described in the vignette (“Ralph” and “Chuck”, respectively), and (2) responsibility for paying health care costs (the individual vs “citizens in society”) Exp. 3: (1) respondents’ perceived cause of the mentioned group differences in life expectancy, and (2) support for government health insurance.	Exp. 1: split sample 1. African American + behavioral cause (smoking: heart disease) 2. African American + family history cause 3. White + behavioral 4. White + history Exp. 2: split sample 1. Low-income + behavioral cause (unhealthy diet; diabetes) 2. Low-income + family history 3. High-income + behavioral 4. High-income + history Exp. 3: split sample 1. Women vs men 2. White vs African American 3. Wealthy vs low-income 4. College vs less than high school education	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: Respondents assign significantly more blame and greater treatment responsibility to Ralph when the vignette specifies that he has engaged in behaviors that could have caused his illness. The racial cue has no significant main effect. There is also no significant interaction effect between the causal and racial cue. *Exp. 2: Chuck is blamed less for his illness and assigned less treatment responsibility when he is portrayed as working rather than middle class. The effect of the causal cue on causal attribution was similar; but had no effect on treatment responsibility. Again, there was no significant interaction between the two cues. *Exp. 3: Respondents were more likely to choose a systemic cause (healthcare or economic system failure) for educational and income-related disparities than for racial or gender differences, while the latter two were far more frequently attributed to inborn biological or genetic characteristics. Behavioral attributions for racial health disparities were surprisingly infrequent in light of recognized racist stereotyping of African Americans as lazy.
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						*Exp. 3: compared with systemic attributions, behavioral and biological attributions are both associated with significantly less support for government-financed health insurance. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the effect of the racial cue is different for white and nonwhite respondents, with nonwhites blaming Ralph significantly less when he is described as African American (and assigning less treatment responsibility). *Exp. 2: no significant interaction between treatments and respondents' socioeconomic status. *Exp. 3: nonwhite respondents were more likely to attribute any group difference to systematic factors rather than to behaviors or biology, while conservatives and Republicans were more likely to attribute group differences to behaviors (and biology, for conservatives). Healthier people were also more likely to attribute differences to behaviors.
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Gramacho et al. (2025) Issue Framing Effects Across Information Environments Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> Brazil (N= 905 in survey 1; 1456 in survey 2; 775 in survey 3; 1636 in survey 4; and 3494 in survey 5) <u>Time:</u> November-December 2018 for survey 1, January 2019 for survey 2, March 2019 for survey 3, December 2019 for survey 4, and March 2022 for survey 5	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy design	Social security (mostly pensions)	“President Jair Bolsonaro intends to reform Social Security. Would you say that you are for or against the approval of new rules for Social Security”?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: only the text on the left 2. Treatment 1: received the message that social security will be reformed to <i>increase investments in health and education</i>. 3. Treatment 2: received message that social security will be reformed to <i>reduce spending on retirement and pensions</i>.	<u>Main effects:</u> / <u>Conditional effects:</u> *In low-salience information environments, both frames exert their influence as expected. The “reduce spending” argument decreased support for social security reform and the “increase investments” frame boosted agreement with that reform. Under a high-salience information environment, neither of the treatment frames influenced individuals’ opinions. *Thus, if each study was conducted in isolation, very different conclusions would have been reached. When issue salience is high enough (measured here as prominence in the news media), surveys might not detect any experimental framing effects on public opinion. *The authors also argue that they find evidence for their resurging effect hypothesis, stating that the frames regain impact after issue salience decreases again. In fact, the “increase investment” frame had the strongest effect in the last survey (61% support the reform versus 32% in the control group; this was 25% in the other group).
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Greenberg (2018) Public Preferences for Targeted and Universal Preschool AERA Open	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2013	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing, priming, information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design + outcomes (exp. 1) and policy recipients (exp. 2)	Preschool/child care	Support for the depicted preschool program. Exp. 1: “Would you support or oppose the government funding programs like these”? Exp. 2: “Would you support or oppose your state funding programs like this one”?	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Description of a targeted preschool program, for low-earning families only, leading to the positive outcome of “help close the gap between low- and high-income children in school and later on in life” 2. Description of a universal preschool program, which supposedly doesn’t close the said income gap. Exp. 2: split sample 1. Tax prime: “taxes may have to be increased on households like yours” 2. Tax-free prime: “no increase of taxes on households like yours” Exp. 3: split sample 1. General description of preschool program + picture of white teacher with two white children 2. General description + picture of black children	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: There is no distinguishable preference for targeted over universal preschool, on average (36% has no preference; 35% favors universal preschool; 29% targeted). *Exp. 2: the possibility of higher taxes has no statistically significant effect on support for targeted programs. By contrast, the threat of higher taxation substantially decreases support for universal preschool. Respondents shown the tax-free prime demonstrate a marginally significant preference for the universal approach, whereas those exposed to higher taxation show a more substantial preference for targeted preschool. *Exp. 3: there is no significant difference in support for targeted/universal preschool by the race of the children attending. *Exp. 4: the addition of information about child outcomes has no detectable effect on preferences for either targeted or universal preschool. Also frames defined by program cost do not significantly affect support for the universal approach either.
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					*Note: descriptions of the effects of targeted v. universal preschool are “a simplified summary of recent findings”. Exp. 4: see Appendix A	<u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: because there was concern of potential presence of bias due to the timing of the survey after Obama’s State of the Union (in which he mentioned preschool as a priority) and the ensuing media coverage, the survey was fielded again a couple of months later, among a smaller subsample of respondents (N=290). The results show that there were no significant differences in average support for either preschool approach between the two survey waves. *Support for universal preschool is generally more susceptible to considerations of financial self-interest than support for targeted programs. That is, the threat of higher taxation decreases support for universal preschool among a number of groups, incl. males, whites, Democrats, Independents, ideological moderates, the higher educated, those without school-aged children, and those low/moderate in egalitarianism. *A small number of subgroups appears consistent in the level of support for both targeted and universal preschool, regardless of the possibility of higher taxes (e.g., Blacks, low-income people, parents, and those who identify as highly ideological).
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Groskind (1991) Public Reactions to Poor Families: Characteristics That Influence Attitudes toward Assistance Social Work Groskind (1994) Ideological Influences on Public Support for Assistance to Poor Families Social Work	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1470) <u>Time:</u> 1986	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unspecified: “public assistance”	“What should this family’s weekly income be? Include both the amount of money already available from sources other than government and any public assistance support you think should get. Remember that changes in the amounts spent on public assistance programs could lead to changes in the taxes you pay.” *note: the scale ranged from 0 to 600 dollars and included the following two markers: (1) average U.S. family income at 400, and amount already received by the family at 300 dollars.	Vignette experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Number of children 2. Father’s employment status 3. Mother’s employment status 4. Mother’s education 5. Current weekly income (see Iyengar, 1990 for the same experiment!)	<u>Main effects:</u> see Iyengar <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There was only 1 statistically significant difference between higher- and lower-income respondents: the former rewarded a poor family with a mother who was employed full-time more benefits than did their low-income counterparts (an increase of 22 dollars vs a decrease of 7 dollars). *There were several significant differences between black and white respondents). The most striking difference was between the constant amounts granted (172 for black respondents; 77 for white). This was the sum recommended for a relatively undeserving family type. Furthermore, the father’s work status was very important to white but not to black respondents. *Women were much less concerned with characteristics of deservingness in supporting mother-only families. The father’s work status was important to men, even for mother-only families. Furthermore, men granted increased benefits to mother-only families if the mother was working full-time or if she could not find affordable childcare, whereas women did not reward either of these characteristics.
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Gross & Wronski (2021) Helping the Homeless: The Role of Empathy, Race and Deservingness in Motivating Policy Support and Charitable Giving Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> U.S (N=691 in exp. 1 & 1226 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2015 for exp. 1 & 2017 for exp. 2 *note: only white respondents were recruited	<u>Framing concept:</u> episodic framing (information) <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual homeless people	Government policy to assist the homeless	Exp. 1: How much effort would you like the federal government to devote to solving the problem of poverty, hunger and homelessness? Exp. 2: scale of item from exp. 1 + two extra items: - Do you think the federal government spends too much or too little on programs to end homelessness? - Do you think it's a good or bad idea for the government to cut back on social welfare and encourage private charities to take care of Americans in need of assistance, like homeless people? (Other dependent variables, measuring sympathy for the homeless and charitable giving, are less relevant).	Exp. 1: split-sample (video!) 1. Black homeless individuals with no deservingness info. 2. White homeless individuals with no deservingness info. 3. Black homeless individuals with information that suggests responsibility is beyond their control. 4. White homeless individuals with information that suggests responsibility is beyond their control. Exp. 2: split-sample (video!) Same treatment groups as exp. 1 but now also with a control group that does not see a video.	<u>Main effects:</u> *The race of the homeless individual has no significant effect. *Deservingness information modestly but significantly increases support for government policies to address homelessness compared to treatments that provide no deservingness information when viewing homeless individuals who are white. There was no significant effect of deservingness appeals relative to the no information condition when viewing black homeless individuals. *However, it is also stated that “we find no significant differences in the effect of deservingness by race”??? *In exp. 2 (but not 1), there is a main effect of deservingness, indicating that support for government policy is higher when the depicted homeless individuals hold signs with information that suggests they are not personally responsible for their situation. <u>Conditional effects:</u> / (Although empathy and racial resentment are included, their moderating effect is only assessed for charitable giving)
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Guardino & Mettler (2020) Revealing the “Hidden welfare state”: How policy information influences public attitudes about tax expenditures Journal of Behavioral Public Administration	<u>Place:</u> US (N=526) <u>Time:</u> 2008	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design + policy outcomes	Tax expenditures: the home mortgage interest tax deduction (HMID), the retirement savings contribution tax credit (RSCTC), and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)	Support for these tax credits before and after receiving information: Do you favor or oppose the policy?	Within-subjects experiment: 1. Basic information group: received no information at T1, and only a basic policy description at T2 2. Full information group: received no information at T1, and the basic description + the distributive impact of the policy at T2 3. Two-step information group: received basic description at T1, and information about distributive impact at T2	<u>Main effects:</u> *The basic information treatment caused subjects to express a higher level of favorability toward the HMID and RSCTC. However, mean support for both tax expenditures dropped sharply in the full information condition, when respondents learned about their regressive nature. *The treatment effects are much smaller with regard to the EITC, but the increase in support after receiving information about the policy’s downward distribution is still highly significant. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Once they were informed that the HMID and RSCTC mostly benefit the affluent, low- and middle-income respondents shifted their opinions from strong support to opposition. Change was especially dramatic for low-income people. Accordingly, the information helped these respondents align their opinions with their material interests. Effects on their high-income counterparts were considerably weaker. *With regard to the EITC, effects were by contrast somewhat larger (but all in the same direction) for high-income earners.
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Haderup Larsen & Schaeffer (2021) Healthcare chauvinism during the COVID-19 pandemic Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=1208) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare claimants	Healthcare	The extent to which a hypothetical person with acute COVID-19 deserves priority to a hospital bed over someone else	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Name (Muslim names; middle-class Nordic names; working-class Nordic names) 2. Length of residence 3. Age Note: all depicted persons were male!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Covid-19 patients with a Muslim name who were born in Denmark are regarded as similarly deserving of hospital treatment as ethnic minority patients. There is thus no evidence of “racism-driven healthcare chauvinism”. *Respondents think that patients with a Danish/Nordic name who immigrated to Denmark only a year ago should be prioritized less (-16% of the SD). The effect for recent immigrants with a Muslim name is =more than double as strong though (-40% of the SD). *Respondents do not distinguish between patients with middle- or working-class Danish/Nordic names. Both types of ethnic majority patients enjoy the same advantage over recent immigrant patients with a Muslim name. *Respondents generally prioritize younger patients (of 58) over older ones (of 83). *There is no significant interaction effect between age and the other characteristics of the patient. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Haeder & Sylvester (2024) I paid into it with every paycheck I earned: How benefit type and beneficiary contributions shape attitudes about increasing or decreasing administrative burdens for social protections Policy Studies Journal	<u>Place:</u> US (N=2904) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)	Support for (1) adding administrative burdens (i.e., face-to-face interviews + provision of government-issues documents) to the existing programs, and (2) easing those burdens (i.e., presumptive eligibility + express lane eligibility)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Medicare treatment: “the nation’s public health insurance program for people aged 65 or older. All seniors qualify for the program if they have worked and paid taxes long enough”. 2. Medicaid treatment: “public health insurance program for low-income Americans. Individuals qualify for the program regardless of whether they have previously worked and paid taxes”. 3. Social Security treatment: “public cash-payment program” + contributory in design 4. TANF treatment: cash + not contributory 5. TANF + work requirements treatment: adding the sentence “However, individuals on the program must be engaged in a work activity in order to maintain benefits” 6. Medicaid + work requirements treatment	<u>Main effects:</u> *We only find very limited evidence that Americans differentiate between earned and unearned benefits and in-kind and cash benefits when it comes to administrative burdens. *The only significant effects observed in the study are that people are more supportive of adding in-person interviews to Medicaid and TANF than to Medicare (even when it is mentioned that the latter programs include work requirements). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Notwithstanding some significant interaction effects, the authors also conclude that important subgroups in the American public (according to political ideology and racial resentment) differentiate little between the different social policy programs under consideration. This might be because both the burden-increasing and the burden-relaxing measures are quite popular among all groups for all programs (=ceiling effects?).
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Haeder et al. (2023) More Than Words? How Highlighting Target Populations Affects Public Opinion about the Medicaid Program Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law	<u>Place:</u> US (N=2086) <u>Time:</u> 2020 *Note: data was collected during the Covid-19 pandemic, which is mentioned in the discussion as a possible context factor influencing the results	<u>Framing concept:</u> priming, framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipients (+ policy design?) *Note: the treatments to some extent also vary the presence of citizenship and residency criteria, which might be seen as belonging to policy design	Medicaid	(1) Medicaid favorability, (2) perceived deservingness of Medicaid recipients, (3) support for proposed policy changes to the program: block-granting Medicaid, expanding the use of out-of-pocket payments, wellness incentives, and work requirements	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: basic description of Medicaid program, without clear reference to the target population(s) 2. Low-income treatment: mentioning low-income individuals and families as target 3. Low-income plus: adding children, pregnant women and aged, blind or disabled people as targets 4. Citizen: mentioning citizens and legal, long-term residents as targets 5. Low-income + citizen 6. Low-income plus + citizen	<u>Main effects:</u> *The only significant difference with the control group was with the citizens treatment, which primed respondents to think about US citizens and green card holders (inducing an increase in program favorability from 3.64 to 3.89). *All other treatment effects did not differ from the control group with regard to program favorability. *With regard to perceived deservingness and support for wellness incentives or block grants, there were no statistically significant treatment effects. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The citizen treatment had a particularly strong effect on Republicans as well as the racially resentful. Among the latter, a negative effect of the low-income treatment was also observed. Almost no differences were found among Democrats and those low in racial resentment. *Generally, there were no significant effects on low-educated respondents and those who had personal experience with Medicaid. *Overall, however, there was little heterogeneity in the effects.
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Haeder (2025a) How Long-Held Perceptions of Deservingness Continue to Shape Public Attitudes About Program Eligibility Politics & Policy	<u>Place:</u> US (N=4177) <u>Time:</u> 2022 *Note: about half of the respondents did not complete the survey because they failed (one of three) the attention checks	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipient characteristics	Medicaid (health insurance/care)	Do you think [name] should be allowed to enroll in Medicaid?	Vignette experiment randomly varying: 1. Target group: a disabled woman, a single mother with two young children, a healthy single woman, a women with a drug addiction 2. Race: White, Black, Asian, Hispanic *Other characteristics, such as gender, were held constant across the different vignettes	<u>Main effects:</u> *Preferences for enrollment for the 4 scenarios were consistent across all four races/ethnicities presented, with support highest for the enrollment of the woman with disabilities, followed by the single mother, the woman with addiction, and lastly the single woman. *Respondents were equally supportive (or unsupportive) for all four individuals no matter what their race or ethnicity was. This did not have any significant impact. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Similar patterns held for liberals and conservatives, and for those low and high in racial resentment. *The authors find it somewhat odd that those scoring high on racial resentment are not affected by the racial cue, but argue that this might be because these (and other) respondents already associate Medicaid with ethnic minorities. This could also explain why the racially resentful are overall less supportive of the program.
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Haeder (2025b) Assessing the Effect of Deservingness Cues on Tolerance for Administrative Burdens Policy Studies Journal	<u>Place:</u> US (N=4177) <u>Time:</u> 2022 *Note: about half of the respondents did not complete the survey because they failed (one of three) the attention checks	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipient characteristics	Medicaid (health insurance/care)	In her home state, [name] is eligible to enroll in Medicaid. Do you think [name] should be required to apply in person or should be allowed to apply online? (=administrative burden tolerance)	Vignette experiment randomly varying: 1. Target group: a disabled woman, a single mother with two young children, a healthy single woman, a women with a drug addiction 2. Race: White, Black, Asian, Hispanic *Other characteristics, such as gender, were held constant across the different vignettes	<u>Main effects:</u> *Across all respondents, burden tolerance was consistently lowest for those with disabilities, followed by single mothers. Respondents were most tolerant of burdens for women with addictions and single able-bodied women. Often, burden tolerance was indistinguishable between the two. *There was no evidence that the race/ethnicity of the claimants had any substantive effect on respondents' burden tolerance. *Respondents consistently favored the vignettes with the Black women in deserving life circumstances over the White women in less deserving life circumstances. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *All these patterns did not significantly differ between conservatives and liberals, those low and high in racial resentment, and whites v. non-whites. *There were some small differences with regard to political ideology, racial resentment and race, but these could have been coincidental due to the large number of comparisons made.
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Hansen (2007) The Sophisticated Public: The Effect of Competing Frames on Public Opinion Scandinavian Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=2000) <u>Time:</u> 2005	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy context/outcomes	Education, welfare, unemployment benefits	Education: spending on public schools + increasing competition between the students Welfare: spending on “public transfer income” Unemployment: agreement with statement that lowering benefits is a good way to increase employment + same but for lowering taxes + same but increasing training + forced choice between these three options	Split-sample experiment with 14 groups. Example for education (see Table 1). The most important thing is that there were positive frames, negative frames and dual frames (as well as a control).	<u>Main effects:</u> *There were only four statistically significant effects: (1) the so-called positive frame for education (“Denmark is among the countries spending the most money per student”) had a negative effect on support for spending on public schools, as did the dual frame (which added that “Danish students are criticized in international studies for poor reading skills”), (2) the positive frame for welfare had a positive effect on spending preferences (but the negative and dual frame did not), and (3) the negative frame for unemployment had a positive effect on support for lowering taxes on work. *Overall, the majority of effects was thus insignificant. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Supportive frames are most effective among the politically aware and the conflicting frames are most effective among the less politically aware – regardless of predisposition as the same finding is present within the socialist group and the liberal/conservative group. *If the respondents accept the arguments, they have stronger effects on their opinions.
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Hansen (2018) Who Cares If They Need Help? The Deservingness Heuristic, Humanitarianism, and Welfare Opinions Political Psychology	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=1939 in both exp. 2 and 3) <u>Time:</u> 2015-6 *Note: exp. 1 was a true convenience sample, recruited via the researcher's network on Facebook	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients (general in exp. 2; individuals in exp. 3)	Social welfare	Exp. 2: "Do you think that eligibility requirements for social welfare should be tightened?" Exp. 3: Agreement with the statement that "the activation requirements for social welfare should be tightened for him", with "him" being the person depicted in the vignette.	Exp. 2: split sample 1. Control group: no treatment 2. News article "People on welfare don't bother to work": provides the results of a scientific report concluding that a lack of motivation is the most important driver of unemployment (and this is confirmed by a social worker in the article). 3. News article "People on welfare are helpless": same actors but now they claim that unemployment is mostly caused by poor health and external circumstances; and can thus not be attributed to people's motivation. Exp. 3: same as Aaroe & Petersen (2014).	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 2: Respondents exposed to the article that described welfare recipients as lazy were significantly less supportive (15% points) than those exposed to the article depicting them as unlucky. *Exp. 3: Respondents who received the vignette where the welfare recipient was described as unlucky were on average 55 % points more supportive than those who received the vignette about the lazy recipient. Average support in the lazy condition was 0.13; 0.42 in the control condition, and 0.68 in the unlucky condition (on 0-1 scale). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 2: Humanitarianism significantly moderates the effect: respondents' welfare opinions are more affected by deservingness cues the stronger the humanitarian values they hold. No such moderating effects were found for egalitarianism, individualism and left-right ideology. *Exp. 3: again, only humanitarianism is a significant moderator of the treatment effect, indicating that it amplifies people's susceptibility to deservingness cues even when these cues concern an individual welfare recipient.
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Harell et al. (2013) Public opinion, prejudice and the racialization of welfare in Canada Ethnic and Racial Studies	<u>Place:</u> Canada (N=767) <u>Time:</u> 2011	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Social assistance	Support for granting social assistance to the person depicted in the vignette (“Wayne”), on a scale from 0 to 4. *note: person positivity bias is mentioned in passing (on p. 7)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Group 1: it is mentioned that “Wayne was raised on an Indian Reserve”, thereby indicating that he has Aboriginal roots. 2. Group 2: same vignette but Aboriginal roots is not mentioned.	<u>Main effects:</u> *There is no evidence that the mention of the Indian reserve significantly reduces support. *Interestingly, the treatment effect becomes positive and significant when control variables and the interaction with respondents’ feelings towards Aboriginals (see below) are added to the models. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Those with more negative attitudes towards Aboriginal people are more likely to be affected negatively by the experimental treatment. Hence, “the effect of showing an Aboriginal recipient is restricted to those predisposed to dislike this target group”.
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Harell & Lieberman (2021) How information about race-based health disparities affects policy preferences: Evidence from a survey experiment about the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States Social Science & Medicine	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3241) <u>Time:</u> 2020 *Note: those who failed the attention check or completed the survey too quickly were excluded from the analysis (p. 2).	<u>Framing concept:</u> information + priming <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of macro context	Covid-19 relief	Four items capturing support for policies that provide extra support for those most affected by COVID-19, incl. people experiencing job loss, lost business revenue, mental health problems, and high medical bills. *Note: there are 4 other outcome variables, but none of these refer to social policies	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group 2. Information treatment: only information about COVID-related death rates by race and ethnicity (indicating that Blacks were 2.5 times more likely to die). 3. Prior belief treatment: only asking respondents to estimate the n° of COVID-related deaths by race and ethnicity. 4. 'Correction' treatment: first estimation, then information	<u>Main effects:</u> *The information treatment had no statistically significant effect on support for Covid-19 relief; also not when false prior beliefs were corrected. Neither did the prior belief priming only. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There were no statistically significant interaction effects between the treatments and respondents' racial identity and racial affect. Note: there were significant effects for some of the other outcome variables; but not for the variable that is relevant for this review.
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Haselswerdt & Bartels (2015) Public Opinion, Policy Tools, and the Status Quo: Evidence from a Survey Experiment Political Research Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2012	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing; information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Home mortgage interest deduction (HMID); job training for the unemployed; paid parental leave	Approval or disapproval of the proposed program (on a 7-point scale)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Tax expenditure + info about the program's contribution to the national debt 2. Cash transfer + same information 3. Tax expenditure + no information 4. Cash transfer + no information *Note: it were in fact three vignette experiments; one per policy domain. As a result, the national debt information differed across the vignettes.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents were significantly more likely to support the different social policies when they were described as being tax breaks rather than direct payments (HMID=+43.4%; parental leave=16.3%; training=+8.6%). *Respondents were significantly less likely to support the policies when information about its impact on national debt was provided. *The negative effect of the debt information was larger in the tax expenditure condition, but only for the HMID policy domain. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The tax expenditure treatment had a larger effect on conservative respondents (at least for HMID and job training), but still had a positive effect for the most liberal respondents (for HMID and parental leave). *Homeowners reacted even more positively to the tax expenditure treatment than other policies (for HMID). The effect was, by contrast, smaller for unemployed people (for job training) and insignificant for respondents with children (for parental leave).
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Haselswerdt (2020) Social Welfare Attitudes and Immigrants as a Target Population: Experimental Evidence Perspectives on Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=2209) <u>Time:</u> 2017	<u>Framing concept:</u> priming <u>Framing content:</u> macro-level characteristics of migrants; policy context	“Generic social welfare policy”	Perceived recipients of hypothetical policy described as “government assistance in the form of extra money to help with living expenses for people with lower incomes” (dichotomous variable with 1 = “immigrants” but not “Americans born in the US)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Cultural threat prime (emphasizing increase in use of foreign language) 2. Fiscal threat prime (emphasizing lower tax revenues from illegal immigrants) 3. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *In the control group, 19% of the respondents assumed the described policy would benefit immigrants but not U.S. born people. *The cultural threat prime does not seem to have had any appreciable effect on this. *There is a statistically significant increase (to 26%) in the fiscal threat group. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is no evidence that those with anti-immigration views are especially susceptible to the primes. *For respondents who live in areas with larger Hispanic populations, both the cultural and fiscal threat primes increase the likelihood of assuming that the policy will benefit immigrants.
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Haselswerdt (2022) Who Benefits? Race, Immigration, and Assumptions About Policy Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> U.S (N=1799) <u>Time:</u> 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristic of policy design	Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)	(1) Target group assumptions (i.e., benefiting blacks but not whites; or immigrants and not U.S. born people); (2) Policy support	Split-sample experiment: 1. Tax credit + presence or work requirement 2. Cash benefit + presence of work requirement 3. Tax credit + no work requirement mentioned 4. Cash benefit + no work requirement *Note: the authors discuss the possibility that respondents are already knowledgeable about both the presence of work requirements in the EITC and its ethnic composition. Such knowledge can indicate pretreatment effects (p. 276) or it might mean that respondents were simply applying that knowledge in the survey (p. 281).	<u>Main effects:</u> *Significantly fewer respondents in the “conditional” treatment groups assumed blacks (and not whites) and immigrants (and not native-born Americans) would benefit. The tax credit manipulation had no statistically significant effect. *The conditional tax credit prompt also increased the likelihood that respondents think whites or native-born Americans benefit. *The unconditional cash benefit treatment is significantly less popular than all others (Table 3). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The inclusion of a work requirement appears to make all respondents less likely to assume blacks and not whites will benefit, regardless of their existing racial attitudes. The same is found for immigration attitudes. *There is no significant interaction between the treatments and respondents’ education either.
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Häusermann et al. (2019) The Politics of Trade-Offs: Studying the Dynamics of Welfare State Reform With Conjoint Experiments Comparative Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> Switzerland (N=1873) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Old-age pensions	(1) Forced choice between two pension reform packages, (2) likelihood of supporting each of the two packages in a popular referendum	Conjoint experiment randomly varying the following reform elements, which each time had three types of levels (with different wordings though): 1. Pension cutbacks, second pillar: status quo, government proposal, going beyond the government proposal 2. Cutbacks in widows' pensions 3. Increase in age of retirement 4. Subsidies for early retirement 5. Extend eligibility, second pillar 6. Increased revenues from VAT	<u>Main effects:</u> *Pension retrenchment (pension cutbacks, lower widows' pensions, and a general increase in the retirement age) clearly, significantly, and sometimes massively reduces support for reform. Raising women's retirement age from 64 to 65, by contrast, increases support for the overall reform (presumably from the perspective of gender equality). *Compensating particular groups through subsidies for low-income earners or increased revenues from VAT does not have a significant impact. The only compensation strategy that does have a significant effect is recalibration: extending eligibility to second pillar pensions for low-income earners and part-time workers (mostly women) increases the probability of the reform being accepted by almost 5%. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Among lower-income earners, targeted subsidies increase support for the reform by 5.7%, whereas the middle- and higher-income earners are basically indifferent towards these reform elements (although the difference between the groups is not significant).
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						*Overall, income as such does not seem to be a very strong predictor of the specific relative importance different compensations have for different groups (nor is education). *Differences are stronger when we compare active men and women. For example, recalibration increased support for the reform significantly by 6.1% among women, while the effect was small and not significant for men. *Pension retrenchment reduced overall support among all voters. However, left-wing voters were more skeptical of the more drastic retrenchment measures. For example, the difference among left-wing voters and the moderate right was significant regarding unbalanced budget cuts and increasing the retirement age to 67. *Partisanship is a more forceful predictor of the effectiveness of compensations than socioeconomic conditions because all three compensation strategies have the most traction among left-wingers. *Because the authors were concerned that the observed effects were situational (i.e., influenced by media debates), they repeated the experiment one year later. Results prove almost identical.
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Hjorth (2016) Who benefits? Welfare chauvinism and national stereotypes European Union Politics	<u>Place:</u> Sweden (N=2525) <u>Time:</u> 2013	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients *Note: the individual recipients are merely given as example recipients, to avoid person-positivity bias (see p. 10)	Child benefits	Opposition to cross-border welfare rights in the EU (in general; not just for the described individuals)	Factorial experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Nationality (Dutch or Bulgarian) 2. Number of children and relevant benefit amount (1 to 5) 3. Children can stay in home country (mentioned vs not mentioned)	<u>Main effects:</u> *When it is mentioned that the children for whom benefits are received can stay in the home country, opposition to cross-border welfare rights increases with 19% on the response scale (0-1). *Being Bulgarian and having more children also increases opposition, by 6% and 3%, respectively. *There are no significant interaction effects between these characteristics. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Ideology moderates the effect of cues about beneficiary characteristics. Especially the nationality cue has a stronger effect on those who score high on ethnic prejudice and economic conservatism. The children cue only has a stronger effect for those high in ethnic prejudice. *Accordingly, the cues elicit stronger reactions among those ideologically opposed to cross-border welfare rights to begin with.
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Hopkins & Mummolo (2017) Assessing the Breadth of Framing Effects Quarterly Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3318) <u>Time:</u> 2011	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics + policy outcomes	Healthcare and anti-poverty policy	(1) Preferred spending levels for healthcare, (2) Preferred spending for aid to the poor	See Figure 1 on p. 46. “All four arguments were written to be typical of conservative political figures and were attributed to an unnamed U.S. Senator”. “All arguments had approximately the same length and reading level”. “75% of the respondents were randomly assigned to read one of the four arguments and then asked the following open-ended question: ‘do you think the Senator is making a convincing argument?’” (= frame strength). *For the specific wording of the arguments, see Appendix.	<u>Main effects:</u> *The crime frame had little impact on anti-poverty attitudes or healthcare attitudes. *Healthcare attitudes are heavily politicized, and attitudes on healthcare spending are accordingly less treatment responsive. There is, however, a small and significant positive effect of the healthcare treatment. *None of the arguments have a meaningful effect on anti-poverty attitudes with even the largest effect (from the stimulus spending treatment) inducing only a 1.2 percentage point change. *Accordingly, the healthcare frame has a stronger impact on healthcare spending than on attitudes on anti-poverty spending, indicating “limited spillover effects”. <u>Conditional effects:</u> / *Note: partisanship seems to be included only as a control variable in the regression models.
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Huber & Paris (2013) Assessing the programmatic equivalence assumption in question wording experiments. Understanding why Americans like assistance to the poor more than welfare Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=994) <u>Time:</u> 2012	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> question wording	Welfare/assistance to the poor	(1) Spending preferences: too much (-1), too little (1), or the right amount (0)? (2) Below is a list of programs and services that are often in the news. Which of these programs and services do you consider to be welfare/assistance to the poor?	Split-sample experiment: 1. "Welfare" 2. "Assistance to the poor"	<u>Main effects:</u> *The average level of support for spending on assistance to the poor ($M = -.388$) exceeds support for spending on welfare ($M = -.004$) and this difference is statistically significant (cf. Smith, 1987). *Of the 9 programs on the list, three were equally likely to be considered either welfare or assistance: food support, public housing, and cash assistance (by more than 75% of respondents). *"For the remaining programs, we found large differences between the two conditions". In all of them, respondents are substantially more likely to classify the programs as assistance to the poor rather than welfare (in particular: things like homeless shelters and food banks). But also: Medicaid, EITC, Social Security/Medicare, disability and unemployment insurance. *However, in the pilot study only 15% spontaneously mentioned things like homeless shelters or food banks as being assistance to the poor, which indicates that citizens do not associate it with either welfare nor with assistance to the poor. It's even less for some of the other programs, like EITC.
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Ingham & Levin (2018) Effects of Deliberative Minipublics on Public Opinion: Experimental Evidence from a Survey on Social Security Reform International Journal of Public Opinion Research	<u>Place:</u> US (N=5758) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> information about the opinions of fellow citizens and political elites	Social Security	Disagreement with two specific Social Security reforms: (1) raising the retirement age, and (2) raising the cap on payroll taxes Also: preferred reform option, with a choice between (1) and (2), but also: raising workers' payroll contributions	Split-sample experiment, separately for each policy reform: 1. Control group: no information 2. Citizens support treatment: "A nonprofit organization recently recruited a random collection of ordinary citizens to participate in a deliberative forum on how to fund the Social Security program in the future. After hearing expert testimony, weighing evidence, and deliberating together, a majority supported raising the retirement age to 68". 3. Citizens support, elites oppose treatment: "But when a bipartisan panel of Congressional leaders and business and labor representatives recently heard expert testimony, weighed evidence and deliberated about the same issue, a majority opposed raising the retirement age". 4. Elites support, citizens oppose	<u>Main effects:</u> *Raising the retirement age: 61.1% oppose this in the control group, - 7.2% when citizens support the reform, -4.5% when citizens support but elites oppose, and - 2.3% when it is vice versa. *Raising the cap on payroll taxes: 20.3% disagree in the control group, +1.4% in citizens support treatment, +4.8% in citizen support vs elite opposition, +8.2% in citizens oppose vs elite support. *Exposure to the views of the citizens' panel had no significant effect on which proposed reform respondent selected as their most preferred option. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The opinion of the deliberative panel of ordinary citizens was generally more likely to influence uninformed respondents, who had little knowledge and reported lower familiarity with Social Security. *For the raise of the retirement age, no effects were found among the more informed respondents. This is different for raising the cap on payroll taxes, in which the rate of disagreement did decline sharply when exposed to the information.
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Iyengar (1990) Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1365) <u>Time:</u> 1986	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unspecified: “public assistance”	“What should this family’s weekly income be? Include both the amount of money already available from sources other than government and any public assistance support you think should get. Remember that changes in the amounts spent on public assistance programs could lead to changes in the taxes you pay.” *note: the scale ranged from 0 to 600 dollars and included the following two markers: (1) average U.S. family income at 400, and amount already received by the family at 300 dollars.	Vignette experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Number of children 2. Father’s employment status 3. Mother’s employment status 4. Mother’s education 5. Current weekly income (see Groskind for the same experiment!)	<u>Main effects:</u> *The most important piece of information conveyed in the vignette was the family’s current level of income: the higher the income, the higher the amount of assistance considered appropriate; with + 33 dollar (=anchor effect). *The greater the number of dependent children, the greater the amount of assistance (+6.19 per child). Similarly, if the male parent was physically disabled, the level of aid was boosted considerably. *Support was greater if the father or mother was looking for employment (+18/17). *Mothers who refused to work because of transportation problems were penalized by 9 dollar per week, while those who refused to work for the minimum wage were penalized with 18 dollar. When the reason cited was the cost of child care, there was no penalty. *Lower-educated mothers were granted more than higher-educated mothers (+8.78). *Never-married mothers were awarded a somewhat smaller level of assistance than married or divorced mothers.
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Jacobsen (2019) How do different sources of policy analysis affect policy preferences? Experimental evidence from the United States Policy Sciences	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1443) <u>Time:</u> 2017 *Note: there were no less than 6 attention checks. However, almost all respondents passed these.	<u>Framing concept:</u> information, framing, persuasion (“unspecified”) <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Health, housing, labour policy	Preference between two policy options Health: health insurance tax credits v. government-provided insurance Housing: housing vouchers v. public housing Labour: EITC v. minimum wage	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. Liberal treatment: information about cost-effectiveness research produced by a liberal (Democrat-leaning) organization. 3. Conservative treatment: research by a conservative (Republican-leaning) organization 4. Non-partisan treatment: research by a politically neutral organization	<u>Main effects:</u> *For health policy, both the nonpartisan and liberal source had a significant positive effect on the choice for the most cost-effective policy (although the first was larger than the second). For labour policy, only the nonpartisan treatment had a significant positive effect. No effects were found for housing policy. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *For health policy, the liberal treatment positively affected liberal voters but not moderates and conservatives (as expected). The nonpartisan treatment had a significant positive effect on liberals and especially moderates. The conservative treatment only affected conservatives. *For labour policy, the liberal treatment only affected liberal voters, but the conservative treatment had no effect (also not on conservatives). The nonpartisan information affected all groups, especially moderates. *For housing policy, there was only 1 significant effect: nonpartisan information positively impacted moderates.
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Jacobs & Matthews (2012) Why Do Citizens Discount the Future? Public Opinion and the Timing of Policy Consequences British Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1213) <u>Time:</u> 2008	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes, but also context and design?	Old-age pensions	Support for a policy reform that imposes costs on workers and/or seniors today in order to accumulate resources that would close the financing gap in pensions tomorrow. Specifically, a reform support index consisting of: - Do you support or oppose the reform? - I would be willing to pay the costs of this Social Security reform - It would be a good idea for the government to adopt this reform	Split-sample experiment randomly varying the timing of benefits, causal complexity, and benefits expression 1. Timing of 5 years, verbal expression of costs/benefits, low causal complexity (“expert consensus”) 2. Timing of 5 yrs, verbal, no information on complexity (control) 3. Timing of 5 yrs, numerical expression, low complexity 4. Timing of 5 yrs, numerical, control 5. Timing of 40 yrs, verbal, low complexity 6. Timing of 40 yrs, verbal, control 7. Timing of 40 yrs, numerical, low complexity 8. Timing of 40 yrs, numerical, control *Note: info was presented as a policy brief (not news report).	<u>Main effects:</u> *Mean support for the reform was higher in the 5-year timing condition (0.44) than in the 40-year condition (0.37). This difference is highly significant and implies that moving benefits from 40 years into the future to just 5 years increases support by nearly 20%. *Within each timing level, support is higher among those to whom the policy is described as causally simple. However, the difference in support by timing condition is substantially smaller for those in the low causal complexity group. *The timing effect is more than twice as large in the verbal than in the numerical condition. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Age, education, parental status, gender and economic perceptions did not moderate the effect of the timing treatment. *Only income did, to some extent, with the poorest quantile displaying greater aversion to the delay of benefits than the top 75%. *Also political trust acted as a moderator, with the strongest effects found among those with the lowest levels of trust.
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Jäger (2024) Social benefits for European Union immigrants? A survey experiment on misperceptions European Union Politics	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=832) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> people's relative income position in Germany/EU; policy context	Social benefits	How long should migrants from other EU member states work and pay taxes before they get the same rights to social benefits as citizens who already live here?	Split-sample experiment: 1. EU treatment: respondents were shown a figure depicting the EU income distribution and were then shown information on both their actual and estimated income position. 2. EU + national treatment: respondents were shown the same information for Germany as well. 3. Control group: no information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Informing subjects about their EU or German income position does not alter their preferences toward the welfare rights of EU foreigners. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Individuals who are informed that they rank lower cross-nationally or higher nationally than they thought become more welfare restrictive. *Information about EU misperceptions has a persistent treatment effect after 3 months, driven by respondents with larger initial misperceptions, but becomes insignificant after one year. *With regard to the national income position treatment, all effects turn insignificant after three months.
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Jensen & Kevins (2019) Numbers and Attitudes towards Welfare State Generosity Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> U.K (N=1952) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design/outcomes	“Welfare”	(Dis)agreement with the statement that benefits for the typical family on welfare are too generous.	Split-sample experiment varying two factors: 1. The income that the typical family on welfare has (in monetary terms) 2. The inclusion of a reference point, namely the yearly minimum wage income for a typical family: yes or no	<u>Main effects:</u> *The probability of agreeing that benefits are too generous increases from around 0.33 in the 9000 pounds treatment to about 0.61 in the 29.000 pounds treatment. *Information about the minimum wage does have an effect, but only for the 24.000 treatment group (which is above the minimum wage; 19.000): the probability of agreeing moves from 0.47 without minimum wage information to 0.62 with it. There is no effect for the 29.000 treatment. *Respondents do not seem to care if benefit levels are said to be less than half of the minimum wage, nor are they bothered if they are equally generous. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *High-knowledge respondents respond to increasingly large amounts of benefit income in a roughly linear manner, with no real signs that minimum wage information had an effect. Low-knowledge respondents were much more affected by such information.
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Jensen & Petersen (2016) The Deservingness Heuristic and the Politics of Health Care American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Exp. 3: Denmark (N=1005); Exp. 4 and 5: Denmark (N=510), Japan (N=528) and US (N=519) <u>Time:</u> ? *Note: exp. 1 and 2 were based on student samples	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	“Government aid”	Exp. 3: agreement with the statement that the person depicted (“Simon”) in the vignette deserved government aid Exp. 4: a “Controllability of Need” scale designed to measure the extent to which outcomes are perceived to be controllable or uncontrollable	Exp. 3: split-sample 1. Unemployed + high control: unskilled worker who is unemployed and did not accept the unions’ offer to receive training. 2. Unemployed + low control 3. Sick + high control: long-term smoker who did not accept his doctors’ help to quit smoking. 4. Sick + low control Exp. 4 + 5: split-sample 1. Respondents were asked about their beliefs about “people with serious illnesses”. 2. Respondents were asked about their beliefs about “people who are long-term unemployed”.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 3: Respondents support government aid significantly more for both the sick and unemployed recipients when they are framed as being low in control. *Exp. 3: Information about the recipients’ level of control is significantly and substantially (about one-third) less influential when the recipient is sick rather than unemployed. *Exp. 4: in all countries, participants are significantly more inclined to think of sickness as being brought about by uncontrollable causes as compared to unemployment. The differences in mean responses ranges between 7 and 12 % points on the full scale. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 3: these effects are not moderated by respondents’ self-interested concerns about becoming sick or unemployed. *Exp. 5: in all three countries, we see that political ideology significantly conditions responses in the unemployment but not in the sickness condition. Left-wingers typically view the unemployed as being unlucky victims, while right-wingers see them as lazy.
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Jerit (2009) How Predictive Appeals Affect Policy Opinions American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1154+1000) <u>Time:</u> 2006/7	<u>Framing concept:</u> (competitive) framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Social Security (=old-age pensions)	Support for the privatization of Social Security through private accounts	Split-sample experiment: 1. Unrefuted future (income) loss argument 2. Unrefuted future gain argument 3. Direct rebuttal of future loss argument (with gain argument) 4. Direct rebuttal of future gain argument 5. Alternate frame to future loss argument (about inheritance for their children) 6. Alternate frame to future gain argument (about the end of guaranteed income) 7. Control group: only received policy support question *Note: all arguments were based on actual statements made by political actors in the national media, giving the treatments high external validity	<u>Main effects:</u> *Average support for Social Security privatization is .41 for respondents receiving the unrefuted loss frame (on a scale from 0 to 1) while it is .53 in the unrefuted gain frame, a difference that is statistically significant. In the control group, the mean level of support is .45, which is significantly different from the gain but not the loss group (the authors argue that this is because respondents were more likely to already think they would lose money with privatization). *The remaining averages are: .42 for the direct rebuttal of future losses, .45 for the direct rebuttal or future gains, .48 for the alternate frame to future losses, and .49 for the alternate frame to gains. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *When belief likelihood is high, direct rebuttal has no effect on opinion, while an alternate framing strategy increases support in response to an initial argument about losing money. When belief likelihood is low, either strategy affects opinion.
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Johnson et al. (2023) Are “red wall” constituencies really opposed to progressive policy? Examining the impact of materialist narratives for Universal Basic Income British Politics	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=858 in exp. 1 and 677 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2021 *Note: all respondents were from specific geographic regions (Wales, the Midlands and North of England)	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing, persuasion <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Universal basic income	Exp. 1: (1) support for UBI; rating of how much the information in the survey had increased or decreased that support Exp. 2: idem	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Economic narrative: stressing the positive economic consequences of introducing a UBI 2. Health narrative: positive health outcomes Exp. 2: within-subject 1. T1: support for UBI among initial opponents <i>before</i> different persuasive narratives were shown 2. T2: support for UBI among initial opponents <i>after</i> different persuasive narratives were shown *Note: the persuasive narratives were produced by a select group of initial opponents through the method of “adversarial collaboration”.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: there was no significant difference between the treatments with regard to UBI support (perhaps because support was already high; ceiling effect?) nor in the rated impact of the narratives (but there was no control group?). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the health narrative produced higher support among homeowners than the economic narrative did, whilst the opposite pattern held for non-homeowners. The effects were not conditional on age and political ideology. *Exp. 2: support at T2 was dramatically higher than support at T1 (+31.3 on a 100-point scale).
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Jordan et al. (2021) Measuring and framing support for universal basic income Social Policy & Administration	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3600) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Universal basic income	Support for a universal basic income, on a scale from 1 to 5. “Now we'd like to get your opinion on new policy proposal. There is a new policy being tested around the world called Universal Basic Income (UBI). This policy guarantees a payment of money to individuals from their government, regard-less of need, qualification, or work.”	Split-sample experiment: 1. Positive policy-based argument + positive value-based argument 2. Pos. policy-based + neg. value-based 3. Pos. policy-based + no value-based ...all 9 combinations Neg. policy: “Some argue that it would be much too expensive to implement on a broad scale”. Pos. policy: “it would help solve unemployment problems caused by increasing automation across a variety of industries” Neg. value: “Others argue that it would encourage laziness by rewarding someone for not working” Pos. value: “it would help make society more fair by reducing income inequality caused by automation across a variety of industries”.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Negative frames affect support for UBI much more than positive frames do. Values frames have a weaker effect on UBI support than policy frames, though not demonstrably so. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Among core groups already predisposed to support (or reject) UBI, the treatments have no effect. <i>Conflicting</i> frames do not affect UBI support among ideological respondents. Positive frames do not increase UBI support among conservatives (Republicans). Liberals (Democrats) resist negative frames about UBI. Interestingly, though, negative conditions do further depress conservative (Republican) support for UBI, but we see no corresponding reaction in enhanced support among liberals (Democrats) who received positive conditions. *Interestingly, among moderate Independents, both of the negative treatments decrease support for UBI, but the positive treatments have no similar effect.
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Kawata et al. (2024) Narrative premiums in policy persuasion Political Psychology	<u>Place:</u> Japan (N=15.000) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients	Poverty relief	Preferences about appropriate levels of poverty relief funding. More specifically, a conjoint experiment task in which respondents are asked to allocate additional revenue from an increase in consumption tax over policy domains: (a) welfare, (b) pensions, (c) health insurance, (d) infrastructure, and (e) education (in comparison to redeem government debt!)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Narrative information treatment: a short essay describing a poor-single parent family (p. 390). 2. Statistical information treatment: percentage of single-parent families living in poverty. 3. Control group *Note: is this related to episodic vs thematic framing?	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents who are shown a narrative story about the plight of a single mother are more likely to support higher expenditures on poverty relief than those who are shown statistical information about the share of single parents living in poverty (=‘narrative premium’). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There are no differences in the size of the narrative premiums by partisanship, income, or educational background. *The narrative premium enhanced the poverty concerns of those who were already aware of it (measured by perceived poverty rates), rather than updating the knowledge of those who discounted prevailing poverty.
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Kangas (1997) Self-Interest and the Common Good: The Impact of Norms, Selfishness and Context in Social Policy Opinions Journal of Socio-Economics	<u>Place:</u> Finland (N=1117) <u>Time:</u> 1993 *note: the sample only includes working-aged people (excluding students, pensioners, etc.)	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing + information <u>Framing content:</u> mostly policy outcomes	Unemployment benefits, old-age pensions, social security	Agreement with different statements (in %)	Split-samples: Exp 1. “There should be a work tax with which the employed would support the unemployed” (control) vs “Unemployment causes great difficulties to families. Therefore, ...” (treatment) Exp. 3. “High pensions should be cut, that is, there should be a pension ceiling” vs “..., even if it would be cancelled out by private pension policies as has happened in other countries” Exp. 4. “The government should subsidize private pensions more effectively” vs “..., even though they benefit the well-to-do”.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: 28% in favour vs 40% *Exp. 3: 89% in favour vs 87%. However, the number of no response opinions triples on account of the framing (although it’s unclear how many respondents indicated not having an opinion). *Exp. 4: 29% in favour vs 14%. This time, the number of “no opinion” answers is cut in half by giving additional information. Over 20% was unable to take a stand on the unframed proposition, which indicates that the issue is somewhat unfamiliar.
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Kangas et al. (2022) Information and legitimacy: results from an experimental survey on attitudes to the 2017 pension reform in Finland Journal of Pension Economics and Finance	<u>Place:</u> Finland (N=1835) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics and policy outcomes (not well specified in article!!!)	Old-age pensions	(1) ‘Objective’ knowledge about the pension reform (i.e., the effects of postponing retirement, impact of increasing life expectancy on retirement age, and impact on adequacy of pension income), (2) ‘Subjective’ knowledge about pension reform, (3) Concerns about increasing retirement age, adequacy of the pension, and sustainability of the pension system, (4) support for increased retirement age and changes in accrual rates proposed in the pension reform	Split-sample experiment: 1. Treatment: received information letter about pension reform at home address two weeks before the survey 2. Control group: no information letter	<u>Main effects:</u> *Receiving the information letter did not have any effect on respondents’ objective knowledge, probably because they were already quite knowledgeable about it (=pretreatment effect!) *Receiving the letter did have a significant positive impact on respondents’ subjective assessment of their knowledge of the reform. *The information letter had no significant direct impact on concerns about the pension system nor on their perceptions of specific aspects of the reform (changes in retirement age and accrual rates). *The letter did have a significant positive impact on the overall perceived fairness of the reform. Accordingly, it was the letter itself rather than any increased knowledge that contributed to this. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The observed effects were generally stronger for those who actually reported receiving the letter (=the effective treatment group, N=667) compared to those who said they did not receive the letter, did not know or could not remember (=the intended treatment group, N=272).
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Kangas et al. (2014) When and why do ideas matter? The influence of framing on opinion formation and policy change European Political Science Review	<u>Place:</u> Finland (N=3500) <u>Time:</u> 2008	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Social assistance	Support for the centralization of social assistance	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: "Today municipalities are responsible for paying out social assistance. It has been discussed that the administration of SA should be transferred to Kela. Should it?" 2. Income transfer machine frame: "However, this might entail easier access to benefits, which might consequently increase economic costs". 3. Social work frame: "This might result in the loss of connection between money transfers and social work". 4. Equality frame: "There are differences between municipalities in the practices of paying out benefits". 5. Non-take-up frame: "There are various local practices and many do not receive the benefits to which they are entitled".	<u>Main effects:</u> *Control group: 57% in favour, 25% against, 18% don't know *Income transfer machine frame: 42% in favour, 35.5% against, 23.5% don't know *Social work frame: 36.5% in favour, 35% against, 28% don't know *Equality frame: 70% in favour, 17.5 against, 12.5% don't know *Non-take-up frame: 70.5% in favour, 16.5% against, 13% don't know <u>Conditional effects:</u> *As a rule, the impact of the frames tended to be similar among all respondents. *Exception: in contrast to all other voters, those who vote for the conservative party reacted negatively to the non-take-up frame, perhaps because they see a solution to non-take-up as increasing costs.
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Karra & Sandoe (2020) A polling experiment on public opinion on the future expansion of Medicare and Medicaid Health Services Research	<u>Place:</u> US (N=5051) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing ('naming') <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Medicare and Medicaid	Approval of two expansionary policy proposals: 1. Medicare For All (MFA) 2. Medicaid Buy-In (MBI)	Split-sample experiment: 1. MFA without name: only policy description 2. MFA with name: description + name 3. MBI without name: only policy description 4. MBI with name: description + name	<u>Main effects:</u> *Including the names "Medicare for All" and "Medicaid Buy-In" increases approval by 3.4 (from 32.7% to 36.1%) and 5.0 (from 50.1% to 55.1%) percentage points, respectively. *Note: although the effects are statistically significant (N=5000!), they seem substantively marginal.
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Keiser & Miller (2019) Does Administrative Burden Influence Public Support for Government Programs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment Public Administration Review	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1324) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)	Support for the TANF program and views of TANF recipients	Split-sample experiment: 1. Low level of administrative burden 2. High level of administrative burden 3. Control group (no information about application process)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents in the high burden condition are generally more supportive of the TANF program and its recipients. *Also the information about low administrative burden increases support and positive views of TANF recipients compared to the control group. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *This is particularly the case for Republican respondents, where there is a 20% difference between the high burden and the control group. Democrats are less susceptible to the information and are always highly supportive of TANF (=ceiling effect?)
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Kootstra (2016) Deserving and Undeserving Welfare Claimants in Britain and the Netherlands: Examining the Role of Ethnicity and Migration Status Using a Vignette Experiment European Sociological Review	<u>Place:</u> UK and the Netherlands (N=5377 and 4048) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Perceived deservingness of depicted claimant of financial support from the government	Vignette experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Gender 2. Job 3. Family status 4. Level of need 5. Effort to find a new job 6. Work history (2 or 10 years) 7. Ethnicity 8. Migration status	<u>Main effects:</u> *In both countries, the public favours natives over immigrants. Ethnic minorities are also consistently deemed less deserving than British or Dutch claimants. *Effort is clearly the most powerful manipulation: claimants who actively look for a new job score on average more than 2.5 points higher than those who do only little to find a new job. *Claimants with a work history of 2 years are less deserving than those with a history of 10 years. *Female claimants and those with greater needs (i.e. with children or no support from relatives) are seen as more deserving. *Making much effort to find a new job brings about a smaller increase in deservingness for ethnic minorities than for the majority. Having a longer work history has a larger positive effect for ethnic minority claimants, mainly because they were penalized more for having worked only 2 years. = 'double standard'! But: minorities are seen as equally deserving if they have an equally long work history and make efforts to find a new job.
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Kootstra (2017) Us versus Them: Examining the Perceived Deservingness of Minority Groups in the British Welfare State Using a Survey Experiment (In: van Oorschot et al., 2017, The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare: Attitudes to Welfare Deservingness)	<u>Place:</u> UK/Britain (N=3746) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy recipients	“Welfare”	Agreement with: “Most [group] on welfare would not have to depend upon social assistance if only they tried a bit harder”. “Most [] do not appreciate sufficiently that it is taxpayers’ money they are receiving”. “[group] on welfare take out more than they contribute to the system”. “I personally sympathize with the fate of [group] on welfare”. “Most [group] on welfare are not needy, they just spend money in a reckless way”. “I believe [group] on welfare are deserving of the support they receive from the government”.	Split-sample experiment: 1. “People” 2. “White Britons” 3. “Black Britons” 4. “Ethnic minorities” 5. “Muslims” 6. “Immigrants”	<u>Main effects:</u> *Black Britons are viewed remarkably positive: their responsibility for their neediness is thought to be lower, they are seen as grateful recipients, concerns over their inputs and outputs to the welfare state are lower and their level of need is perceived higher. *White Britons are evaluated very positively when it comes to the identity criterion, somewhat negatively concerning control and need, and averagely in terms of their attitude and reciprocal status. *Immigrants score the lowest al all the groups on four criteria: control, attitude, reciprocity and identity. *Ethnic minorities and Muslims have a more average position on each of the five criteria. *Overall, black Britons, white Britons and people in general are considered the most deserving of receiving financial help from the government. Ethnic minorities, Muslims and mainly immigrants are seen as the least deserving.
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Kootstra & Roosma (2018) Changing public support for welfare sanctioning in Britain and the Netherlands: A persuasion experiment Social Policy & Administration	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=3324) & UK (N=4468) <u>Time:</u> 2014 (two waves though)	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Unemployment benefits	Support for a policy that requires “those receiving unemployment benefits to accept jobs with wages or skill levels below their previous jobs or lost their benefits”: 1. DV1: support before treatment 2. DV2: support after treatment 3. DV3: attitude change; yes or no 4. DV4: going from initial opposition to support after treatment 5. DV5: going from initial support to opposition after treatment	Within-subjects experiment measuring support before and after one of the following experimental stimuli. For initial supporters: 1. Economic counter-argument, stressing that “this measure will not save the government much money, as it would be expensive and require a lot of time and resources to monitor” 2. Moral counter-argument: “this measure will cause greater poverty and suffering” 3. Both counter-arguments at once For initial opponents: 1. Economic counter-argument: “this policy will boost economic growth” 2. Moral counter-argument: long-term welfare recipients become socially isolated, lonely and insecure	<u>Main effects:</u> *People who initially oppose welfare sanctioning are more persistent in their opinions than people who are supportive of it (66% vs 55% stays foot). *Especially those with more extreme opinions change it less. *The Dutch seem easier to persuade than the British. *Moral arguments seem stronger than economic arguments, at least for the group of people who initially support activation policy. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The politically engaged and higher educated are less likely to be persuaded by counterarguments. *Women are more likely to change their opinion. *Initial opponents of the policy with friends or family on benefits are less likely to change their views on the policy, whereas those with higher subjective income are actually more likely to do so. *Finally, no significant effects were found for respondents’ age or history of benefit reciprocity.
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Kuklinski et al. (2000) Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship The Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1160) <u>Time:</u> ? *Note: the sample was restricted to residents of the state of Illinois *The other experiment reported in the article is not documented here because it was based on a student sample (see p. 803)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare policies (design/outcomes) and the context	“Welfare”	(1) Accuracy of welfare beliefs, (2) Support for cutting welfare, (3) support for imposing a two-year limit on welfare	Split-sample experiment: 1. Information treatment: receiving correct information regarding the % of families on welfare, the proportion of the federal budget for welfare, the average annual benefit amount for a welfare family, the % of mothers who are on welfare for more than 8 years, the % of mothers who are African-American, and the percentage of mothers who have less than a high school education. 2. Quiz treatment: estimation without information 3. Control group: no estimation nor information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Mistaken beliefs about the realities of welfare are widespread, and mostly skewed in an “anti-welfare direction” (e.g., more than 60% overestimate at least twofold the total proportion of American families who are on welfare). *Respondents who were informed about welfare facts are not more pro-welfare compared to the control group. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Those holding the least accurate beliefs perversely expressed the highest confidence in them. These people also tend to identify as the strongest partisans. *No interaction effect was found between the informational treatment and the strength of respondents’ partisanship.
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Kuhn & Kamm (2019) The national boundaries of solidarity: a survey experiment on solidarity with unemployed people in the European Union European Political Science Review	<u>Place:</u> Spain (N=1920) and the Netherlands (N=1850) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients	(European-wide) unemployment benefits	Are you, personally, prepared to make some personal sacrifice, for example paying a little more income taxes, to help unemployed people in [experimental treatment] *Note: no reference is made whatsoever to the EU context, the ideas of risk sharing/pooling, the principle of reciprocity, etc.	Split-sample: 1. National unemployed condition 2. Unemployed in Germany 3. Unemployed in Greece	<u>Main effects:</u> *In both Spain and the Netherlands, people are considerably less willing to make a personal sacrifice in favour of German/Greek (with no distinction between the two) than for the national unemployed. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The treatment is not significantly moderated by left-right ideology, inequality aversion, or education. *In the Netherlands, there is a positive interaction effect between foreign receipt and respondents' European attachment, suggesting that it significantly reduces the (still strong and significant) foreigner penalty. *A similar thing applies to pro-immigration attitudes in Spain (but not in the Netherlands). *The authors conclude that the so-called penalty for foreigners is shared across all respondents, despite having very different characteristics and viewpoints.
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Kumlin (2011) Claiming blame and giving credit? Unintended effects of how government and opposition frame the Europeanization of welfare European Union Politics	<u>Place:</u> Sweden (N=1501) <u>Time:</u> 2009	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing + information <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Healthcare	(1) Perceptions of Europeanization of national healthcare (“How does the EU affect opportunities for Swedes to get good healthcare?”), (2) Perceptions of domestic healthcare performance	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. Negative anonymous: received information that the EU negatively affects Swedish healthcare 3. Negative left: received the same negative information but also learned that it came from the Left Party’s election manifesto 4. Positive anonymous: information that the EU had a positive impact on healthcare performance 5. Positive right: same positive information + formulated by the right-wing Moderate Party *Note: the positive and negative frames are not equivalent!	<u>Main effects:</u> *The anonymous negative condition made respondents perceive the EU’s healthcare influence in a more negative light compared with the control group. The positive framing had a positive but weaker effect, leading the author to conclude that negativity bias is at play here. *By contrast, the negative anonymous frame positively affects perceptions of domestic performance (and vice versa). *These effects tend to decrease, on average, once people learn about the messenger of the information. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *With regard to the EU influence, the negative left condition has an even stronger impact among left-wing voters compared with neutrals, and basically no effect on right-wing voters. The opposite is found for the positive right frame. *With regard to domestic performance, the effects are different. The negative anonymous frame mainly has a positive effect on rightists’ perceptions, but a smaller and no effect on neutrals and leftists, respectively. By contrast, it is mainly the leftists,
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						and to a weaker extent neutrals, who react to the positive EU frame by perceiving domestic performance more negatively. The negative left conditional has similar effects among the different ideological groups though (and the interaction with the positive right condition are largely insignificant). *Note: interestingly, the article explicitly aims to answer the question: “How do the nature of message, messenger and receiver interact in shaping perceptions of the EU-welfare nexus”?
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Kumlin & Goerres (2022) Who Persuades and Who Responds? In: Election Campaigns and Welfare State Change: Democratic Linkage and Leadership Under Pressure. Oxford University Press.	Place: Norway (N=2576; experiment 2) and Germany (N=1920; experiment 3) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> pressure framing <u>Framing content:</u> reform pressures, policy cues and political sender	Experiment 2: welfare state in general Experiment 3: family policy (parental leave benefits, kindergarten services, nurseries)	Experiment 2: affordability/sustainability perceptions Experiment 3: preferences for expanding family policy	Experiment 2: split-sample with 7 groups: 1. Control group 2. Immigration frame from social-democratic party 3. Immigration frame from conservative party 4. Too few working frame from conservative party 5. Welfare advantage frame from social-democratic party 6. Population ageing frame from social-democratic party 7. Population ageing frame from conservative party Experiment 3: split-sample with 8 groups that vary in terms of policy facts, policy response and political sender (see p. 158) *Critical note: the frames are unbalanced in terms of both content & strength!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Experiment 2: only the conservative immigration treatment has a negative effect on sustainability perceptions. All other treatments are insignificant. *Experiment 3: there were no significant effects of any treatments <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Experiment 2: reactions to statements from identified party messengers were contingent on respondents' voting history. (a) Conservative voters reject the social democratic message about benefit export and immigration, while they indeed develop greater sustainability worry when exposed to a comparable message from their own party. (b) Social-democratic voters show clear signs of counter-arguing against pressure framing: they become less worried about sustainability when conservative politicians e.g. tell them 'too few are working'. *Experiment 3: mainly CDU voters were affected by the frames; the other voters groups were much less susceptible to framing.
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Kumlin & Nemcok (2024) Perceiving welfare state sustainability: fiscal costs, group deservingness, or ideology? Journal of Public Policy	Place: Norway (N=1800) Time: 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> information, framing, priming <u>Framing content:</u> policy context (pressure framing)	Sickness benefits and unemployment benefits	Think 10 years ahead in time. For each of the following social security systems and public services, where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means that Norway will not be able to afford the present level of social security and 7 means that it will be able to do so: (a) Sickness benefits (b) Unemployment benefits	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: no information 2. General problem reminder: mentioning “people at an employable age who are not working” 3. Fiscal cost treatment, adding that it will be difficult to maintain current levels of social security 4. Deservingness treatment: general problem + suspicions of benefit abuse 5. Cost and deservingness treatment	<u>Main effects:</u> *Only the general problem reminder produces a significant net difference compared to the control group, with sustainability perceptions being more positive by about 0.3 on the 1-7 scale. *None of the more specific informational treatments produced significant net effects. And these results are largely similar across the two dependent variables. *Note: the authors offer context as a possible reason for the observed effects (referring to the factors of salience and fiscal affluence). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The positive effect of the general reminder on the perceived sustainability of sickness (not unemployment!) benefits is driven largely by left and center voters. Right-wingers are no different from the control group here. *Individuals on the left become <i>less</i> worried about sustainability of both sickness and unemployment benefits after being exposed to the fiscal cost treatment (cf. backfire effect). Right-wingers are not affected by it. Perhaps because left-wingers think the message is coming from right-wing sources??
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Kuziemko et al. (2015) How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments American Economic Review	<u>Place:</u> US (3741 in omnibus survey; 1002 in follow-up survey 1; 1111 in follow-up survey 2) <u>Time:</u> 2011/2	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy context + policy recipients + policy outcomes	EITC, aid to the poor, food stamps, public housing	Omnibus experiment: (1) concern for inequality, (2) support for the EITC and food stamps Follow-up surveys: (1) agreement with statement that “poverty is a serious problem”, (2) support for “aid to the poor”, public housing and food stamps *Note: I do not consider the results regarding support for other policies, such as the minimum wage or real estate tax (which are generally stronger)	Omnibus experiment: 1. Omnibus treatment: interactive, customized information on income inequality in the US 2. Control group Follow-up experiment 1: 1. Emotional appeal treatment: asking respondents to put themselves in the shoes of a family facing poverty (incl. pictures) 2. Control group Follow-up experiment 2: 1. Emotional appeal from follow-up 1 + slides showing how current government programs help these households (e.g., “the food stamps program helps many low income families, such as those earning only one minimum wage. It provides 150 dollar per month to help with food expenses”). 2. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> Exp. 1: the treatment is associated with a 10% increase in the share agreeing that inequality is a “very serious” problem. However, it does not significantly affect support for food stamps or the EITC. Exp. 2: similarly, there were large effects on concern for poverty and inequality, but little movement on policy preferences. Nevertheless, the “emotional” treatment did have a marginally significant (and rather small) positive effect on support for aid to the poor in general and food stamps. There was no effect for public housing. Exp. 3: in contrast to the other experiments, the treatment does not make respondents view poverty as a more serious problem. However, it does increase support for food stamp and public housing (but not aid to the poor). Thus, the interaction of the empathic portrayal of low income families along with information emphasizing the efficacy of a transfer program has an effect. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: dropping respondents from different survey rounds did not change the sign or significance of the main results.
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Kweon & Choi (2022) Deservingness Heuristics and Policy Attitudes toward the Elderly in an Aging Society: Evidence from Japan Political Research Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> Japan (N=2547) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue framing <u>Framing content:</u> macro-level characteristics of welfare recipients	Elderly policy	Government responsibility for providing a decent standard of living for the old	Split-sample experiment: - Needs treatment group: a vignette describing senior citizens' economic needs - Needs + effort treatment group: a vignette signaling both elderly people's needs and their continued effort to earn their living - Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Though emphasizing economic need of the elderly increases popular support for government aid to senior citizens, the level of public support is even higher when both economic need and effort are manipulated. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *These effects are mainly found among younger working-age individuals. For those aged 70 and over, the cues have no statistically significant impact (=ceiling effect). *Working-aged people with part-time jobs or the unemployed show a higher level of support than labour market insiders. Emphasis on elderly poverty and effort to work does not increase their level of support (=ceiling effect?) *We see a similar trend for low-educated individuals. High-educated working-age people are only more supportive when both economic need and effort to work are emphasized. *Household income does not have a similar conditioning effect.
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Laenen (2023) The Popularity of Basic Income: Evidence from the Polls Palgrave Springer	<u>Place:</u> BE (N=3000 for BABEL and 1650 for BNES), NL (N=1200), FI (N=2x1000), ES (N=1000), CH (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2016, 2019, 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics + policy outcomes	Universal basic income	BABEL: support for the introduction of a basic income	BABEL/BIN: vignette experiment randomly varying the following policy design characteristics: 1. Generosity 2. Conditionality 3. Universality 4. Integration within existing welfare system 5. Financing BABEL: vignette experiment randomly varying the following policy outcomes: 1. Poverty 2. Employment 3. Informal caregiving 4. Income inequality 5. Entrepreneurship Other experiments : see Laenen et al., 2023; Rincon, 2021/2; Stadelmann-Steffen & Dermont, 2019	<u>Main effects:</u> See book for details on the results. Generally: *The BABEL and BIN experiments demonstrate an impact of most policy design dimensions, and interactions between them. Furthermore, the BABEL experiment also demonstrates that predicted policy outcomes influence support (with a negativity bias present), in interaction with policy design dimensions as well. In fact, many citizens seem to change their opinion after being informed about policy outcomes. *The BNES experiment (reported also in Laenen et al., 2023) further demonstrates the interactions between policy design dimensions. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *A direct comparison of the BABEL and BIN experiments makes clear that there is cross-national variation in the influence of BI's policy design on its public support. A more indirect comparison with the experiments conducted in Finland, Spain and Switzerland further supports this. *Both the BABEL and the BNES experiment demonstrate that there
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						are also important within-country differences in this regard, between Flanders and Wallonia. Additionally, the BNES demonstrates that the temporal context also exerts influence, by comparing the pre-Covid with the peri-Covid sample (see also Van Hootegem & Laenen, 2022). *The discussed experiments clearly demonstrate that there are both important differences and striking similarities with regard to the effects of individual characteristics on support for differently designed types of BI with varying policy outcomes. In particular, the following characteristics were investigated: age, gender (=exception, in the sense that it hardly ever makes a difference), income, political ideology, voting intentions, trade union membership, welfare performance evaluations, benefit reciprocity, and Covid-19 experiences.
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Laenen et al. (2023) The multidimensionality of public support for basic income: a vignette experiment in Belgium Journal of European Public Policy	<u>Place:</u> Belgium (N=1591) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	Support for implementation of the depicted basic income scheme (from 0 to 10)	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Universality 2. Uniformity 3. Conditionality 4. Integration 5. Accumulation	<u>Main effects:</u> *Only the uniformity and conditionality dimensions have statistically significant effects: proposals that grant a higher amount to those who have worked longer score 0.43 higher on public support than schemes that allocate an equal income to everyone. Likewise, both the schemes that are dependent on job-seeking behaviour and those dependent on volunteering or taking up caring responsibilities receive significantly more support than unconditional BI proposals. Here the differences are slightly larger, as schemes that require a job or the fulfilment of volunteering/ caring score 0.54 and 0.46 higher on public support, respectively. *There are also significant interaction effects between the dimensions of conditionality and uniformity/universality. <u>Conditional effects:</u> * For most BI schemes, we see that leftist individuals express the strongest support, while right-wing individuals are the least supportive. Nevertheless, there are important differences in the size of the gaps for the different dimensions.
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Laenen (2025) What makes social policy programs (un)popular? Disentangling the causal impact of policy design, risk group deservingness and mode of delivery Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> BE (N=1000) and US (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2023	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics + policy recipients (social risk groups)	Old-age pensions, old-age care, sickness and disability benefits, healthcare, child benefits, childcare, unemployment benefits, training	To what extent are you in favor of, or opposed to, this social benefit or service? (ranging from 0 to 10)	“Cash” experiment: 1. Social risk group 2. Policy design “Kind” experiment: 1. Social risk group 2. Policy design	<u>Main effects:</u> *In Belgium, means-tested programs for the poor only (i.e., the ref. category) are significantly less popular than all other policy design options. The only exception here are universally accessible programs that regressively pay out higher benefit amounts (or provide services at a lower cost) to high-income earners, which are about unequally unpopular as poverty testing. In the US, the observed pattern points in a different direction. With the exception of low-income targeting within universalism, poverty testing is not significantly less popular. *It is clearly not the case that popular support is higher when programs are targeted at the elderly or the sick/disabled vis-à-vis children or the unemployed. In fact, the evidence even shows that (at least in Belgium) policy programs for the sick/disabled (M=5.96) are somewhat less popular than programs for the unemployed (M=6.11), although the difference is small and barely reaches statistical significance. The same goes for programs targeted at families with children, in both Belgium and the US.
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						*Likewise, I also reject the hypothesis that programs provided in kind are more popular than programs provided in cash. Although in-kind provision receives more support than cash provision, the difference is statistically insignificant and substantively negligible in both Belgium and the US. *Further, I show that popular support is very often a function of the specific <i>combination</i> of programs' policy design, social risk group and mode of delivery rather than being singlehandedly driven by any of these. *Additionally, I also find that the relative popularity of the specific policy combinations varies quite a lot between Belgium and the US. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *See country differences discussed above.
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Laenen & Aerts (2025) Information Experiments In: De Wispelaere, Chrisp, Mulayi, & Roosma (Eds.), Basic Income and Public Opinion. Palgrave Springer	<u>Place:</u> Belgium (N=2500) <u>Time:</u> 2024	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics + policy outcomes	Universal basic income	(Change) in support for the introduction of the depicted basic income scenario	Between-subject part: Each respondent is randomly allocated (depending on whether they are of working age or retired) to one of five basic income scenarios, varying in terms of their amounts and funding. Respondents then indicate their support for the scenario (=baseline). Within-subject part: After that, each respondent received (in randomized order) micro-simulated information about the predicted impact of the BI scenario on the level of poverty in Belgium and about its effect on their household income (personalized info!). Respondent were asked to indicate their support for the BI scenario again after each piece of information (T1 + T2).	<u>Main effects:</u> *To assess the perceived credibility of the source of the information, respondents are asked at the end of the survey to what extent they trust the results provided. In that sense, it is somewhat reassuring that only 22% report to have relatively little trust in the scientific research presented to them. *Support varies significantly across the different scenarios. Three out of five scenarios are opposed by the majority of respondents. Scenarios 1 and 4, which are both partial UBI proposals offering lower amounts on top of (instead of replacing) the current income protection system, initially seem to be the most appealing to respondents. *Upon providing respondents with information about how UBI might impact their household income and the poverty levels in society, we observe substantial shifts in support, indicating that the information indeed resonates. The direction in which support fluctuates, however, depends heavily on the specific outcomes associated with each scenario. *Around 30% of respondents consistently maintained their original opinion, unaffected by the
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						information presented. However, the majority did modify their stance at least once during the survey. Notably, nearly 20% of respondents were persuaded by the information to completely switch their initial position on UBI. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *We see in the survey that about half of the respondents view UBI as an idea rooted in their own political faction, while the other half associates it with “the other side”. These perceptions strongly influence whether or not a respondent is receptive to the information provided. The survey reveals that respondents not only tend to strongly oppose a UBI if they perceive it as an idea from the opposite political faction, but are also more likely to remain steadfast in their initial opinions. We see that 43% of left-leaning respondents who perceive UBI as a right-wing idea, and 39% of right-leaning respondents who see it as a left-wing idea, did not alter their support at all, regardless of the information provided.
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Lawrence & Sides (2014) The consequences of political innumeracy Research & Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1000 in exp. 1; 1000 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2007 for exp. 1; 2010 for exp. 2)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> context characteristics	Exp. 1: student loans, aid to the poor and job training Exp. 2: loans for college tuition, aid to the poor, job training, unemployment benefits, food stamps	Exp. 1 and 2: spending preferences regarding these policy areas	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Treatment group(s): estimation of the average household income & the % of Americans with 4-year college degrees + the correct information 2. Control group(s): estimation but without correct information Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Estimation treatment: estimating the unemployment or poverty rate, without correct information 2. Information treatment: estimation + information 3. Control group: no estimation nor information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: across the four experimental conditions, there were no significant differences in preferences for increased spending. This might be because the estimates were, on average, close to reality (pretreatment effects!). *Exp. 2: there are no significant differences between the different groups in terms of their spending preferences. Information provision thus had very little effect. However, also here the initial estimates were not that far off from the actual figures (e.g., median estimate of unemployment rate was 12%; actual rate was 9.6%). This is once again suggestive of possible pretreatment effects.
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Lergetporer et al. (2018) How information affects support for education spending: Evidence from survey experiments in Germany and the United States Journal of Public Economics	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=4171) and the U.S. (N=2669) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> spending levels	Education	Exp. 1: support for increase or decrease in government funding for public schools in their district (U.S.) or nationally (Germany). Exp. 2: support for increase in salary of public school teachers Exp. 3: preferences for different categories of education spending (class-size reductions, teacher salary increases, new books and technologies)	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Informed treatment group: received information about the actual level of spending per student in their district (U.S.) or nationally (Germany) 2. Informed + tax treatment: receiving info and was asked whether taxes to fund public schools should increase or decrease (=tax prime) 3. Control group: no information Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Informed treatment: actual teacher salaries 2. Control group Exp. 3: split-sample 1. Informed: receiving information that reducing average class sizes by 3 students would cost roughly the same as increasing salaries by 13 or buying a lot of new books. 2. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: Informing respondents about the current level of education spending reduces support for increased spending (from 71% to 50% in Germany and 60% to 43% in the U.S.). Additionally stating that the spending increase would be financed through higher taxation reduced support even further (30% in Germany; 26% in the U.S.). *Exp. 2: the same pattern is founded for teacher salaries. *Exp. 3: the tradeoff information significantly reduces support for class-size reductions. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1 and 2: treatment effects were substantially larger for respondents who underestimated actual spending levels and salaries and were almost zero for those who were already well informed prior to the information treatment (cf. pretreatment effects!). *Exp. 1 and 2: no evidence of heterogeneous effects across subgroups defined by gender, age, education, income, employment, and parental/ minority status. *Exp. 1, 2 and 3: very few country differences were found.
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Lergetporer et al. (2020) Educational inequality and public policy preferences: Evidence from representative survey experiments Journal of Public Economics	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=3302 in wave 1 and 4078 in wave 2 and follow-up survey) <u>Time:</u> 2016 for wave 1, 2017 for wave 2 and follow-up survey	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> context characteristics and policy outcomes	Education policy	Exp. 1: (1) concern about educational inequality, (2) support for 8 education policies: free preschool for children from low-income families, compulsory preschool, increased gov. spending for schools with many disadvantaged students, postponing ability tracking, bonuses for teachers, whole-day schooling for all students, disabled children in regular classes, need-based scholarships Exp. 2: only policy preferences Exp. 3: support for compulsory preschool only	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Information treatment: scientific information about the degree of educational inequality 2. Control group: no information Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Information treatment 2. Policy connection treatment: same information but with extra info that the proposed reforms aim to reduce inequality 3. Control group Exp. 3: split-sample 1. Information treatment 2. Policy effectiveness treatment: same information but with extra info that studies confirm that preschool participation reduces inequality. 3. Information + policy effectiveness 4. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the information treatment has a large and highly significant positive effect on respondents' expressed concerns about educational inequality (which persists over a time span of two weeks, although it is reduced from +12% to +5.7%) but hardly any impact on policy preferences (except for compulsory preschool). *Exp. 2: the policy connection treatment had no significant effect on respondents' policy preferences. *Exp. 3: being informed about a study showing that preschool participation strongly improves opportunities of children from difficult social backgrounds significantly increases support for compulsory preschool by 5.1%. Providing info about inequality as well as policy effectiveness led to an increase of 12.6%. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The treatment effects were largest for respondents who initially (and quite confidently) underestimated educational inequality. *There was little heterogeneity in treatment effects according to people's political ideology, income, education, parenthood, etc.
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Levy (2021) Once Racialized, Now Immigration-ized? Explaining the Immigration-Welfare Link in American Public Opinion Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=900 in exp. 1, and 940 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2018-2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	“Welfare”	Exp. 1: (1) fraud & effort perceptions, (2) deservingness beliefs, and (3) general attitudes about welfare Exp. 2: idem	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. “White woman” welfare recipient 2. “Illegal immigrant woman” recipient Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Native-born welfare mother 2. Immigrant welfare mother	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: Respondents’ perceptions of the illegal immigrant welfare mother were significantly, though modestly, more negative than their perception of the white welfare mother. *Exp. 1: There is no evidence that perceptions of each welfare recipient relate differently to general attitudes about welfare. *Exp. 2: Perceptions of both welfare recipients were statistically indistinguishable. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Lindner et al. (2023) Does informing citizens about the non-meritocratic nature of inequality bolster support for a universal basic income? European Societies	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=1630) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of the macro context	Universal basic income	Support for universal basic income (measured on a 7-point scale)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Wealth disparities treatment: a graph and facts-list showing how wealth is unequally divided across the Dutch population. 2. Ethnic inequality treatment: a graph and facts-list demonstrating how opportunities for social mobility are distributed unequally per ethnic background. 3. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Both informational treatments had non-significant effects on support for introducing a UBI. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Income, welfare chauvinism and institutional trust do not significantly moderate the effects of the information treatments. *The only significant finding is that economic egalitarianism negatively moderates the effect of the wealth disparity treatment, meaning that egalitarian people are less inclined to express a higher level of support for a UBI after the treatment. Note: the authors suggest there might be a ceiling effect at play here because egalitarians already have a high baseline level of support for UBI. Additionally, it could be that they were already aware of the provided information about wealth inequality (=pre-treatment effect).
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Linden & Reibling (2022) Unemployed + Sick = More Deserving? A Survey Experiment on How the Medicalization of Unemployment Affects Public Opinion Frontiers in Sociology	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=2621) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	(1) Support for social rights (preferred replacement rate of UI + level of minimum income benefit in EUR) (2) Support for social obligations (traditional job-seeking requirements, compulsory medical treatment, benefit sanctions)	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Name 2. Age 3. Reason for unemployment 4. Family status 5. Motivation to find a new job 6. Missed appointments Note: the authors offer the lack of other factors (e.g., gender) as a possible limitation, but add that the main results remain valid “as long as these other factors do not interact with the factors under study”. However, there is no way of knowing this!	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents chose lower benefit levels when the unemployed person was laid off because of bankruptcy or chronic back pain (compared to personal misconduct). Depression, by contrast, reduced levels for UB but increased these for MIP. *Respondents generally imposed less conditions and sanctioned less when unemployment was due to sickness. There was no significant difference between misconduct and bankruptcy. There was nevertheless large support for imposing compulsory treatment on sick unemployed people (64% for back pain; 55 for depression). *Respondents allocated significantly less benefits and sanctioned more when the vignette person had a foreign name, had low motivation, was older (60 years), was married and had a child (only effect on MIP levels; not UB or sanctions). Sanctions were also more likely if the person missed an appointment more than once. *According to the authors, there were no substantial interaction effects between the vignette variables nor between vignette and respondent variables (but no results are shown in the article).
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Liscow & Pershing (2022) Why is so much redistribution in-kind and not in cash? Evidence from a survey experiment National Tax Journal	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N = 2580) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> persuasion and information <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Cash vs in-kind assistance to the poor	(1) Relative preference for a cash transfer versus a so-called necessities account (= a cash transfer than can be spent only on healthcare, housing and food) of equal worth (i.e., 2000 dollar), (2) the largest amount respondents are willing to support, (3) the stated reasons for preferring in-kind or cash transfers (multiple choice + open-ended format)	Split-sample experiment: (1) “Economics” treatment: providing respondents with the economic logic that giving people cash allows them to choose how to spend the money, making them better off (see footnote 34). (2) “Rights” treatment: encouraging respondents to think about goods that many consider to be rights (see footnote 41). (3) “Poor spending” treatment: informing respondents that the poor spend most of their income on necessities (see footnote 40). (4) Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *The economics treatment significantly increased the preference for cash by 12 percentage points. It also increased the median largest amount support for cash by 500 dollars (off a base of 1500 in the control group) and make respondents 7 percentage points less likely to give paternalistic reasons for preferring in-kind assistance and 13 points more likely to give anti-paternalism as a reason for preferring cash transfers. *The treatment informing participants how the poor spend their money had little impact, with no statistically significant impact on the preference for cash. *The rights treatment also had no statistically significant effects. This might be because the preference for in-kind assistance was already very high (72%) and there were thus fewer people to persuade to support in-kind (=ceiling effect). *All three treatments left considerable majorities preferring in-kind, suggesting durability in the in-kind preference. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Lim & Tanaka (2018) Work disincentive perceptions and welfare state attitudes: A survey experiment in South Korea Governance	<u>Place:</u> South Korea (N=1221) <u>Time:</u> 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> not specified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design + policy outcomes	Income transfer programs	Level of support for a hypothetical proposal for an income transfer program (strongly oppose vs support)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Universal program + neutral information about work disincentives 2. Universal program + negative information about work disincentives 3. Targeted program + neutral information about work disincentives 4. Targeted program + negative information about work disincentives *Note: there was no control group that received no information.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Those in the moral hazard/work disincentives information treatment are less likely to support the proposed program. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *When the program in question is a universal transfer, moral hazard information substantially reduces the lower-income group's support, yet has no discernable effect on the higher-income group's support level. When the program in question involves pro-poor targeting, moral hazard information has no effect on the lower-income group's support, but significantly reduces the higher-income group's support.
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Lopez-Santana et al. (2023) Assessing public support for social policy in times of crisis: evidence from the Child Tax Credit during the COVID-19 era in the United States Policy & Society	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1200) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design	Child Tax Credit (CTC), EITC, SNAP	Support for the different policy programs	Split-sample experiment: 1. Information condition: received basic information about the different programs 2. Control condition: received only the name of the different programs	<u>Main effects:</u> *While 24% of respondents were against the expanded version of CTC in the control condition, this was only 17% in the information group. However, this difference was not statistically significant. *The same holds for the EITC and SNAP programs. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Magni (2024) Boundaries of Solidarity: Immigrants, Economic Contributions, and Welfare Attitudes American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Italy (N=1275), France (N=1403), UK (N=1122) and US (N=1829) <u>Time:</u> 2016-2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Forced choice between two unemployed individuals: who is more deserving?	Conjoint experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Work attitude 2. Health 3. Work history 4. Nationality 5. Religion 6. Family condition 7. Education	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents express significantly lower willingness to support (Western and non-Western) immigrants than native citizens. *Respondents are more likely to support unemployed individuals with a work history. The length of past employment is also important. *Respondents are more supportive of unemployed individuals who are actively looking for a job, experience health issue, and have children. Recipients' education and religion play a more limited role. *Although immigrants are always penalized compared to natives, their penalty is reduced by almost 10 percentage points when they have a long work history. *Immigrants who are actively looking for a job or can't work because of health reasons are in some cases found less deserving than similar natives. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Even politically progressive, economically secure and highly educated citizens penalize immigrants (=hidden consensus?)
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Martinangeli & Windsteiger (2023) Immigration vs. poverty: Causal impact on demand for redistribution in a survey experiment European Journal of Political Economy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=4000) <u>Time:</u> ?	<u>Framing concept:</u> information, priming <u>Framing content:</u> context characteristics	Public education, social insurance, disability support and pensions, unemployment and welfare benefits, public healthcare, affordable housing	Preferred allocation of a fixed public budget (100%) to different public policies *Note: also support for progressive taxation was included, but is not discussed here	Split-sample experiment: 1. Neutral condition: control group receiving only information about the total size of the population in Germany 2. Immigration condition: also information about the size of the population that was born abroad (=13.2 million) 3. Poverty condition: information about the size of the population living below 60% of the median income rate (=13.7 million) 4. Immigration + poverty condition: both types of information 5. Overlap condition: also received information about the size of the population that was born abroad and lives on an income below the poverty line (=3.2 million)	<u>Main effects:</u> *The only significant finding is that the poverty condition (and not the others) increases respondents' desired expenditure on education. There are no effects for the other public policies. *The authors argue that the main effects are of relatively limited use because there is large treatment heterogeneity, and the effects run in opposite directions, thereby possibly cancelling each other out. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Middle- and high-income earners would like to increase spending on education in the poverty condition, while the low income group exhibit a strong negative response in the immigration condition. *Information on the size of immigration + poverty reduces desired public education expenditure among low-income respondents, but has no significant effect on high-income respondents. *There are no heterogeneous effects according to income for the other public policies. For education, there is also no significant heterogeneity with respect to education, having children, and political orientations.
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Marx & Schumacher (2016) The effect of economic change and elite framing on support for welfare state retrenchment: A survey experiment Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=3500) <u>Time:</u> 2012	<u>Framing concept:</u> elite framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of the macro context	Unemployment benefits	Which of the following goals do you personally think the government should prioritize? (1) Maintaining the standard of living for the unemployed even if this leads to a higher budget deficit or (2) reducing the budget deficit even if it means cuts in unemployment benefits. (2) is taken as support for retrenchment of unemployment benefits	Split-sample experiment: 1. “Objective” frame: Next year unemployment in the UK will reach an all-time high. Many jobs in the public and private sector will be cut. 2. “Inequality” frame: Experts say that unemployment benefits need to be kept at their current level to keep people from falling into poverty. Otherwise the UK will become a more unequal country. 3. “Deficit” frame: Experts say that unemployment benefits need to be cut, because the costs will skyrocket and push the budget further into deficit. Otherwise debts will be passed on to future generations. 4. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Respondents exposed to the objective and the inequality framing (both 49%) are significantly less supportive of retrenchment than respondents in the control group or those exposed to the deficit frame (58%). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The treatment effects differ by income group (see p. 25-26) and political ideology. *Left-wing voters are positively affected by the inequality frame but do not react to the deficit frame. Right-wing voters are only negatively affected by the deficit frame (not by inequality framing). Independent voters are mostly influenced by the objective frame.
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McIntyre et al. (2024) Medicaid by Any Other Name? Investigating Malleability of Partisan Attitudes toward the Public Program Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law	<u>Place:</u> US (N=5807) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> unclassified	Medicaid (health insurance)	Thinking about the ways people in this country get their health insurance coverage: in general, do you have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of Medicaid/state-specific name, the government health insurance for certain low-income adults and children in your state?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Medicaid, no information about the size of the population enrolled in the program 2. Medicaid, information about the absolute number of people enrolled in the program 3. Medicaid, info about the relative percentage of people enrolled 4. State-specific name (which was either real or fictive, depending on which state respondents were living in), no enrollment info 5. State-specific name, absolute enrollment information 6. State-specific name, relative information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Being exposed to a state-specific name mainly created greater confusion, by increasing the number of respondents indicating that they “haven’t heard enough to say” by 12.5% overall, and no less than 26% among respondents living in states with fabricated names. Importantly, the name treatment both reduced and increased program favorability. *Providing enrollment information does not change attitudes for any of the naming conditions. Expressing volume as an absolute number or as a percentage of the total state population had no effect either. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The naming condition created greater confusion among higher-income respondents than the lowest incomes, especially when the names were fabricated. *There was overall little treatment heterogeneity in terms of partisanship, the only exception being that Republicans do seem to be slightly more inclined to report “very favorable” views when a state-specific name is used -an effect that is not observed among Democrats or independents.
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Mulayi et al. (2023) New directions in research on public support for universal basic income In: F. Roosma & T. Laenen (Eds.), A Research Agenda for Public Attitudes to Welfare.	<u>Place:</u> Belgium (N=2955) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	Support for the introduction of basic income, on a scale from 0 to 10	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Conditionality 2. Universality (see Laenen, 2023 for full experimental design)	<u>Main effects:</u> See Laenen, 2023 <u>Conditional effects:</u> *For the universality dimension, we see a clear preference for the stricter eligibility criteria of nationality and residency requirements, especially for those who identify as centrist and rightist. For leftists, the conditional marginal mean does not vary greatly across universality levels. *Regarding the conditionality dimension, it is clear that a UBI with caring tasks or volunteering required generates the most support across the three ideological groups. *For leftists, we see a positive interaction between the universality and conditionality dimensions, suggesting that the combination between stringent eligibility criteria and no caring tasks increases the level of support for UBI. For centrists, by contrast, this interaction term is negative. No interaction term appears to be significant for rightist voters.
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Munoz & Pardos-Prado (2019) Immigration and Support for Social Policy: An Experimental Comparison of Universal and Means-Tested Programs Political Science Research and Methods	<u>Place:</u> UK (N=3600) <u>Time:</u> 2013	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics and policy recipients	Child benefits	In the current context of crisis the government is sharply reducing its spending in several areas. Regarding these benefits for families with children less than 16 years of age, you personally consider that: - benefits should be removed and resources devoted to other issues - benefits should be reduced - benefits should be maintained - benefits should be expanded with resources currently devoted to other issues *note: the framing of austerity in the question might have influenced the results!	Split-sample: 1. Universal policy design + immigrants mentioned as growing % of recipient families 2. Means-tested policy design + immigrants mentioned 3. Universal policy design + immigrants not mentioned 4. Means-tested policy design + immigration not mentioned	<u>Main effects:</u> *When primed about immigration, nearly twice as many respondents preferred that child benefits were removed. This difference was stronger in the means-tested conditions (17.12) compared to the universal conditions (11.65). *When immigration is not primed, support for means-tested child benefits is significantly higher than support for universal benefits. This gap disappears when immigration is primed. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Among those with lower levels of cultural prejudice, the immigration priming has no effect. Also, for those respondents who believe that welfare recipients work hard enough, the immigration prime does not have an effect. *Priming immigration matters for all socio-economic groups, but is slightly more consequential in magnitude for the lower educated.
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Myers et al. (2022) Who is “On Welfare”? Validating the Use of Conjoint Experiments to Measure Stereotype Content Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1295) <u>Time:</u> 2021 *Note: respondents were all non-Hispanic whites	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	“Welfare”	1 group indicated the perceived likelihood that the depicted person is on welfare, the other group the perceived typicality of the depicted person of those on welfare	Conjoint experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Race/ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic) 2. Gender 3. Marital status 4. Children 5. Immigration status 6. Employment status 7. Criminal record	<u>Main effects:</u> *People described as black, female, unmarried, having children, being unemployed (and not seeking employment) and having a criminal record are generally seen as more typical recipients of welfare/more likely to receive welfare. *In contrast to expectations that welfare has become “immigrationized”, we find no evidence that being an immigrant is part of the welfare recipient stereotype among whites, on average. *Support for welfare decreases when its beneficiaries are seen as unauthorized immigrants and unemployed people not seeking work. The other characteristics do not seem to have an effect. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Individualism has a positive impact on stereotyping welfare recipients as not seeking employment. Strong Republicans and older respondents also have more pronounced stereotypes of welfare recipients as undeserving. *Those with negative racial attitudes are more likely to see welfare recipients as black.
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Naumann (2017) Do increasing reform pressures change policy preferences? An experimental study on population ageing, pension reform preferences, political knowledge and ideology Ageing & Society	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=1468 but 764 after panel attrition and item non response) <u>Time:</u> 2012	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> context characteristics (reform pressures)	Old-age pensions	Pension reform preference: Which of the following reform proposals would you most likely support? (a) Increase in social security contributions (b) Increase in income taxes (c) Increase in retirement age (d) Reduction of state pension according to the demographic change	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: “The ageing of society puts the financing of the state pension at its current level at risk.” Followed by dependent variable. 2. Treatment group: adds the following sentence: “People in Germany live longer than before. In 1990 a 65-year old man on average could expect to live for another 14 years. Today, a 65-year old man will approximately live until he will be 82.5 years old; he can thus expect to live for another 17.5 years”. *Note: in my opinion, the control group also receives the treatment, and the additional treatment in the treatment group is very weak. Furthermore, most people must have already known this information??	<u>Main effects:</u> *The information on an ageing society did not change the ranking of reform alternatives (with tax increases on top and pension cuts at the bottom). *When faced with increased reform pressures people give up their reluctance to increase the retirement age. However, the effect is substantively very small (going from 38.3% opposed to 33.4%). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *People with low political awareness react to increased reform pressures by abandoning their strong opposition to increasing the retirement age (-15.6%). Instead, their opposition against a reduction of pension benefits increases. By contrast, politically knowledgeable respondents are not affected by the information (pretreatment effects!). *Information on population ageing seems to have led to a convergence of reform preferences of left-wing and right-wing voters (see p. 287 for full results).
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Naumann (2018) Tax Constraints, Social Policy Preferences and Support for Redistribution Societies	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=992, 2867 and 3198 (p. 4) <u>Time:</u> 2014, 2016 and 2017 (p. 4)	<u>Framing concept:</u> priming <u>Framing content:</u> tax constraints	Pensions, healthcare, long-term care, unemployment benefits, redistribution	(1) Support for government spending in these four policy domains and (2) support for redistribution	A split-sample experiment per dependent variable: 1. Experimental group: respondents are reminded that, if they prefer more spending or redistribution, a tax increase might be required. 2. Control group: no priming of tax constraint	<u>Main effects:</u> *Support for spending on unemployment benefits and redistribution is significantly lower when tax constraints are primed. *This effect is not statistically significant for pensions, healthcare and long-term care. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Left-leaning respondents reduce their support for pension spending and redistribution if tax constraints are being primed. There is no evidence that right-leaning respondents differ in how they react to tax constraints (possibly because of a floor effect??). *Whereas the low-income group does not significantly reduce its support for spending on pensions, unemployment benefits and for redistribution, we find stronger negative and often significant reactions to the tax constraint for the other income groups (but not for long-term care). It seems that, in particular, the middle-income group is very sensitive to this. *For healthcare, by contrast, we see that the low- and middle-income groups react more strongly to the tax constraints prime than their higher-income counterparts.
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Naumann et al. (2019) Public support for sanctioning older unemployed – a survey experiment in 21 European countries European Societies	<u>Place:</u> 21 European countries (N=26.740) <u>Time:</u> 2016/17	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of (individual) welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Sanctioning of unemployed person for turning down a job offer because of lower pay or lower level of education required for the job. Response options are that the person should lose all unemployment benefit, lose about half of it, lose a small part of it, or should be able to keep all. The dependent variable is the average of the two questions.	Split sample: 1. Control group: no mention of the unemployed person's age 2. Treatment 1: imagine an unemployed person in their 50s... 3. Treatment 2: unemployed person between 20-25 years	<u>Main effects:</u> *Though differences are small, younger unemployed face stricter benefit sanctions and older unemployed are punished less, compared to the control group. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is a general pattern that younger unemployed are punished more than the control group (with the exception of CH, UK, IS, PL). In contrast, older unemployed in their 50s face lower sanctions in most countries, with notable exceptions in ES and PT. *There is no relationship between the level of age stereotypes at the country level and the strength of the treatment effects. *The analysis does show that as populations become older, the preferential treatment of older unemployed compared to the general and the younger unemployed gets weaker.
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Naumann et al. (2024) The ethnic penalty in welfare deservingness: A factorial survey experiment on welfare chauvinism in pension attitudes in Germany Journal of European Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=4493) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Old-age pensions	Preferences for the monthly level of pension benefits for the person depicted in the vignette	Factorial vignette experiment randomly varying: 1. Name (German vs Turkish; to indicate ethnic background) 2. Gender 3. Average net income in last job 4. Years of contribution 5. Number of children 6. Partner support (pension only for oneself vs also for partner)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Higher amounts are granted when pensioners have more children, a higher income and more years of contributions. Gender only has an impact for pensioners without work history, in which case women are granted higher amounts. *A foreign ethnic background leads to a penalty in pension benefits of €70 on average. This is much lower though than the impact of most of the other characteristics (some of these well above €200). *There is no significant interaction between the ethnicity of pensioners and their pension claims. The authors conclude from this that the ethnic penalty neither closes nor widens with reciprocity. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Low-educated natives support an ethnic penalty of €66; among the highly educated this is only €23. *There are important differences across political constituencies in this regard: +€15 for The Left, -€34 for Green voters, -€32 for liberal FDP, -€54 for CDU/CSU, -€87 for social-democratic SPD and -€202 for radical right AfD (!!!).
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Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2021) Administrative Burden, Social Construction, and Public Support for Government Programs Journal of Behavioral Public Administration	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1236) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of program design and (individual) welfare recipients	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and disaster relief food assistance program (D-SNAP)	Do you approve or disapprove of the SNAP/disaster relief food program?	Split-sample experiment varying the following three things: 1. The program: SNAP vs disaster relief 2. The applicant: parolee vs veteran 3. The level of administrative burden: no vs low vs high In total, there are thus 12 experimental conditions.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Compared to the no burden group, there is a negative effect of high burden in the disaster food aid + veteran group (which are both considered more deserving). Low burden does not have a positive effect on program approval though. *Compared to the no burden group, there is a negative effect of low burden in the SNAP + parolee condition (which are both seen as relatively less deserving). There is no positive effect of high burden. *Overall, however, the no burden condition seems most popular (see Figure 1 on page 7). This seems to contradict the findings from Keiser & Miller (2020). Furthermore, effect sizes are rather small! <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Results differ according to political party affiliation. Among Republicans, low burden has a negative effect on SNAP approval when the applicant is a parolee. Among Democrats, high burden has a negative effect on disaster food aid approval when the applicant is a veteran. It thus seems that the main effects can be reduced to the conditional effects.
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Palmer (2018) Caught in the crossfire: the competing influence of outcome and beneficiary cues on perceptions of antipoverty spending Politics, Groups, and Identities	<u>Place:</u> US (N=769 in study 1 and 516 in study 3) <u>Time:</u> 2010 for study 1, 2013 for study 3 *Note: only white, non-Hispanic respondents were analyzed, thereby excluding 253 respondents in study 1 and 145 respondents in study 3 (see p. 107 for a critical reflection on this) *Note: study 2 was based on a student sample	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing + information <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes + policy recipients (as a group)	EITC	Support for the EITC on a 5-point scale	Study 1: split-sample 1. Policy success + African American treatment 2. Policy success + Hispanic treatment 3. Policy failure + African American 4. Policy failure + Hispanic 5. Control group: only asked EITC question Study 3: split-sample Same 4 treatment groups and control group as in study 1, but adding: 5. Policy success + White treatment 6. Policy failure + White	<u>Main effects:</u> *Studies 1 and 3: only the Successful, Hispanic target failed to reach statistical significance. *It is clear than policy cues have a stronger effect, as support is always higher when the EITC program is described as effective/successful, regardless of the policy recipient cues. *According to the authors, “the negative manipulations are the most consistently influential, with each of the treatment indicators being negative and statistically significant (cf. negativity bias?). *Study 3: it does seem that the unsuccessful program is even less popular when the target is being described as African American compared to white. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Most notably in the African-American treatments, support increases among those with positive (racial) group stereotypes in the successful condition, while decreasing among those with negative stereotypes in the unsuccessful condition. Conversely, when prior beliefs are inconsistent with the treatment, the interaction is not significant.
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Pedersen & Larsen (2018) Putting a Number on Preferences: How Numerical Attitudes are Shaped by Ideology and Equivalency Framing International Journal of Public Opinion Research	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=1116) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> numerical (and equivalency) framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Unemployment benefits	(1) Preferred income gain/loss (per hour or month) for transitioning from full-time work to unemployment benefits, (2) Attitudes towards the unemployed and unemployment (e.g. “Many people are unemployed because they do not really want a job”)	Split-sample experiment: Politicians spent a lot of time discussing unemployment benefits during the election campaign. The Ministry of Employment has previously calculated how the current rules on unemployment benefits affect a family comprising 2 adults & 2 children, provided that 1 adult in the family is already receiving UB. 1. Calculations show that if the other adult transitions from full-time work to unemployment benefits, the economic loss will be 6 DKK per hour. 2. Loss of 1000 DKK per month 3. Gain of 6 DKK per hour 4. Gain of 1000 DKK per month	<u>Main effects:</u> *When the welfare-work gap was framed as a loss, respondents generally preferred it to be smaller, whereas if the gap was framed as a gain, they thought it should be larger. Similarly, if the gap was framed with a small denominator (per hour) rather than a large denominator (per month), voters were more likely to think the gap should be larger. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Right-wing voters want a larger welfare-work gap than left-wing voters. However, voters across the entire political spectrum want a larger difference than the status quo of 1000 DKK per month. *Furthermore, no side of the political spectrum is immune to the effects of numerical framing. Accordingly, “politicians can—by framing the same numbers differently—convince a left-wing voter that a meager welfare program is generous or a right-wing voter that a generous welfare program is meager”. *Subjective numeracy has little impact: those who feel comfortable with numbers are just as affected by framing as those who feel less comfortable with it.
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Pedersen (2019) Attitudes on the Size of Unemployment Benefits: Ideology and Numbers Scandinavian Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=1058 in exp. 1 and 2036 for exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2015	<u>Framing concept:</u> numerical framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Unemployment benefits	Exp. 1: preferred amount of unemployment benefits (weekly) Exp. 2: preferred benefit amount; opinions regarding the policy proposal and the party behind it	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Unemployment benefit of 4135 DKK per week 2. 17918 DKK per month (=equivalent to 1) 3. 6923 DKK per week 4. 7000 DKK per week 5. 30000 DKK per month Exp. 2: split-sample 1. 6923 DKK/week 2. 7000 DKK/week 3. 7078/week	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: Preferred benefit levels are markedly lower for respondents exposed to the current level of benefits than for respondents exposed to the higher level. *Exp. 1: A very large share of respondents (48%) accepted the number presented to them (=anchoring or demand effect?). *Exp.1: Preferred amounts were higher when respondents saw a weekly rather than monthly denominator (=unit effect). *Exp.1: Respondents presented with the precise anchor ended up with a mean preferred amount of 6116 per week, compared to 5705 for the slightly larger, but rounded, amount (=precision effect). *Exp. 2: confirms the precision effect on preferred benefit amount, but not for perceptions of the party providing the number. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: The anchoring effects are found among all subgroups of Danish voters (but are largest for left-leaning voters). Both the unit and precision effect are strongest among right-leaning voters (but also work for all respondents).
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Peffley et al. (1997) Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1841) <u>Time:</u> 1991? *Note: respondents are all white!	<u>Framing concept:</u> (counter-stereotypical) information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of (individual) welfare recipients	“Welfare”	Exp. 1: beliefs about welfare recipients' job-seeking efforts and likelihood to “have more children in order to get a bigger welfare check” Exp. 2: support for welfare policy	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Black women, high school dropout 2. Black women, high school graduate 3. White women, high school dropout 4. White women, high school graduate Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Program specially designed to help blacks + beneficiaries are people who have shown that they want to work their way out of problems 2. Help blacks + people who have trouble hanging onto their jobs 3. Help new immigrants from Europe (presumed to be white) + high work history 4. New immigrants + low work history	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: while judgments are more negative for the dropouts than the graduates, the differences across racial treatments are small and statistically insignificant. *Exp. 2: support is higher for those wanting to work but is not affected by recipients' race. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 2: Among whites with a negative image of blacks, support for welfare hinges heavily on the beneficiary. When the target fits their stereotypical expectations (i.e., blacks with a troubled work history), they are less likely to favor welfare programs for blacks than for immigrants who have the same troubled history (46.8% vs 61.7%) – a clear-cut instance of a racially discriminatory double standard. But when blacks are at odds with these stereotypes, whites' support shoots up to 92.8%, as compared to 71.9% for European immigrants. *Exp. 2: whites who reject negative characterizations of blacks unanimously support welfare, regardless of the beneficiary. *Exp. 1: highly similar results!
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Perna & de Reguero (2025) Intra-EU migration and Healthcare Deservingness: A Conjoint Experiment in Belgium and Spain Social Science & Medicine	<u>Place:</u> Belgium (N=1307) and Spain (N=1307) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual policy recipients	Healthcare	Priority access to healthcare: “Please, imagine that you work at the registration desk of a publicly-funded health centre in your municipality. You receive two patients who request to be visited by a doctor. Neither of them is in need of an emergency treatment; yet, they are not feeling well lately. Due to the long waiting list in the centre, you have one available slot for today as a scheduled visit was just cancelled. Therefore, you have to choose which patient is going to be visited today, which will lead the other patient to wait three weeks to be visited”.	Conjoin experiment varying the following characteristics: 1. Nationality: Belgian/Spanish, Danish, Italian, Bulgarian 2. Migration status: living in country since birth, residence of 6 years, residence of last 4 months 3. Responsibility over illness: inherited heart disease, heart disease caused by unhealthy diet and smoking 4. Employment status: employed, unemployed	<u>Main effects:</u> *In both countries, less priority is given when the depicted claimant is deemed responsible for their illness (strongest effect), when they are unemployed, when they are short-term residents, and when they have a different nationality (especially Bulgarian; to a lesser extent also Danish and Italian). *In both countries, there is evidence of a double standard: holding a foreign EU citizenship and being deemed responsible for ill-health, or holding a foreign nationality and being unemployed decreases profile favourability. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There are some country differences: being unemployed has a much stronger effect in Belgium compared to Spain, presumably due to the insurance-based character of its welfare regime and healthcare system (but could also be driven by higher unemployment rate in Spain). In Spain, by contrast, migration status has a stronger effect, possibly reflecting the fact that the universal Spanish healthcare system is based on citizenship/residency.
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Petersen et al. (2010) Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic European Journal of Political Research	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=2043 in study 1; 500 in study 2) <u>Time:</u> 2006	<u>Framing concept:</u> “information” <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Means-tested social welfare benefits	Exp. 1: Do you agree or disagree that the activation requirements should be made stricter (for the person depicted in the vignette)? Exp. 2: same as exp. 1 + perceived deservingness of the welfare recipient (“could get a job if (s)he wanted to” + “contributed enough to deserve social welfare”)	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. A young man 2. A woman in her fifties 3. A woman in her fifties with a work-related injury 4. An aged man who has been on the labour market all his life. Exp. 2: split-sample Same conditions as in exp. 1 + control condition (“a person who receives social welfare benefits”)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: respondents are most supportive of tightening the activation requirements for the young man. They are clearly less supportive when it comes to the woman with a work injury and the aged man. The woman in her 50ies without injury is in the middle. *Exp. 2: same ranking (but smaller effects) as in exp. 1, but the control condition is statistically indistinguishable from the young man condition. *Exp. 2: we see the same ranking for perceived deservingness <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: respondents’ political sophistication and egalitarianism do not change their reliance on deservingness cues. In other words, all respondents seem to have the same rank order in mind, irrespective of their political knowledge or egalitarian values.
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Ponza et al. (1988) The Guns of Autumn? Age Differences in Support for Income Transfers to the Young and Old Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1405) <u>Time:</u> 1986	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unspecified: “public assistance”	See Iyengar & Grosskind	See Iyengar & Grosskind	<u>Main effects:</u> See Iyengar & Grosskind. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Respondents under 35 years of age are more generous to both young families and elderly women than are respondents in any other age group. There are no significant differences between elderly and middle-aged respondents when it comes to awarding benefits to the young poor. *Older respondents appear less generous than younger respondents when awarding benefits to low-income elderly women (=counterintuitive finding?).
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Porumbescu et al. (2023) Can reducing learning costs improve public support for means-tested benefit programs? Policy Studies Journal	<u>Place:</u> New Jersey, US (N=1677) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)	(1) Knowledge of SNAP, and (2) public support for SNAP, measured as SNAP approval, perceived deservingness of SNAP recipients, and support for government spending on SNAP	Split sample: 1. Control group: no information about the SNAP application process and eligibility 2. Treatment group 1: basic information provided through a flyer 3. Treatment group 2: information provided through an eligibility screener, which broke the content into smaller blocks of info. 4. Treatment group 3: information provided through a video that uses worked examples to walk respondents through the blocks of information. *Note: the content of the information is equivalent across the three treatment groups.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Comprehension of SNAP was highest in the video (M=4.6), followed by the screener (M=4.1) and flyer (M=4.0). It was lowest in the control group (M=3.2). *The higher participants' SNAP comprehension, the higher their level of SNAP approval, perceived deservingness of its recipients, and support for government spending. Accordingly, it is also shown that SNAP comprehension has a statistically significant indirect effect on support for SNAP. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *This relationship does not seem to be moderated by respondents' political ideology, potential SNAP eligibility (measured by income and household size) and self-reported race.
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Qi & Haselswerdt (2024) Ideology, Information, and Social Welfare Preferences American Politics Research	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1000 in exp. 1 and 2177 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2020 for exp. 1; 2021 for exp. 2	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics, policy outcomes	Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF); Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)	Exp. 1: support for policy program Exp. 2: (1) program support for each program (rating task) + forced choice between programs (ranking task)	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Description of EITC + negative information about benefit fraud 2. Description of EITC + negative info about benefit inadequacy 3. Description of TANF + neg. info about fraud 4. Description of TANF + neg. info about inadequacy Exp. 2: conjoint 1. Policy description: EITC vs TANF 2. Policy problem I: inadequacy 3. Policy problem II: fraud (only shown for EITC; not TANF) 4. Funding: federal vs federal + state 5. Total cost per year 6. Time limit for receiving the benefit 7. Number of recipients	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the information treatments have no significant effects when the full sample is considered <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the fraud treatment had a larger negative impact among conservatives than liberals. Conversely, the inadequacy treatment had a larger negative impact among liberals (but only for EITC; not TANF). *Exp. 2: confirms exp. 1 regarding the inadequacy treatment, but adds that it also negatively impacted conservatives' policy support. *Exp. 2: in contrast to exp. 1, the negative impact of the fraud treatment did not significantly differ between liberals and conservatives. *Exp. 2: describing a program as being funded also by state governments or having a short time limit for benefit receipt boosted conservatives' support more than that of liberals.
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Reeskens & van der Meer (2018) The inevitable deservingness gap: A study into the insurmountable immigrant penalty in perceived welfare deservingness Journal of European Social Policy See also: Reeskens & van der Meer (2017) The Relative Importance of Welfare Deservingness Criteria (In: van Oorschot et al., 2017, The Social Legitimacy of Targeted Welfare: Attitudes to Welfare Deservingness)	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=23.015) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment insurance	The preferred replacement rate of unemployment benefit for the depicted recipient	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Country of origin (native vs migrant) 2. Length of residence (5 vs 12 years; for migrants only!!!) 3. Motivation to migrate (political refugee vs migrant worker) 4. Net salary 5. Family size 6. Age 7. Labour market trajectory 8. Reason for unemployment 9. Job-seeking efforts Note: some characteristics (age = male and former profession = tiller) were held constant across the vignettes.	<u>Main effects:</u> *The most important difference is caused by labour market reintegration strategies; those who are not actively looking for a job can count on little sympathy. *Second most important is the cause of unemployment: those fired because of their own poor work ethic receive considerably less support. *The third largest difference is caused by country of birth: the native Dutch is seen as more deserving than those born in other countries. However, the authors do not find a strong ethnic hierarchy. *External causes of unemployment do not make immigrants closer to being equally deserving as natives. Alternatively, immigrants are also not further penalized for a poor work ethos either. *Natives are rewarded more for their reintegration behavior than immigrants (=double standard?). *Overall conclusion: the deservingness penalty for migrants is sizable and inevitable/insurmountable. <u>Conditional effects:</u> see van der Meer & Reeskens (2021)
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Reeskens et al. (2021) The perceived deservingness of COVID-19 healthcare in the Netherlands: a conjoint experiment on priority access to intensive care and vaccination BMC Public Health	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=1461) <u>Time:</u> 2020 (mid-pandemic)	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Healthcare	Forced choice between two claimants: who should have priority access to intensive care unit (ICU) treatment? *note: the paper also deals with priority access to Covid-19 vaccination, but I consider this to be outside of the review's scope.	Conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Age: 27, 52, 77 2. Weight: healthy (BMI=22), unhealthy (BMI=31) 3. Compliance with Covid-19 policy measures: went on holiday to Barcelona in spite of a negative travel advice; cancelled the holiday 4. Occupation (before retirement): nurse, teacher, administrative assistant, unemployed	<u>Main effects:</u> *Most relevant is compliance with the Covid policy measures, with those not obeying to the measures receiving on average 31.5 percentage points less support in case of ICU access. *Compared to being a nurse, an unemployed patient is 23.4% less likely to be given priority and an admin assistant 11.5% less likely. There is no significant difference between nurses and teachers. *For ICU access, a penalty for obesity exists, of -7.4%. *Compared to a 27-year old, the elderly are 13.6% more deserving of ICU access. There is no significant difference with a 52-year old though. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *All respondents gave priority to the youngest over the oldest, irrespective of their age. *Only respondents considering themselves healthy penalized someone who is overweight. *Right-wing voters differentiate more between the profiles, especially with regard to the unemployed and obeying the rules.
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Rincon (2021) A Robin Hood for all: a conjoint experiment on support for basic income. Journal of European Public Policy	<u>Place:</u> Spain (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2019 *To maximize data quality, I exclude all responses from respondents who have taken less than 10 min to go through the whole survey, and keep only the observations from respondents who have completed the whole four conjoint rounds, with consistent responses (n = 748). Consistent responses are those which reflect the same preference in both dependent variables, i.e., that the policy selected in the forced choice is never rated lower than the other alternative in the support rate dependent variable.	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	(1) Support for the two policy proposals contrasted in the conjoint task (“how likely to vote in support for it”), (2) forced choice variable	Conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Target population subgroups 2. Conditionality 3. Legal requirements 4. Recipients 5. Generosity 6. Funding mechanism *Note: these characteristics represent broader categories collapsed from more fine-grained categories, reported in the appendix.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Targeting individuals in need increases support for a policy proposal, with a marginal mean of 4.48, which is higher than the average level of support and significantly higher than universal policies (4.17). *Unconditional policies gain lower support than average (with a marginal mean of 4.24), but this is not statistically different from other forms of conditionality. *Reducing universal welfare provision to finance a reform is a very unpopular mechanism (marginal mean of 4.0). Increasing inheritance taxation (4.14) and personal income tax for everyone (4.21) also generates low marginal means and, in fact, does not seem statistically different from reducing universal welfare state spending. In contrast, taxing the rich significantly increases support for a proposal (achieving a marginal mean of 5.09). *No other policy dimensions seem to have an effect on policy support. *Also interactions are tested: some of these are significant; others not. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Rincon et al. (2022) What's not to like? Benefit design, funding structure and support for universal basic income Journal of European Social Policy	Place: Finland (N=1000) Time: 2019 *To maximize data quality we exclude all responses that have taken less than 10 min. to go through the whole survey, and we keep only those respondents who have completed the whole four conjoint tasks, and whose responses across the two dependent variables are consistent (N=653).	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	See Rincon (2021)	See Rincon (2021)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Conditionality and funding appear especially relevant, whereas target groups, legal requirements, the unit of recipients and generosity do not have an effect on policy support. *Compared to an unconditional BI (marginal mean = 4.49), there is greater support for conditional types of BI (mean = 4.66). This is a rather small effect though? *While reducing costs from existing universal welfare schemes such as health, education and pensions to fund a UBI appear particularly unpopular, support isn't hindered as much when reducing costs from selective benefits such as low-income support or housing benefits. *On the tax side of funding proposals, we find that there is a strong demand for increasing taxes to the rich, which is the most popular of all attributes within the design (with a mean of 4.96). *Also interactions are tested: some of these are significant; others not. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Rincon (2024) Who's in for no strings: revisiting the determinants of universal basic income support Journal of Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Spain (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2019	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	See Rincon (2021)	See Rincon (2021)	<u>Main effects:</u> See Rincon (2021) <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Low-income respondents do prefer means-tested policies over universal ones, but they do not prefer attaching behavioural conditions over unconditionality. *There are no significant differences in preferences across income groups in the support given to the attribute of universality and unconditionality. *A result that is particularly striking is the lack of significant differences in preferences between the employed-unemployed, and the high vs. low risk individuals, especially in a highly dualized context like Spain. *The results do not convey hardly any cleavages in preferences – or statistically significant differences in support – across ideological groups, with the exception of those on the right higher support for conditioning on need and means-testing over a UBI, more so, than those on the left.
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Rodriguez et al. (2010) A randomized experiment of issue framing and voter support of tax increases for health insurance expansion Health Policy	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1203) <u>Time:</u> 2008 *Note: the sample was restricted to residents of Washington state	<u>Framing concept:</u> (issue) framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes + policy context	Health insurance	Willingness to pay additional taxes to ensure adequate and reliable health insurance for (1) all American citizens, (2) all children, regardless of citizenship, and (3) all military veterans	<u>Split-sample experiment:</u> 1. Control group: no information 2. Externalities frame: “Evidence indicates that the care of people with health insurance coverage is negatively affected in communities where lots of uninsured people live. For example, people with health insurance coverage who receive care in communities with high levels of uninsurance report worse access to emergency and specialty services compared to other people with health insurance” 3. Racial and ethnic disparities frame: “Evidence indicates that African-Americans and Hispanics are much less likely to have health insurance than White Americans. As a result, they often do not receive the care they need to manage chronic medical conditions like diabetes”	<u>Main effects:</u> *There were no statistically significant differences between voter support in the framing and control groups, nor between the two frames for any of the target groups under consideration. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There was no significant moderation by political party, satisfaction with health care, race/ethnicity, or anxiety about one’s own economic situation.
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Sahn et al. (2025) Equivalency Framing of Problems and Policy Solutions Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3510) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> (equivalency) framing <u>Framing content:</u> policy context/outcomes	Healthcare	Problem-framing experiment: (1) preferred government priority, anger about problem, perceived seriousness of problem, worry about problem Policy-framing experiment: approval of policy reform, willingness to sign petition to support the policy	Problem experiment: “The chance of surviving a life- threatening medical emergency can depend on how long it takes to get to a hospital. According to a recent report [80%, 20%] of Americans live [close enough to/too far from a hospital to get adequate care in case of an emergency”. Policy experiment: “Representatives in Congress have proposed a policy that would [increase/decrease] the number of Americans that live [cf. supra] a hospital to get adequate care. The policy proposal calls for a coordinated effort across the 50 states, the creation of public- private partnerships, etc. The price tag is estimated to be 10 billion per year. The policy is expected to [increase/decrease]...”	<u>Main effects:</u> *When problems are negatively framed-i.e., described in terms of the incidence of bad rather than good outcomes-, they generated more anger and worry and were perceived as more serious. *However, people’s opinions about the priority government should give to the problem and their support for policy remedies was largely unaffected by the framing, meaning that reactions to the gain- framed and loss-framed versions of the policy are almost identical. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There were no statistically significant differences between pure Independents, Democrats and Republicans.
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Sawler (2025) Who Benefits? How Gender Shapes the Perceived Deservingness of Welfare Claimants Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> US (N=1880) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Federal assistance/welfare	Budgeting task of allocating 1500 dollars across two applicants for federal assistance (with a limit of 900 each, which is supposed to represent their maximum need) The DV is in fact the dollar amount awarded to the treatment applicant against the dollar amount for the baseline applicant. *Note: respondents could also choose to divert some or all of the funds to “offset the state deficit”. It is, however, unclear how prevalent this choice was?	Split-sample: 1. “Excellent Sandra”: female applicant with an excellent work quality assessment (=baseline application rated by all respondents) 2. “Excellent Misty” 3. “Poor Misty” 4. “Poor James”: male applicant with a poor work quality assessment 5. “Excellent James” 6. “Poor Sammie” 7. “Excellent Sammie” *All names were selected to represent White applicants (hence, no testing of black welfare queen stereotype was possible)	<u>Main effects:</u> *When paired with Excellent James or Sammie, (excellent) Sandra is awarded significantly more (e.g., 642 vs 619 dollars). *There is no significant difference between Excellent Sandra and Excellent Misty. *There is a significant difference in the amount of aid awarded to Excellent Misty compared to Poor Misty (643 vs 611); however, there is no such difference between Excellent Sammie/James compared to Poor Sammie/James. *Overall, thus, women applicants receive more dollars than their otherwise-identical male counterparts, and women are disproportionately credited for good work histories, while this has no effect for male applicants. *In substantive terms, however, the differences are small relative to the total amount of aid awarded, as the average deservingness penalty never exceeds 100 dollars (which might be indicative of a general preference for equality). <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Schaeffer & Haderup Larsen (2023) Who Should Get Vaccinated First? Limits of Solidarity during the First Week of the Danish Vaccination Programme European Sociological Review	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=2514) <u>Time:</u> 2020 (during the Covid-19 pandemic)	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Healthcare	Priority access to Covid-19 vaccination (“who of these two persons should get vaccinated first”?)	Forced-choice conjoint experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Name: typically Nordic vs Muslim (signaling ethnic background) 2. Length of residence: born in Denmark vs one-year stay 3. Lifestyle: either healthy or unhealthy 4. Compliance with government guidelines: either following the guidelines on facemask wearing and social distancing or not *Note: age (55), gender (male), profession (supermarket cashier) and illness (diabetes) were held constant	<u>Main effect:</u> *Respondents saw the profiles as less deserving when they did not follow the guidelines (-21%), had diabetes because of an unhealthy lifestyle (-9.6%), had only been living in DK for one year (-13.6%), and had a Muslim name (-4.6%). *Having a Muslim name did not amplify the effect of having recently immigrated and vice versa. There is also little evidence of an extra penalty for immigrants/Muslims who did not follow gov. guidelines or had unhealthy lifestyles (as the effects are very small and not statistically significant at conventional levels). *However, recent immigrants continue to be seen as less deserving even when they fulfill the other deservingness demands. The same goes for Muslims. The only exception is that native-born Muslims who follow the gov. guidelines are no longer seen as less deserving of vaccination. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Men and less educated respondents are more likely to penalize Muslims, while women are more likely to penalize immigrants. Age, by contrast, did not have a moderating effect.
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Schueler & West (2016) Sticker Shock: How Information Affects Citizen Support for Public School Funding Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=2993) <u>Time:</u> 2012	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> spending levels	Education	(1) Spending preferences for government funding of local public schools (increase, decrease, stagnate), (2) Higher taxes to support local schools, (3) Preferred teacher salaries	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Do you think that government funding for public schools in your district should increase, decrease, or stay about the same? 2. Additional information on annual amount spent on each child attending public school in the relevant district. 3. Tax question 4. Tax question + information Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Do you think teacher salaries should increase, decrease, or stay about the same? 2. Salary question + information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: Support for increased funding drops from 62.5% in the uninformed to 42.9% in the informed condition. This comes about because most people underestimate current spending. *Exp. 1: Respondents are also less supportive of increasing taxes to fund public schools than of increasing school funding in the abstract. This tax effect is larger than the information effect. *Exp. 2: only 36.7% of informed respondents support higher salaries, as compared to 63.7% in the uninformed condition. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The effect of providing information regarding both current per-pupil spending and average teacher salaries is larger among respondents who underestimate what is currently spent. *However, even for respondents who accurately estimated spending, the information still decreases the probability that they support funding increases by 17%. This suggests that this is partly a priming effect (rather than an information effect).
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Schuetz et al. (2023) Pension reform preferences in Germany: Does information matter? European Journal of Political Economy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=849) <u>Time:</u> 2020-21 *More than 100 respondents were excluded from the analysis because their prior beliefs about demographic change were “above the 5th or below the 95th percentile”. I find this very strange!	<u>Framing concept:</u> information (or salience) <u>Framing content:</u> context characteristics (reform pressure)	Old-age pensions	(1) Perceived necessity of pension reform, (2) preference for pairwise comparisons of four specific reform measures (i.e., raise retirement age, lower benefit level, increase social security contributions, increase taxes)	Within-subject experiment Stage 1 (saliency): 1. Treatment 1: information that German pension system is organized as a PAYG and that it is necessary to look at the old-age dependency ratio + asked about prior beliefs 2. Treatment 2: idem. 3. Control group: no info + no prior beliefs Stage 2 (information): 1. Treatment 1: no info 2. Treatment 2: provided with correct information that old-age dependency ratio is 37. Respondents who were quite accurate in stage 1 were informed about this. 3. Control group Stage 3: preferences Stage 4: posterior beliefs (only treatment 2)	<u>Main effects:</u> *The majority of respondents who received the information on the correct ratios updated their beliefs. *Highlighting the salience of the topic leads to a marginally significant increase in the perceived reform necessity of 15.2% of a SD. So does the information treatment (+18.6%). Furthermore, the frames also increase the likelihood that respondents choose reform measures that could increase the financial sustainability of the pension system. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *In East-Germany, only respondents below the age of 50 react to the information treatment. In West-Germany, this effect is found for respondents over 50.
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Senghaas et al. (2022) The perceived fair duration of unemployment benefits for older workers. The role of lifetime achievements in the labour market. International Journal of Social Welfare	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=998) <u>Time:</u> 2019-2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment benefits	Maximum number of months the depicted person should be able to receive unemployment benefits (ranging between 0 and 99) *note: the status quo of 15 months was mentioned in the introductory text (=potential anchoring effect, but note that the max. duration was on average 24 months; see p. 10)	Factorial vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Gender 2. Contribution to unemployment insurance (17, 22 or 27 years) 3. Need (use savings or apply for means-tested Hartz IV benefits) 4. Activities other than employment (no info, parenting, parenting + training, self-employment, self-employed + training, unemployment, unemployed + training)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Of all the vignette features, it is the duration of the previous employment which causes the most important difference in the maximum benefit duration: + 2 months for contribution record of 22 years, + 3 months for 27 years. *When respondents received info that the person had been taking care of their 2 children in the meantime, the max. period perceived as fair was more than 2 months longer (but no interaction with the gender in the vignette). *Longer max. duration was also perceived fair if the benefit recipient followed further training, was female, and had some savings. Conditional effects: /
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Senghaas et al. (2022) Fairness perceptions regarding in-work benefits: A survey experiment International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=868) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	In-work benefits (but specifically: Arbeitslosengeld II in Germany)	The preferred level of (in-work) benefits provided to the person depicted in the vignette	Factorial survey randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Gender 2. Household composition (single, single parent, couple without children, couple with children) 3. Health status (no health restrictions, frequent back pain, depressive episodes) 4. Monthly net earnings after increase in working hours (€100, 400, 600, 1000) *All vignettes describe an in-work benefit recipient with an initial monthly earning of €50 who increases his or her working hours so that his or her monthly earnings also rise.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Single parents were granted a slightly yet significantly higher benefit retention rate than a childless couple. There is, however, no significant difference between the earnings retention rate considered adequate for a couple with a child and a childless couple. *Gender did not have a significant effect neither. *The monthly earnings have by far the strongest effects, with the retention rate being 14/19/28% lower for 400/600/1000 euro compared to 100 euro. *In-work benefit recipients with an illness are granted somewhat more generous public support. However, mental illness (depression) was associated with public support equally as generous as that for the physical illness of back pain (see also Baumberg Geiger!). <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Sievert & Bruder (2023) Unpacking the effects of burdensome state actions on citizens' policy perceptions Public Administration	<u>Place:</u> Germany (N=1602) <u>Time:</u> 2020 *Note: 146 respondents were excluded because they failed the attention check, and the sample is skewed towards higher-educated women (because of non-probability based sampling)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Unemployment benefits (Hartz IV)	(1) Scale for prejudices against the unemployed, (2) general approval of the Hartz IV program on a 7-point scale, (3) preferred spending on the program (more, less, the same)	First, participants received general information about the Hartz IV program (i.e. its goals, benefits and eligibility criteria) from an imagined friend (!!!!!) who is receiving the benefit. Then, they are randomly assigned to one of 8 treatment groups, each of which received a distinction combination of vignettes that represented the program's administrative burdens (i.e. learning demands, compliance demands, program sanctions). The vignettes imitated the program's website to resemble the official information material. *Note: the description of the experiment is unclear to me! For example, I don't even know whether it is a classic split-sample experiment or a factorial one ("8 treatment groups" vs "2x2x2 vignette experiment").	<u>Main effects:</u> *Neither learning demands nor compliance demands or sanctions exhibit significant effects on prejudices against the unemployed. *Information regarding program sanctions showed a significant <i>negative</i> effect on general approval of Hartz IV. By contrast, sanctions showed a significant <i>positive</i> effect on support for governmental spending on the program. *According to the authors, these seemingly contrasting findings "indicate general discomfort with the policy related to program sanctions and the expectation that higher spending should improve the program design". *Note: I think these effects are strongly driven by the fact that the experiment asks respondents to imagine one of their friends receiving unemployment benefits. This might explain why they differ from Keiser & Miller. It might also have to do with the different contexts (DE vs US), the fact that treatment heterogeneity was not examined here (perhaps left-wing and right-wing voters move in opposite directions?), or a left-wing bias in the sample?
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Slothuus & de Vreese (2010) Political Parties, Motivated Reasoning, and Issue Framing Effects Journal of Politics	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=925) <u>Time:</u> 2006 *Note: most of the paper focuses on respondents who indicate they voted for the Social Democrats or Liberals (N=379)	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue/party framing <u>Framing content:</u> arguments + source information	Elderly care	Support for policy proposal to privatize in-home care for senior citizens (measured on 7-point scale)	“Conflict issue exp.”: 1. Pro frame from Social Democratic party 2. Contra frame from Social Democratic party 3. Pro frame from Liberal party 4. Contra frame from Liberal Party (see online appendix)	<u>Main effects:</u> *In the restricted sample, opinion is significantly more supportive of contracting out in-home care in the pro-frame (M=.54) than in the con-frame (M=.45). This also holds for the full sample. *The source information (SD vs Lib) had no significant main effect. Neither did the overall two-way interactions between frame content and frame source. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Among Liberal voters, framing effects are greater if the Liberal party promotes the frame. The size of framing effects does not differ significantly across party sponsors for Social Democratic voters. *There is a substantial contrast effect among politically aware Liberal voters: if the Social Democrats frame the issue by emphasizing the disadvantages from contracting out, Liberals become even more supportive of contracting out. This is not found among Social Democratic voters.
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Smith (1987) That Which We Call Welfare by Any Other Name Would Smell Sweeter: An Analysis of the Impact of Question Wording on Response Patterns Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=?) <u>Time:</u> 1984/85	<u>Framing concept:</u> question wording <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare policies	“Welfare”, “assistance the poor”	Spending preferences for “welfare”/“assistance to the poor”	Split-sample: 1. “Welfare” 2. “Assistance to the poor”	<u>Main effects:</u> *While only 24.6% agreed that too little is spent on “welfare”, this increases to 64% for “assistance to the poor” in the 1984 General Social Survey. This further increases to 19.3% and 64.7% in the 1985 GSS. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Welfare is no more associated with respondents’ race than assistance to the poor is. Similarly, more tolerant racial attitudes are associated with preferences for more spending in both domains.
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Song et al. (2024) Verification of policy information and citizen attitudes toward government under COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from a survey experiment in South Korea Social Policy & Administration	<u>Place:</u> Gyeonggi-do province in South Korea (N=4005) <u>Time:</u> 2020	<u>Framing concept:</u> information provision <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Stimulus checks during COVID-19 (=universal, individual, unconditional cash benefit system)	(1) Satisfaction with the stimulus check, (2) willingness to pay extra taxes for social welfare	Split-sample experiment: 1. Treatment group: provided with accurate information from the Gyeonggi Research Institute stating that the province had provided the largest amount of local stimulus checks in all of South Korea. 2. Control group: no information	<u>Main effects:</u> / <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Providing correct information has a positive effect on satisfaction and willingness to pay taxes only when respondents already knew the correct information. Support did not increase when false beliefs were corrected for. *The positive effect from verification came from those who did not suffer an income loss during the pandemic; not from those who did not lose income. *Additionally, most of the verification effect for the well-informed group came from politically neutral and conservative subgroups; not from liberals. This finding suggests a ceiling effect, because liberal respondents already had high levels of satisfaction. *Critical note: the study's lack of observed correction of backfire effects is likely largely due to the small-number of ill-informed respondents (only 12% of the total sample gave a wrong answer!).
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Stadelmann-Steffen & Dermont (2019) Citizens' Opinions about Basic Income Proposals Compared – A Conjoint Analysis of Finland and Switzerland Journal of Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> Finland (N=1000) and Switzerland (N=1000) <u>Time:</u> 2016	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Universal basic income	Stated likelihood of approving the proposed basic income in a referendum on a scale from 0 to 100%.	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Amount for adults 2. Amount for children 3. Degree of universality 4. Interplay with other welfare schemes 5. Financing	<u>Main effects:</u> *The more restrictive a BI proposal is with respect to non-nationals, the more strongly citizens support it. *Citizens in both countries prefer more generous variants of a BI to more limited variants. This pattern is particularly pronounced in Switzerland where a generous monthly basic income garners the highest support. *Citizens exhibit higher levels of support for a BI that exists alongside other social benefits. *Citizens do not have clear preferences regarding the funding of a BI, but tend to prefer proposals that finance costs by cutting back other government expenditures. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Whereas citizens in Finland and Switzerland may have different levels of general support for BI proposals, they tend to evaluate the different elements of a concrete BI scheme in a rather similar fashion. *Different age, gender, education and political groups do not significantly vary in how they evaluate the various elements of our BI proposals.
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Stanley & Hartman (2018) Tax preferences, Fiscal Transparency, and the Meaning of Welfare: An Experimental Study Political Studies	<u>Place:</u> U.K (N=1932 in exp. 1; 2047 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> 2015 for exp. 1; 2014 for exp. 2	<u>Framing concept:</u> information and framing <u>Framing content:</u> tax information	“Welfare”	(1) Perceived budget for welfare, (2) preference towards welfare spending	Exp. 1: split-sample 1. Control 2. Tax summary with broad “welfare” category 3. Tax summary with welfare category disaggregated into 4 parts: personal social services, public service pensions, other benefit spending on pensioners and other benefit spending on those of working age. 4. Tax summary with 25 distinct categories *the experiment in fact had 9 treatments because respondents’ income was also used as a dimension. However, this is not discussed in the results section. Exp. 2: split-sample 1. Tax summary similar to treatment 2 in exp. 1. 2. Tax summary similar to treatment 3 in exp. 1. (see p. 841)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: while the effect size is modest, citizens who receive the broad welfare category are more likely than those in the control condition to say that a larger portion of their tax money is spent on welfare (=increased knowledge). There was, however, no statistically significant effect on support for welfare spending. *Exp. 2: citizens who received information about “welfare” as a broad category were more likely to think that the government is already spending too much on welfare. *It is not explained why the two experiments point to opposing results. Important notes: - Almost 30% of the sample is removed because they did not pass the attention checks. This is common in experiments such as these. But doesn’t this lead to overly positive results, as not everyone is equally receptive of frames in the real world? - 25% of the respondents had already received an official tax summary from the government (= pretreatment effect!)
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Stenderup & Pedersen (2025) Compliance burden versus program integrity protection: A survey experiment on citizen attitudes toward administrative documentation requirements in public service policy Public Administration Review	<u>Place:</u> Denmark (N=2004) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics + policy outcomes	“Employment policy, encompassing the allocation of social security, unemployment benefits, and early retirement rights”, and “specialized social policy, encompassing the allocation of public subsidies to cover additional expenses for adults with disabilities”.	Support for a policy reform either eliminating certain administrative documentation requirements, or introducing them.	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Change in administrative documentation requirements: adding or removing 2. Target group of reform: citizens or public employees 3. Policy area: employment policy, specialized social policy, (business subsidy policy) 4. Program integrity: increased or decreased fraud/waste/abuse (see online Appendix for details!)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Citizens tend to favor policy reforms that remove requirements over reforms that add them (+0.31 on a 7-point scale, which is considered a “small effect”). *This preference for removal over addition is most pronounced for specialized social policy (b=0.57), showing significance but weaker strength in employment policy (b=0.34). This might have to do with the higher perceived deservingness of the disabled. *Citizens’ attitudes do not depend on whether the change in requirements applies to citizens or to public employees. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is a significant interaction between ideology and changes in requirements: left-leaning citizens tend to view reforms that add these more unfavorably than their right-wing counterparts. However, both left-wing and right-wing voters show a clear preference for reforms that remove requirements. *While personal experience within the policy area appears to increase opposition to adding requirements, experience as a public employee did not have such an effect.
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Tesler (2012) The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. American Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=3147) <u>Time:</u> 2009	<u>Framing concept:</u> (source) framing <u>Framing content:</u> information about frame messenger	Health care	Health care support scale (i.e., support for public, federally provided healthcare policy proposal for all Americans; consequences of the policy and feelings about it)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Obama-framed condition: the policy proposal was ascribed to president Obama. 2. Clinton-framed condition: the proposal was ascribed to president Clinton during his 1993 reform efforts. 3. Neutral condition: stating that “some people” have made the policy proposal.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Health care support was not higher in the Clinton condition than in the Obama condition. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The Obama frame caused racial attitudes to be a more important determinant of health care support. *Moving from least to most racially resentful decreased support for health care by 23% of the scale’s range in the Clinton condition and 40% in the Obama condition – a statistically significant difference. *Racial resentments’ impact on health care support among Obama-group respondents was not statistically different from its neutral-condition impact. The most probable reason is that the neutral-group respondents connected Obama to their health care support even when no cue was provided (=pretreatment effect and “ceiling effect that limits the additional framing”). *The effects of non-racial factors such as partisanship and ideology were not larger in the Obama condition than they were in the two other experimental groups.
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Thomas et al. (2023) Mitigating welfare-related prejudice and partisanship among U.S. conservatives with moral reframing of a universal basic income policy Journal of Experimental Social Psychology	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=629 in exp. 1; 701 in exp. 2; 599 in exp. 3) <u>Time:</u> ? *Note: exp. 2 & 3 only had conservative respondents	<u>Framing concept:</u> (moral re)framing <u>Framing content:</u> moral values, policy outcomes	Universal basic income	Exp. 1: (1) policy support, (2) resistance to counterarguments, (3) stereotypical beliefs about UBI recipients, (4) perceived moral fit, (5) desire to receive UBI, (6) perceived policy effectiveness Exp. 2: idem to exp. 1 but additionally (1) open-ended question on characteristics of UBI recipients, and (2) attitudes towards poor people Exp. 3: idem to exp. 1 but additionally (1) commitment to the unconditionality of UBI, stereotypical beliefs about current welfare recipients	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Control condition: policy details alone 2. Freedom treatment: framing that UBI would promote individual autonomy and freedom 3. Security treatment: framing that UBI would protect Americans against financial shocks Exp. 2: 1. Control 2. Freedom 3. Freedom plus: adding the message that “with financial freedom, individual Americans can capitalize on their own strengths and on the strength of America. Exp. 3: 1. Control 2. Freedom treatment	<u>Main effects:</u> / <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Exp. 1: the freedom message significantly increased support for UBI among conservatives, shifting the average from moderate opposition (M=3.08) to slightly above the scale midpoint (M=4.24). The security message had no effect. *Exp.1: the freedom message also increased conservatives’ resistance to counterarguments against UBI, decreased their belief that recipients would become dependent, increased the perceived moral fit of UBI, etc. *Exp. 1: neither message had a significant effect on liberals’ support, which was quite high in all conditions (=ceiling effect?) *Exp. 2: the freedom plus treatment also had a positive effect, but this was weaker than that of the freedom treatment. *Exp. 2: conservatives showed significantly less negative stereotyping in the freedom condition (in the open question). Exp. 3: conservatives did not become more supportive of the unconditionality aspect nor more positive towards welfare recipients.
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Thorp & Larner (2024) Responsibility for impairment shapes the perceived deservingness of welfare claimants with disabilities Political Psychology	<u>Place:</u> Wales (N=3393) and Scotland (N=1707) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Disability benefits	Perceived deservingness of government assistance and perceived responsibility for impairment	Study 1 in Wales: vignette experiment, varying the following characteristics: - cause of injury (birth; motorbike; drugs) - ethnicity (David from Cardiff vs Khalid from Yemen) Study 2 in Scotland: vignette experiment, varying the following characteristics: - cause of injury (birth; motorbike; drugs) - ethnicity (David vs Khalid)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Study 1: David & Khalid were seen as most responsible for their disability when it was acquired by using illicit drugs, and least responsible when it was acquired at birth, with motorcycle accidents failing in the middle. *Study 1: David was seen as most deserving in the birth treatment and least deserving in the drugs treatment. This was not the case for Khalid, who was seen as less deserving in the birth treatment compared to the motorbike treatment. Outside of the birth treatment, Khalid was not perceived any more or less deserving than David. *Study 2: Respondents considered Khalid to be less deserving than David in both the birth and drugs treatment. “However, the magnitude of the effects observed here are negligible”. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Left-right values did not moderate these effects. By contrast, more authoritarian respondents only assigned lower levels of deservingness to the subject in the drugs condition (in study 2) and also reacted stronger to the name treatment (in study 1).
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Thorson & Trump (2024) The Effects of Wage Information on Support for Redistributive Spending American Politics Research	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1006 for study 1 and N=2332 for study 2) <u>Time:</u> 2014 for study 1 and 2021 for study 2	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> contextual information	Support for redistributive policies (food stamps, welfare, child care, Medicaid, EITC, minimum wage, guaranteed income, college education)	Index scale of support for spending on redistributive policies	Study 1 (“explorative”): 1. Information treatment (=estimating the salary of several high- and low-wage occupations, and then information about real salaries) 2. Network treatment (=participants were asked whether and how closely they knew anyone in these occupations) 3. Information + network treatment 4. Control group Study 2 (“main”): 1. Same as study 1 2. Low-income occupations only 3. Only information about low- and high-wage occupations (no estimates) 4. Only information about low-wage occupations (no estimates) 5. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Study 1: people exposed to information became more supportive of redistributive spending. *Study 2: Information about low-income salaries significantly increased support for redistribution, but the effect is substantively very small. *Study 2: the contrast with high-income occupations and estimation prompt had no significant effects. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Study 1: while the information effect occurred among all respondents, it was largest among people who knew someone in a low-income occupation. *Study 2: the effects do not vary by respondent partisanship or empathy. *Study 2: none of the treatment effects are statistically significant among respondents who reported knowing at least one person in a low-wage occupation. *Notes: the opposing effects in study 1 and 2 are ascribed to possible pretreatment bias and ceiling effects (see p. 7).
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Toossi (2022) Think of the children? The effect of children on support for welfare. Public Opinion Quarterly	<u>Place:</u> US (N=3091) <u>Time:</u> 2020 *Note: the sample originally consisted of 3872 participants, but all those who did not pass the attention check were excluded.	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of (individual) welfare recipients	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)	Should spending on SNAP increase, decrease, or remain unchanged?	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control group: description of SNAP, without reference to children. 2. Text only condition: mention of children ("20 million children" receiving SNAP). 3. Text & black image condition: addition of an image showing black children between the age of five and ten. 4. Text & white image condition 5. Text & diverse image condition (black, white, Hispanic)	<u>Main effects:</u> *Relative to those in the control condition, participants in any of the treatment conditions were 8% more likely to support SNAP, which was statistically significant as well. *Effects are supposedly more pronounced when children are not explicitly racialized or characterized as diverse or white than when they are characterized as black, though only those of the text & diverse image and text & black image are statistically distinguishable from one another (+10% compared to +6%). <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Among black respondents, simply mentioning children or characterizing them as black produces large effects (compared to white respondents), raising the likelihood of supporting SNAP by 16% and 10%, respectively. *Evaluations of SNAP are group centric among Republicans, while Democrats' support for the program increases uniformly across different characterizations of its child beneficiaries.
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van den Heijkant et al. (2024) Justice Matters. News Framing Effects on Opinions about Pension Reform Work, Ageing and Retirement	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=762) <u>Time:</u> ? *Note: all those who responded in less than 5 seconds were excluded from the analysis (=70 participants)	<u>Framing concept:</u> framing, information <u>Framing content:</u> unclassified	Old-age pensions	Preference for a collective pension system + preference for an individual system “What type of pension system would you prefer in the Netherlands? (1=completely individual system, 7=completely collective system)”	Split-sample experiment randomly varying the responsibility, justice and news media type: 1. Newspaper article stating that individual responsibility (as recommended by the Ministry) is just (according to employers and trade unions) 2. Same as 1, but unjust 3. Newspaper, collective responsibility, just 4. Same as 3, but unjust 5. Facebook post stating that individual responsibility is just 6. Same as 5, but unjust 7. Facebook, collective responsibility, just 8. Same as 8, but unjust 9. Control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Citizens who were exposed to a news frame stressing collective or individual responsibility for pensions showed a greater preference for such a basis for a future pension system. However, this effects was only positive if the relevant form of responsibility was also framed as being just. Framing collective or individual responsibility for pensions as unjust, by contrast, evoked a negative effect on citizens’ preferences for such a system. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The interaction between age (presented as “age-based self-interest) and the responsibility frame was not significant. Also the interaction with people’s sense of solidarity was not significant. *There was a significant interaction between education (“education-based self-interest” and the frame, in the sense that lower-educated people are more strongly (positively) impacted by it than higher-educated people. *There was no significant interaction between the frames and exposure to participants’ primary mode of news use (print media vs social media).
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Van der Meer & Reeskens (2021) Welfare Chauvinism in the Face of Ethnic Diversity: A Vignette Experiment Across Diverse and Homogeneous Neighborhoods on the Perceived Deservingness of Native and Foreign-Born Welfare Claimants European Sociological Review	<u>Place:</u> the Netherlands (N=23.015) <u>Time:</u> 2014	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Unemployment insurance	The preferred replacement rate of unemployment benefit for the depicted recipient	Vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Country of origin (native vs migrant) 2. Length of residence (5 vs 12 years; for migrants only!!!) 3. Motivation to migrate (political refugee vs migrant worker) 4. Net salary 5. Family size 6. Age 7. Labour market trajectory 8. Reason for unemployment 9. Job-seeking efforts Note: some characteristics (age = male and former profession = tiller) were held constant across the vignettes.	<u>Main effects:</u> Reeskens & van der Meer, 2018 <u>Conditional effects:</u> *The effect of the share of non-Western migrants in the neighborhood is non-significant if the welfare recipient is native. *By contrast, we find significant effects of neighborhoods' ethnic composition on perceptions of migrants' welfare deservingness (for three out of four groups of migrants). In homogeneous neighborhoods, the probability that natives propose to offer less than 70% of the previous wage is 40% for an economic migrant and 29% for the native migrant. This is 46% and 19% in diverse neighborhoods. *The cross-level interaction effects between the share of non-Western migrants in the neighborhood and the other vignette attributes are not significant. *The economic neighborhood variables do show significant interaction effects with some of these attributes (see p. 96-98).
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Wang (2023) Disentangling the Welfare Puzzle: Framing Effects on Public Attitudes towards SNAP Journal of Education & Social Policy	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=615) <u>Time:</u> unknown	<u>Framing concept:</u> media framing <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)	Spending on SNAP (increase, decrease, status quo)	Split-sample experiment: 1. News story with negative tone + white race of target 2. News story with positive tone + white race of target 3. News story with negative tone + black race of target 4. News story with positive tone + black race of target 5. News story with negative tone + Latino race of target 6. News story with positive tone + Latina race of target *Note: in all news stories, the SNAP recipient as a mother with two children	<u>Main effects:</u> *The tone of the news story had no statistically significant impact. Neither did the condition that the SNAP recipient had a black-sounding name. *Respondents were more likely to support decreasing government spending when the perceived race of a SNAP recipient in a news story is Latina compared to those who read a news story about a white SNAP recipient. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Ward & Denney (2021) Welfare chauvinism among co-ethnics: Evidence from a conjoint experiment in South Korea International Migration	<u>Place:</u> South Korea (N=1200) <u>Time:</u> 2018	<u>Framing concept:</u> priming <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of welfare recipients and fiscal costs	Social housing	(1) Determining priority for social housing between two hypothetical profiles (assuming the role of municipal housing bureaucrat), (2) How much the chosen application should be required to pay (=recipient contribution requirement)	Choice-based conjoint experiment, varying the following attributes: - origin/location - age - income - gender - health - occupation - criminal record + split-sample experiment: (1) high public cost (2) low public cost (3) control group	<u>Main effects:</u> *Applicants from another jurisdiction in South Korea are about 5% less likely to be preferred compared to local applicants. This increases to 10% for applicants from North Korea or Koreatown in L.A, and 17% for applicants from China. *Applicants who are older, married (especially when also having children), female, employed, low-income and without a criminal record are all more likely to be chosen. *Informing respondents that there is a public cost results in higher rents charged: 191% more in case of high costs, and 45% more in case of low cost (=priming effect). *When given the opportunity to force chosen applicants to contribute to the cost of their social housing, respondents generally did not opt to charge more to those who they were more likely to discriminate against. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *No substantive differences are found across select demographic, socioeconomic and political characteristics.
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Wetts & Willer (2018) Privilege on the Precipice: Perceived Racial Status Threats Lead White Americans To Oppose Welfare Programs Social Forces	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=147 in exp. 1 and 236 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> unknown (only white participants?)	<u>Framing concept:</u> information <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of macro-level context + policy recipients	“Welfare” (TANF) and unemployment insurance	Exp. 1: fictional task of cutting 500 million dollars from the federal budget as a Congressional committee member. How much would you cut on TANF? Exp. 2: support for TANF or UI (put into composite measure of program support)	Exp. 1: split sample 1. Majority salient condition: graph showing that White Americans’ population share is expected to remain about 60% of the population. 2. Decline salient condition: graph showing that whites’ population is expected to fall to about 40% Exp. 2: Treatment 1: 1. Gap expanding condition: information that income gap between whites and non-whites has returned to previous (unequal) levels. 2. Gap closing condition Treatment 2: 1. TANF beneficiaries are mostly African American or Latino and UI mostly benefits whites. 2. Opposite information	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: White participants in the decline salient condition reported significantly greater opposition to welfare than those in the other condition (cutting 51 billion compared to 28 billion). *Exp. 2: There was significantly less support for TANF than for unemployment insurance. *Exp. 2: there were no significant main effects of exposure to the gap closing condition or the racial composition of program beneficiaries. Exp. 3: White participants did show uniquely low support for programs that benefited minorities if they had been told that the white income advantage is closing. When evaluating programs they believed benefited primarily whites, white participants who were told the racial income gap was shrinking did not differ in their program support from those who were told the gap was widening. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Participants’ racial identification did not moderate the interaction between the gap closing condition and race of program beneficiaries.
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Will (1993) The Dimensions of Poverty: Public Perceptions of the Deserving Poor Social Science Research	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=±1320) <u>Time:</u> 1986	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare families	“Welfare”	“What should this family’s weekly income be? Include both the money already received from sources other than the government, and any public assistance support you think this family should get”.	Factorial vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Number of children 2. Marital status 3. (Work) situation of the father 4. Mothers’ employment status 5. Mothers’ education 6. Marital status of the father (in case of divorce) 7. Financial prospects 8. Financial aid from mothers’ parents 9. Savings 10. Total family income *Note: “illogical” combinations were excluded	<u>Main effects:</u> *The employment characteristics of both parents had a strong effect. Most notably, when the father was disabled, respondents granted more generous awards (+26\$) compared to when he was employed. If the father was unemployed but looking for work or in prison, generosity increased with 12 and 6\$. If the father was unemployed and not looking for a job, generosity decreased by 7\$. *Also the mothers’ employment situation had an impact: especially unemployed women who were not looking for a new job because it would only be paid at the minimum wage were penalized with 20.5 \$less (compared to working full-time). They were also penalized if they weren’t looking because they lacked transport or when the reason was not specified. *Generosity also increased with the number of children, predicted financial difficulties for the next couple of years (but not “continually in the future”), and families’ lack of savings/income. *The age of the children and the marital status of the parents did not have any significant effect. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Wu (2021) Work Requirements and Perceived Deservingness of Medicaid American Politics Research	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1650 in exp. 1; 1075 in exp. 2) <u>Time:</u> unknown	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients + policy design	Medicaid (health insurance)	Exp. 1: (1) attributed blame for sickness and lack of insurance, (2) perceived deservingness of government support and Medicaid, (3) perceived cost burden Exp. 2: (1) support for Medicaid (expansion), (2) willingness to pay more in tax, (3) support for work requirements	Exp. 1: vignette experiment randomly varying the following characteristics: 1. Health: Type-II diabetes due to unhealthy diet vs Type-I diabetes due to family history (=responsibility) 2. Employment: working full-time vs laid off vs fired (=reciprocity) Exp. 2: 1. Policy treatment: Medicaid vs Medicaid + info (see p. 40) 2. Recipient treatment: responsible vs irresponsible (see p. 40) *Note: the recipients' descriptive characteristics are held constant across the vignettes (incl. race). I argue, however, that this biases the results because the randomly varied characteristics will interact with the fixed characteristics.	<u>Main effects:</u> *Exp. 1: if the illness is due to an unhealthy lifestyle, the recipient is seen as bearing greater responsibility for the illness and for lacking insurance, and is considered less deserving of federal support and Medicaid. *Exp. 1: the employment treatment does not have similar effects. Only when the recipient is fired, he is blamed more for lacking insurance. *Exp. 2: according to the authors, "the results suggest that programmatic support is contingent on both how the policy works (i.e., eligibility requirements and how it's funded) as well as who is benefitting from the program." *Exp. 2: however, tables 6 & 7 show that there are barely any statistically significant effects. *Exp. 2: The authors also argue that "learning about eligibility requirements for Medicaid makes respondents view work requirements as marginally more appropriate." However, I don't really see this in any of the reported regression tables. <u>Conditional effects:</u> /
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Yang & Hopkins (2025) Does Administrative Burden Influence Support for a Low-Income Child Care Supplement? Evidence from a Survey Experiment Canadian Journal of Political Science	<u>Place:</u> Canada (N=821) <u>Time:</u> 2022	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> policy design characteristics	Childcare (low-income supplement)	(1) Support for the hypothetical low-income childcare supplement, (2) willingness to pay extra taxes for it; (3) perceived deservingness	Split-sample experiment: 1. Control condition: information about childcare and cash supplement for low-income families 2. Low-burden condition: automatic enrollment 3. High-burden condition: complicated enrollment procedure *Note: in all conditions, the text mentions that “childcare will be too expensive for many families” and that “without access to childcare, low-income parents, especially women, cannot fully participate in the economy”. This seems like framing to me, which can have an influence on the frame being tested (interactions with fixed factors!). *Note: the low- and high-burden conditions differ significantly in the length of the text	<u>Main effects:</u> *Both people in the low-burden and high-burden condition showed a significantly lower level of support than those in the control condition. However, this effect disappears for the low-burden condition when pre-treatment covariates are added to the model (the question is: why??). *There is no significant difference between the low- and high-burden conditions with regard to support. *There is no evidence of treatment effects on people’s willingness to pay and deservingness opinions. *Overall, there is thus “no substantial effect of administrative burden on public attitudes toward a low-income childcare supplement”. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *There is evidence of significant heterogeneity of treatment effects by political party and gender.
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Yeung (2022) Can Conservatives Be Persuaded? Framing Effects on Support for Universal Basic Income in the US Political Behavior	<u>Place:</u> U.S (N=2539) <u>Time:</u> 2021	<u>Framing concept:</u> issue framing, persuasion <u>Framing content:</u> policy outcomes	Universal basic income	Support for UBI (on 7-point scale), open-ended question to explain their views, perceived partisan ownership of UBI (Democrats or Republicans)	Split-sample experiment: 1. Equalizing-opportunity frame 2. Limiting-government frame 3. Control group (only description of UBI) (see p. 8)	<u>Main effects:</u> / <u>Conditional effects:</u> *None of the frames had a significant impact on conservatives' support for UBI (M=1.28 in control group; and around 1.37 in both treatment groups). *There is also no evidence that the frames had a larger positive effect on conservatives than on liberals. *Importantly, most conservative respondents (75%) associated UBI with the Democratic party, believing that Democratic politicians are more likely to support UBI (=messenger effect!).
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Zhirkov et al. (2023) Measuring Support for Welfare Policies: Implications for the Effects of Race and Deservingness Stereotypes Journal of Experimental Political Science	<u>Place:</u> U.S. (N=1271) <u>Time:</u> 2022 Note: only non-Hispanic whites were recruited	<u>Framing concept:</u> unspecified <u>Framing content:</u> characteristics of individual welfare recipients	“Welfare” (TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, housing assistance)	(1) Spending on welfare in general, (2) additive index of spending on specific welfare programs (TANF, Medicaid, SNAP, housing assistance) Note: this is a conceptual replication of an earlier study (Myers et al., 2022), which had the same experimental set-up but different ‘attitudinal’ dependent variables (p. 4). It is, however, unclear whether these other DVs were also included in this study or only in the previous one.	Conjoint experiment randomly varying: 1. The race of the welfare recipient (black, Hispanic, white) 2. The job-seeking efforts of the recipient (seeking vs not seeking) ...and others (see Myers et al., 2022).	<u>Main effects:</u> *When the attitude measures are used, stereotyping welfare recipients as being nonwhite does not significantly predict welfare opinions (as in Myers et al., 2022). *However, when using the spending measures we find that stereotyping welfare recipients as black significantly suppresses support for welfare. *In contrast to Myers et al. (2022), stereotypes about immigration status do not predict support for welfare spending. <u>Conditional effects:</u> *Stereotyping welfare recipients as black leads to lower support for welfare spending only among racially conservative whites. *There is no statistically significant interaction effect for the measures used in Myers et al. (2022)
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